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Abstract	
Addressing	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	of	 anthropogenic	 climate	 change	 is	 one	of	
the	 most	 pressing	 challenges	 facing	 the	 world.	 A	 range	 of	 social	 and	 technical	
responses	 to	 this	 challenge	have	been	proposed,	which	 –	 if	 successfully	mobilised	 –	
can	limit	dangerous	climate	warming	through	a	transition	to	a	low-carbon	and	resilient	
society.	The	role	of	the	nation	state	in	governing	such	a	large-scale	transition	is	often	
presumed,	 but	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 highly	 uncertain.	 At	 a	 time	when	 political	 and	 economic	
trends	 in	 Western	 Europe	 have	 made	 government	 intervention	 and	 investment	 in	
climate	policies	particularly	difficult,	this	thesis	offers	a	timely	analysis	of	the	politics	of	
climate	change	in	the	UK.	
Drawing	 on	 extensive	 qualitative	 data	 this	 thesis	 addresses	 four	 questions.	 First,	 to	
what	 extent	 do	 current	 approaches	 to	 describing	 and	 prescribing	 low-carbon	
transitions	adequately	address	their	social	and	political	dimensions?	Second,	how	have	
the	fundamental	ideas	of	climate	change	politics	and	economics	changed	during	2006-
2016?	 Third,	 what	 impact	 have	 these	 changes	 had	 on	 climate	 and	 energy	 policy	
outputs?	And	finally,	where	are	the	governance	innovations	coming	from	and	what	is	
government’s	 role	 in	empowering	 them?	Multiple	analytical	 frameworks	are	used	 to	
answer	these	questions	in	four	distinct,	but	related,	articles.	
The	 first	 article	 offers	 a	 critical	 review	 of	 popular	 academic	 and	 governance	
approaches	 to	 sustainability	 transitions.	 The	 following	 three	 articles	 explore	 these	
theoretical	 claims	 through	 empirical	 analyses	 of:	 the	 fluctuating	 nature	 of	
institutionalised	 discourses,	 the	 rationalisation	 of	 renewable	 energy	 policy	
		
IX	
retrenchment,	 and	 the	ambiguous	 role	of	 the	 state	 in	 facilitating	a	more	polycentric	
approach	 to	 climate	 governance.	 This	 thesis	 argues	 that	 the	 complexity	 of	 climate	
change	as	a	political	 issue	 is	a	double-edged	sword,	which	provides	opportunities	for	
mobilising	 multiple	 sources	 of	 agency	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 but	 which	 also	 diffuses	
responsibility	 and	 creates	 unhelpful	 trade-offs	 between	 various	 interests	 and	 policy	
goals	on	the	other.	It	provides	new	theoretical	tools	for	analysing	this	paradox,	as	well	
as	new	empirical	insights	into	the	UK	case	study	and	beyond.	
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1.	Introduction	
This	 thesis	 addresses	 the	 increasingly	 important	 question	 of	 how	 industrialised	
societies	 can	 mitigate	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 Earth’s	 climate.	 In	 doing	 so,	 it	 raises	
significant	concerns	about	the	role,	and	capacity,	of	national	governments	in	steering	
and	 facilitating	 a	 timely	 transition	 towards	 a	 low-carbon	 future.	 It	 offers	 novel	
theoretical	 and	 analytical	 contributions	 to	 a	 social	 science	 understanding	 of	
anthropogenic	 climate	 change,	 including	 empirical	 contributions	 to	 policy	 and	
governance	 studies	 in	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (UK)	 and	 beyond.	 To	 begin,	 existing	
conceptualisations	 of	 how	 societies	 respond	 to	 the	 threats	 of	 climate	 change	 are	
critically	 examined	 and	 some	 suggestions	 are	 made	 for	 increasing	 the	 sensitivity	 of	
these	theories	to	issues	of	politics,	power	and	agency.	Then,	the	benefits	of	one	such	
approach,	discursive	institutionalism,	are	illustrated	through	an	analysis	of	interactions	
among	key	stakeholders	in	the	UK	climate	policy	area,	showing	how	the	meaning	and	
influence	of	fundamental	ideas	about	climate	governance	and	economics	has	changed	
over	 time.	 The	 effects	 of	 these	 ideational	 and	 discursive	 factors	 are	 then	 further	
demonstrated	 in	 the	 context	 of	 emissions	 reduction	 targets	 and	 low-carbon	 energy	
policy	decisions.	Finally,	the	limitations	of	national	government-led	climate	policy	and	
governance	 are	 enumerated	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 more	 polycentric	 options	 are	
critically	examined.	Ultimately	 these	contributions,	and	the	 in-depth	case	study	 from	
which	 they	 are	 drawn,	 serve	 as	 a	 warning	 against	 over-reliance	 on	 government-led	
transitions,	particularly	 in	 the	context	of	a	globalised	and	unpredictable	political	and	
economic	environment.	
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UK	climate	politics	and	policy	represents	a	timely	and	relevant	case	study.	In	response	
to	simultaneous	political,	scientific	and	economic	pressures	the	UK	parliament	almost	
unanimously	passed	the	Climate	Change	Act	(CCA)	in	2008.	This	legislation	was	the	first	
in	the	world	to	set	legally	binding	targets	for	reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	Even	
more	significantly	for	this	thesis,	it	institutionalised	a	policy	framework	for	setting	and	
monitoring	five-yearly	 interim	targets	with	the	expressed	aim	of	maintaining	political	
commitment.	Since	then	a	prolonged	economic	recession	and	a	shift	from	centre-left	
to	centre-right	administrations	has	put	 this	 framework	under	significant	pressure.	As	
such,	it	is	an	opportune	moment	for	conducting	a	detailed	case	study	of	the	social	and	
political	dimensions	of	governing	turbulent	transitions	towards	a	low-carbon	future.	
In	 this	 chapter,	 section	 1.1	 introduces	 the	 academic	 and	 empirical	 context	 for	 the	
thesis.	 This	 includes	 considerations	 of	 the	 broad	 nature	 of	 social-environmental	
change	and	the	way	they	are	articulated	through	large-scale	political	systems,	as	well	
as	 through	 specific	 inter-personal	 factors	 and	 governance	 strategies.	 The	 review	
highlights	 the	 need	 for	 a	 socio-political	 understanding	 of	 how	 social	 transitions	 are	
contested	and	governed,	and	in	particular	it	calls	for	a	critical	analysis	of	the	ideational	
foundations	 of	 state	 leadership	 and	 how	 this	 is	 problematised	 by	 new	 multi-actor	
forms	 of	 governance.	 Section	 1.2	 defines	 the	 overarching	 research	 aims	 and	
objectives,	detailing	how	four	specific	questions	are	addressed	in	order	to	meet	them.	
Section	 1.3	 offers	 a	 justification	 of	 the	 research	 methodology,	 which	 stems	 from	 a	
critical	 realist	 philosophy	 of	 science	 and	 incorporates	 a	 number	 of	 analytical	
frameworks	 and	 qualitative	 evidence	 sources.	 Section	 1.4	 briefly	 outlines	 the	 key	
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contributions	of	the	thesis	and	explains	the	way	they	are	structured	in	the	remaining	
chapters.	
1.1. Academic	research	context	
Broadly	speaking,	the	contributions	of	this	thesis	relate	to	three	specific	areas	of	social	
science.	Given	their	most	disciplinary	titles,	these	include:	1)	low-carbon	transitions,	2)	
political	 science	 and	 policy	 studies,	 and	 3)	 climate	 governance.	 There	 is	 significant	
theoretical	 and	empirical	 overlap	between	all	 three;	 therefore,	 this	 inter-disciplinary	
thesis	 combines	 analytical	 approaches	 from	 each	 in	 order	 to	 advance	 dialogue	
between	them	and	to	provide	multiple	perspectives	on	the	research	subject.	However,	
the	thesis	also	takes	a	critical	approach	to	these	disciplines,	challenging	some	of	their	
assumptions,	highlighting	limitations	and	pointing	out	tensions	between	them.	In	this	
section	some	crosscutting	themes,	concepts	and	questions	from	each	area	of	literature	
are	outlined	in	order	to	set	the	academic	context	and	rationale	for	the	thesis.	
1.1.1. Low-carbon	transitions	
1.1.1.1. Wicked	problems	and	 the	challenge	of	mitigating	anthropogenic	 climate	
change	
Paradoxically,	as	the	level	of	physical	scientific	certainty	about	the	global	atmospheric	
warming	effect	of	anthropogenic	greenhouse	gas	emissions	has	grown,	so	has	the	level	
of	social	scientific	uncertainty	about	how	best	to	govern	a	transition	towards	a	more	
climate	 compatible	 future	 i.e.	 one	 that	 is	 low-carbon	 and	 adaptive.	 The	
Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC)	has	regularly	published	reports	that	
collate	 the	 findings	 from	a	vast	number	and	 range	of	 scientific	 studies,	outlining	 the	
evidence	 that	 human	 activity	 is	 accelerating	 global	 atmospheric	 warming	 and	
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predicting	the	likely	impacts	as	well	as	the	steps	that	would	be	likely	to	be	needed	in	
order	 to	 avoid	 them.	 After	 years	 of	 publishing	 such	 work,	 in	 2014	 the	 IPCC’s	 Fifth	
Assessment	Report	(IPCC,	2014)	stressed	the	importance	of	greater	scientific,	political	
and	civic	coordination	in	order	to	achieve	a	society-wide	transformational	change.	The	
following	 year,	 at	 the	 21st	 Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	 (COP)	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	
Framework	 Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (UNFCCC)	 in	 Paris,	 the	 international	
community	 responded	 by	 agreeing	 to	 increase	 the	 stringency	 of	 their	 target	 for	 an	
acceptable	level	of	warming	from	2	to	1.5	degrees	Celsius1.	
Beneath	this	international	diplomatic	fanfare,	long	running	concerns	remain	about	the	
capacity	 of	 nation	 states	 to	 achieve	 the	 reduction	 of	 emissions	 necessary,	 even	 for	
reaching	 the	 previous	 2	 degrees	 Celsius	 target.	 These	 concerns	 relate	 to	 both	 the	
technical	and	political	feasibility	of	coordinating	fundamental	and	rapid	social	changes.	
For	 instance,	 although	 annual	 growth	 in	 the	 global	 renewable	 energy	 market	 is	
outpacing	that	of	fossil	fuels,	its	long-term	success	and	uptake	in	specific	countries	has	
been	stymied	by	policy	variability	and	a	 lack	of	 infrastructure	 investment	 (IEA,	2015;	
Frankfurt	School-UNEP	Centre,	2015).	Similarly,	at	an	aggregate	global	level,	emissions	
increases	have	slowed	in	recent	years	but	there	is	a	great	deal	of	variability	between	
countries	and	sectors	that	is	a	result	of	numerous	social,	political	and	economic	factors	
e.g.	 legislative	 activity	 and	 international	 and	 domestic	 socio-economic	 inequalities	
(Bailey	and	Compston,	2012;	Nachmany	et	al.,	2015;	PBL	Netherlands	Environmental	
Assessment	Agency,	2016).	
																																																						
1	 The	Agreement	entered	 into	 force	 in	October	2016.	At	 the	 time	of	writing	144	of	 the	197	
parties	have	ratified	the	Convention.	
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A	 clear	 indication	 of	 just	 how	 complex	 a	 challenge	 climate	 change	 poses	 is	 that	
engineers,	 climate	 scientists,	 political	 scientists	 and	 international	 organisations	 all	
regularly	describe	it	as	a	‘wicked	problem’	(Grundmann,	2016;	Incropera,	2015;	Stang	
and	Ujvary,	2015;	Sun	and	Yang,	2016;	Urry,	2016).	This	dramatic	sounding	designation	
is	 intended	 to	 highlight	 the	 fact	 that	 both	 the	 problem	 and	 its	 solutions	 are	 often	
cross-cutting,	contradictory	and	emergent.	This	has	led	to	calls	for	greater	reflexivity,	
learning,	and	socially	sensitivity	when	searching	for	–	and	implementing	–	solutions.		
After	a	century	of	(if	not	longer)	of	catastrophic	attempts	to	impose	ideological	social	
orders	 in	 the	 West	 there	 is	 now	 an	 underlying	 sense	 of	 critical	 pragmatism	 with	
regards	 to	 driving	 social	 change	 (see:	 Rorty,	 1999),	 which	 is	 expressed	 in	 specific	
instances	 by	 social	 scientists	 concerned	 with	 the	 politics,	 policy	 and	 governance	 of	
climate	change.	Within	this	field	it	is	assumed	that	the	appropriate	response	of	social	
science	 to	 the	 wickedness	 of	 the	 climate	 problem	 is	 to	 acknowledge,	 analyse	 and	
mobilise	multiple	 interpretations	of	 ‘what	ought	 to	be	done’	 i.e.	 to	avoid	 the	 lure	of	
any	 silver	 bullet	 solution	 (e.g.	 Bäckstrand,	 2010;	 Hulme,	 2009;	 Stirling,	 2011).	
Immediately	this	opens	questions	of	how	climate	change	is	understood	and	articulated	
and	 how	 society’s	 responses	 are	 enacted,	 providing	 space	 for	 critical	 scholars	 to	
challenge	the	assumptions	and	norms	of	dominant	theories	and	modes	of	governance.	
1.1.1.2. Building	resilient	social	and	ecological	systems	
‘Complex	systems	theory’	has	become	a	popular	and	influential	way	to	conceptualise	
(and	 intervene	 in)	 the	 interactions	 between	ecology	 and	 society.	 This	work	 seeks	 to	
explain	 how	 human	 systems	 (such	 as	 technology,	 the	 economy,	 culture	 and	
livelihoods)	evolve	over	time	and	in	tandem	with	ecological	systems	(such	as	the	global	
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climate,	 biodiversity	 and	 natural	 resources)	 (Fischer-Kowalski	 and	 Rotmans,	 2009;	
Foxon	et	al.,	2009).	Epistemologically	it	produces	a	functionalist	perspective,	focusing	
on	the	ebb	and	 flow	of	system	attributes,	with	an	overarching	normative	position	of	
working	 towards	 an	 ‘optimal’	 system	 state	 (an	 ontological	 assumption	 that	 is	
addressed	in	more	detail	in	chapter	2).	There	is	clearly	space	for	contesting	what	such	
an	 optimal	 state	 should	 be,	 but	 most	 often	 it	 is	 assumed	 to	 be	 a	 stable	 natural	
environment	 operating	 in	 harmony	with	 the	 human	 systems	 that	 depend	 on	 it.	 For	
instance,	the	notion	of	Earth	System	Governance	and	‘planetary	boundaries’	implies	a	
level	 of	 human	 control	 over	 ecosystems	 that	 should	 be	 exercised	 to	 provide	 for	 a	
certain	 (often	 presumed)	 way	 of	 life	 (Biermann,	 2007;	 Rockström	 et	 al.,	 2009).	
Similarly,	 a	 socio-technical	 perspective	 implicitly	 extends	 the	 modernist	 myth	 of	
unstoppable	technical	innovation	overcoming	environmental	challenges	(Bijker,	1997).		
Within	 these	 strands	 of	 eco-centric	 /	 techno-centric	 social	 science	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
identify	 some	 shared	 theoretical	 assumptions	 about	 what	 ‘system	 properties’	 are	
needed	in	order	for	society	to	successfully	respond	to	the	challenges	of	climate	change	
(Bailey	 and	 Wilson,	 2009;	 Foxon	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Typically	 this	 includes	 high	 levels	 of	
adaptive	capacity	(e.g.	changes	to	the	way	ecosystem	services	are	secured	in	response	
to	climate	change	impacts)	and	redundancy	(e.g.	renewable	energy	start-ups	that	drive	
innovation	 but	 don’t	 derail	 the	 train	 when	 they	 fail)	 (Tompkins	 and	 Adger,	 2004;	
Walker	 and	 Cooper,	 2011).	 In	 theory,	 what	 these	 attributes	 aim	 to	 achieve	 is	 a	
sufficient	level	of	resilience,	enabling	society	to	survive,	and	adapt,	to	the	pressures	of	
a	changing	climate.	
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But	 is	resilience	really	what	 is	needed	at	a	time	when	significant	and	rapid	emissions	
reductions	 are	 being	 called	 for?	 Furthermore,	 is	 a	 functionalist	 theory	 of	 system	
properties	sufficient	for	explaining	the	complex	social	determinants	of	such	significant	
change?	 Based	 on	 past	 examples	 of	 technological	 breakthroughs,	 some	 generalised	
transition	 pathways	 have	 been	 suggested	 (see	 figure	 1)	 (Rotmans	 and	 Kemp,	 2001;	
Geels	and	Schot,	2007),	as	have	some	specific	pathways	towards	a	low-carbon	future	
(in	 the	 UK:	 Foxon,	 2013).	 But	 neither	 provides	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 the	 power	
dynamics,	 personal	 interactions	 and	 institutional	 factors	 that	 affect	 individuals’	 and	
societies’	 capacity	 to	 drive	 such	 change.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 inherent	 conservatism	 of	
resilience	 as	 an	 overarching	 norm	 can	 be	 criticized	 for	 the	 limited	 forms	 of	 climate	
governance	 it	 gives	 rise	 to	 (see:	 Brown,	 2014;	Walker	 and	 Cooper,	 2011).	 As	 more	
transformational	aspirations	are	set,	 the	governance	recommendations	of	 transitions	
studies	need	to	be	revisited	and	expanded	to	cope	with	the	deeply	social	and	political	
nature	of	the	task	at	hand.	
  
		
8	
	
Figure	1.1:	A	typology	of	system	transition	phases	and	outcomes.	Source:	Vandevyvere	
and	Nevens	(2015).	
1.1.1.3. Governing	transitions	through	political	and	economic	turbulence	
The	literature	on	socio-technical	and	low-carbon	transitions	can	be	fairly	technocratic,	
as	 its	disciplinary	name	of	 ‘Transitions	Management’	suggests.	 It	contains	a	tendency	
towards	elitism	and	technological	determinism	inasmuch	as	a	small	number	of	leaders	
in	society	are	entrusted	with	envisioning	a	low-carbon	future	and	technical	experts	are	
expected	 to	pave	 the	way	with	material	 innovations	 that	 in	 turn	alter	 social	 systems	
(see:	Grin	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Interestingly,	 this	 elitism	 is	 obscured	 by	 the	 repeated	 adage	
that	 complex	 systems	 cannot	 ever	be	 fully	 controlled.	 It	 is	 claimed	 that	 through	 the	
management	of	certain	system	properties	(such	as	adaptive	capacity,	redundancy	and	
reflexivity)	deliberate	transitions	can	still	be	facilitated	into	existence	(Loorbach,	2010;	
Hendricks,	 2009).	 In	 theoretical	 terms	 this	means	 trusting	 in	 Schumpeter’s	notion	of	
‘creative	destruction’	and	Hayek’s	 free	market	dynamics	 to	 select	 the	most	effective	
drivers	of	change.	In	practice	this	means	setting	strategic	policy	goals	and	encouraging	
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entrepreneurialism	and	innovation	before	letting	market	forces	–	or	some	other,	often	
unspecified,	social	processes	–	select	the	winners	and	losers	(Grin	et	al.,	2010;	Walker	
and	Cooper,	2011;	Voß,	Smith	and	Grin,	2009).	
Although	 it	 is	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 liberal	 capitalist	 zeitgeist	 of	Western	 Europe	 and	
beyond,	this	form	of	governing	appears	to	be	at	odds	with	the	demands	of	a	long-term	
policy	problem	such	as	climate	change	 (Giddens,	2009).	 It	 cannot	be	entirely	 laissez-
faire,	as	the	overarching	goal	of	steering	society	towards	a	low-carbon	future	provides	
a	mandate	for	intervening	in	any	social	system	that	is	either	high-carbon	or	vulnerable	
to	 climate	 impacts	 (Hendricks,	 2009;	 Grin	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Voß,	 Smith	 and	 Grin,	 2009).	
However,	 the	reliance	on	market	 forces	to	select	 the	pathways	 for	change	presumes	
that	 the	 selection	 criteria	 are	 set	 to	 prioritise	 emissions	 reductions	 (as	 opposed	 to	
profit	 maximization	 or	 short-term	 interests).	 	 This	 is	 patently	 not	 the	 case	 in	many	
societies,	 despite	 the	 grand	 claims	 of	 green	 capitalism	 and	 ecological	modernisation	
(Bailey	et	 al.,	 2011;	 Prudham,	2009;	 York	 and	Rosa,	 2003).	 Linked	 to	 this,	 the	public	
and	political	 salience	 of	 climate	 change	 varies	 between	 sections	 of	 society	 and	over	
time	(Boykoff,	2008),	potentially	undermining	whatever	 legitimacy	governance	actors	
thought	their	vision	afforded	them	for	intervening.	
These	theoretical	and	practical	challenges	facing	the	transitions	governance	literature	
can	be	summarized	in	two	broad	questions:	1)	how	to	explain	and	overcome	the	social	
determinants	 of	 high-carbon	 inertia,	 and	 2)	 how	 to	 explore	 the	 disruptive	 effect	 of	
competing	 visions	 of	 the	 future.	 Evidence	 from	 the	 Netherlands	 (where	 transition	
management	 has	 its	 intellectual	 roots,	 and	 has	 been	 applied	 most	 directly	 by	
government	policies)	highlights	the	enduring	influence	of	incumbent	interests	and	the	
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ambivalence	of	a	flexible	discourse,	such	as	ecological	modernisation	(Smith	and	Kern,	
2009;	 York	 and	 Rosa,	 2003).	 Ultimately,	 the	 success	 of	 a	 particular	 transition	
governance	 initiative	 rests	on	how	effectively	 it	 redefines	 the	 rules	of	 the	game	and	
then	 maintains	 the	 legitimacy	 and	 impact	 of	 that	 arrangement	 over	 time	 i.e.	 its	
institutionalization	(‘stabilisation’	in	figure	1.1).		
Potential	barriers	to	this	success	story	include	individual	factors	(such	as	beliefs,	values	
and	 behaviour	 of	 decision	 makers)	 as	 well	 as	 collective	 ones	 (such	 as	 power	 and	
political	 structures)	 (Geels,	 2013;	 2014;	 Kern,	 2011;	 Shove	 and	 Walker,	 2010).	 In	
Western	 Europe,	 cultural,	 political	 and	 economic	 turbulence	 associated	 with	 the	
effects	of	globalisation	and	economic	recession	continue	to	challenge	the	legitimacy	of	
governing	elites’	discourses	about	 climate	 change	and	many	other	 issues	 (Burns	and	
Tobin,	 2016;	 Geels,	 2013;	 Žižek,	 2011).	 As	 such	 there	 is	 an	 opportunity	 for	 social	
science	research	in	these	contexts	to	begin	answering	these	critical	questions.	
1.1.1.4. Rationale	for	the	thesis	
Critical	 social	 science	 that	 recognises	 the	multiplicity,	 and	 limitations,	 of	 ontological	
and	epistemological	assumptions	is	well	suited	to	researching	‘wicked	problems’	such	
as	 climate	 change	 (Bhaskar,	 2010;	 Urry,	 2016).	 The	 physical	 and	 technical	 reality	 of	
human	 influences	 on	 the	 Earth’s	 atmosphere	 has	 been	well	 articulated	 (specifically,	
concentrations	 of	 greenhouse	 gases	 and	 their	 global	 warming	 effect).	 As	 current	
emissions	trajectories	and	naturally	occurring	atmospheric	processes	continue	to	push	
the	 climate	 system	 beyond	 ‘points	 of	 no	 return’,	 there	 is	 an	 increasing	 urgency	 to	
understand	 the	 social,	 as	 well	 as	material,	 factors	 that	 affect	 how	 quickly	 and	 how	
efficiently	humans	can	mitigate	their	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	
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Many	 industrailised	 societies	 have	 a	 long	 high-carbon	 history,	 making	 the	 scale	 of	
change	 required	 to	 reach	a	 low-carbon	 future	 significant.	Studying	 the	 rocky	 road	of	
such	 transitions	 can	 help	 address	 broad	 questions	 about	 processes	 of	 social	 change	
and	the	socio-material	reality	of	reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions.	For	instance,	this	
thesis	will	explore	what	happens	at	the	various	stages	of	 ‘system	change’	outlined	 in	
figure	 1.1.	 It	 will	 do	 so	 from	 an	 empirically	 informed	 and	 explicitly	 socio-political	
perspective.	 This	will	 provide	 particularly	 valuable	 insights	 for	 countries	 and	 sectors	
where	low	hanging	fruit,	such	as	non-disruptive	low-carbon	technology	adoption,	have	
largely	 been	 picked	 and	 only	 the	 more	 socially	 disruptive	 options	 remain.	 More	
broadly,	 it	 will	 address	 the	 tension	 between	 aiming	 for	 social	 resilience	 or	
transformation,	 between	 driving	 change	 through	 evolution	 or	 revolution.	 It	 will	
explore	 how	 this	 tension	 is	 expressed	 through	 more/less	 flexible	 discourses,	
policymaking	and	governance	practices.	
Pushing	beyond	the	transitions	governance	literature	this	thesis	seeks	to	open	up	the	
boundaries	 of	 who	 gets	 to	 envision	 and	 enact	 a	 pathway	 to	 a	 low-carbon	 future.	
Technology	 and	 behaviour	 are	 key	 components	 of	 the	 low-carbon	 story,	 but	 in	 this	
thesis	the	social	structures	and	interactions	that	animate	them	will	be	the	main	focus,	
rather	than	a	vaguely	defined	backdrop.	Addressing	how	ideas,	norms,	values,	policies	
and	 practices	 all	 change	 –	 or	 are	 stabilized	 –	 over	 time	 will	 help	 explain	 the	 most	
political	aspects	of	transitions	governance.	This	may	start	with	the	nation	state,	as	the	
source	 of	 a	 particular	 climate	 policy	 discourse	 and	 strategy,	 but	 it	 will	 also	 include	
myriad	 interactions	–	 formal	and	 informal	–	between	 its	 representatives	and	various	
areas	of	 society	 including	business,	 communities,	 and	 individuals.	 This	 level	of	detail	
		
12	
and	 inclusivity	 will	 add	 a	 more	 inter-personal	 and	 power-sensitive	 layer	 to	 the	
transitions	literature’s	current	understanding	of	how	systemic	change	is	governed	and	
contested.	
1.1.2. Climate	Politics	and	Policy	
1.1.2.1. Environmental	politics	and	the	challenge	of	greening	the	state	
The	international	political	response	to	the	threat	of	dangerous	climate	change	impacts	
has	 predominantly	 been	 coordinated	 by	 the	 UNFCCC,	 thereby	 continuing	 a	 long	
tradition	of	prioritising	the	nation	state,	as	a	sovereign	actor,	and	using	 international	
relations	 as	 the	 predominant	 form	 of	 analysis	 for	 understanding	 this	 arena	 (Harris,	
2013).	 Herein,	 the	 overarching	 goals	 are	 to	 foster	 mutual	 trust,	 develop	 legal	
commitments	 and	 carry	 out	 effective	 monitoring	 to	 ensure	 states	 pursue	 sufficient	
domestic	 emissions	 reductions	 to	 collectively	 limit	 global	 warming.	 A	 succession	 of	
landmark	COPs	have	driven	this	process	forward	since	1992,	but	in	2009,	despite	high	
expectations	 among	 politicians	 and	 the	 public	 (at	 least	 in	 Western	 Europe),	 the	
international	 consensus	 temporarily	 faltered.	Coming	 just	one	year	after	 the	UK	had	
passed	the	world’s	first	 legally	binding	domestic	emissions	reductions	 legislation,	this	
breakdown	may	 have	 been	 expected	 to	 stall	 a	 domestic	 race-to-the-top	 on	 climate	
policy.	However,	between	then	and	2015	the	number	of	national	climate	policies	rose	
from	426	to	804,	collectively	accounting	for	93%	of	global	emissions	(Nachmany	et	al.,	
2015).	This	flurry	of	national	level	policymaking,	combined	with	strong	growth	in	low-
carbon	sectors	of	 the	economy	 (despite	a	prolonged	period	of	economic	austerity	 in	
Europe),	and	a	 resurgence	of	public	and	political	 campaigning	on	 the	 issue	 led	 to	an	
even	stronger	commitment	to	global	targets	at	the	2015	COP	in	Paris	(Jacobs,	2016).	
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But	 how	 do	 specific	 countries	 fit	 into	 this	 optimistic	 international	 backdrop?	 What	
happened	 to	 the	 UK’s	 self-proclaimed	 climate	 leadership	 aspirations	 when	 progress	
faltered	 and	 how	 has	 this	 played	 out	 within	 domestic	 politics	 and	 policy?	 How	 has	
economic	 recession	and	domestic	politics	affected	the	climate	policy	community?	To	
answer	these	questions	in	a	detailed	and	explanatory	way,	rather	than	simply	pointing	
to	 empirical	 descriptors	 such	 as	 number	 of	 policy	 instruments	 or	 annual	 emissions	
records,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ask	 fundamental	 questions	 about	 the	 capacity	 of	 national	
governments	 to	 shape	 society-environment	 relations	 and	 to	 govern	 society-wide	
transitions.	
Numerous	 attempts	 have	 been	 made	 to	 theorise	 a	 ‘green	 state’	 capable	 of	
incorporating	 pro-environmental	 values	 into	 its	 raision	 d’etre	 and	 governmental	
functions	(Duit	et	al.,	2016;	Eckersley,	2004).	Empirical	work	 in	this	vein	has	engaged	
with	political	 science	 typologies	of	 the	 state	 to	highlight	 the	benefits	and	 limitations	
each	 affords	 to	 environmental	 policy	 and	 governance	 e.g.	 the	UK	 is	 described	 as	 an	
environmental	neoliberal	state	with	weak	institutionalization	of	environmental	values	
(Barry	and	Eckersley,	2005;	Bäckstrand	and	Kronsell,	2015).	This	approach	lends	itself	
to	 categorizing	 states	 into	 ‘leaders	 and	 laggards’,	 evident	 in	 the	 comparative	
environmental	 politics	 and	 policy	 studies	 literature	 (e.g.	 Liefferink	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 For	
instance,	 within	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU),	 the	 UK,	 Germany	 and	 Sweden	 are	 often	
portrayed	as	 leaders	 in	climate	policy	 (Giddens,	2009;	Sarasini,	2009;	Schaffrin	et	al.,	
2014).	More	 in-depth	 analyses	 of	 the	 institutions	 and	 pioneering	 actors	 behind	 the	
flagship	policies	of	 these	countries	 can	help	explain	how	 leaders	emerge	 (or	do	not)	
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and	whether	they	are	able	to	maintain	this	position	through	challenging	circumstances	
(regarding	the	UK	see:	Carter	and	Jacobs,	2014;	Lockwood,	2013).	
There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 challenges	 any	 government	 can	 face	 when	 attempting	 to	
deliver	 a	 transformational	 response	 to	 climate	 change.	 These	 include:	 institutional	
path	 dependency,	 entrenched	 power	 dynamics,	 political	 economy	 pressures,	 and	
governance	 failures	 (Nalau	and	Handmer,	2015).	Broadly	 these	 can	be	 split	 into	 two	
interdependent	themes:	politics	and	policy.	Table	1.1	presents	a	few	examples	of	each,	
largely	 drawn	 from	 liberal	 democracies,	 with	 a	 brief	 description	 and	 some	 key	
references.	
Cutting	 across	 many	 of	 these	 challenges	 is	 the	 enduring	 dialectic	 between	 social	
structures	(e.g.	 in	the	form	of	democratic	 institutions	and	governance	arrangements)	
and	 agency	 (e.g.	 in	 the	 form	 of	 policy	 discourses	 and	 low-carbon	 initiatives).	
Ultimately,	this	area	of	literature	paints	an	ambivalent	picture	with	regards	to	the	role	
of	 the	 nation	 state;	 it	 can	 both	 help	 and	 hinder.	 A	 close	 look	 at	 the	 interactions	
between	specific	governmental	structures	and	processes,	especially	during	 long-term	
(climate	and	energy)	transitions,	can	reveal	what	works	and	in	what	context	(Kern	and	
Rogge,	2016).	
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Table	1.1:	Examples	of	political	and	policy	challenges	for	a	transformational	response	
to	climate	change	
Challenge	 Examples	 References	
Politics	
Party	politics	 • Political	 economy	 pressures	 make	 it	
difficult	 for	 governments	 to	 pass	
disruptive	climate	policies	
• New	 governments	 may	 repeal	 climate	
policies	to	appeal	to	voters	
Fankhauser	et	al.	
(2015);	 Giddens	
(2009);	 Pierson	
(2004)	
Salience	 and	
agendas	
• Interest	 cycles	 make	 it	 difficult	 to	
maintain	 support	 for	 old,	 or	 pass	 new,	
policies	
• Climate	change	is	infrequently	a	priority	
agenda	for	governments	or	publics	
Boykoff	 (2008;	
2015);	
Compston	 and	
Bailey	 (2008);	
Pralle	(2009)	
Post-politics	 • Climate	 change	 is	 seen	 as	 a	
predominantly	 scientific	 and	 technical	
issue	i.e.	it	is	apolitical	
• Space	 for	deliberating	and	 innovating	 is	
limited	for	climate	policymakers	i.e.	 it	 is	
technocratic	
Swyngedouw	
(2014);	Kuzemko	
(2016)	
Policy	
Legitimacy	 • Capacity	 and	 support	 for	 strong	 state	
intervention	is	low	in	many	policy	areas	
• Climate	policies	can	be	delegitimized	as	
economics	change	over	time		
Voß	 et	 al.	
(2009);	 Giddens	
(2009);	 Maor	
(2014)	
Integration	 • Climate	 goals	 are	 can	 contradict	 other	
entrenched	policy	goals	
• Coordinating	climate	goals	across	policy	
areas	is	difficult	
Adelle	 and	
Russel	 (2013);	
Jordan	 and	
Lenschow	(2010)	
Incrementalism	 • There	 is	 limited	 scope	 for	
experimentation	 within	 certain	 policy	
areas	
• Policy	 feedback	 cycles	 are	 slow	 and	
path-dependent	
Fankhauser	et	al.	
(2015);	 Giddens	
(2009);	 Pierson	
(2005)	
	
1.1.2.2. The	structure-agency	dialectic:	an	institutionalist	view	of	government	
Many	 social	 and	 political	 theories	 about	 government	 and	 processes	 of	 long-term	
intentional	 social	 change	 refer	 to	 the	 dichotomy	 of	 structure	 and	 agency.	 Although	
different	terms	are	used,	e.g.	social	fields	(Bourdieu	and	Farage,	1994)	or	structuration	
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(Giddens,	 1984),	 essentially	 what	 is	 being	 discussed	 is	 the	 interaction	 between	
historical	 context	 and	 human	 action.	 This	 distinction	 lends	 itself	 to	 philosophical	
debates	about	the	relative	influence	of	each	on	processes	of	continuity	and	change	in	
society,	and	how	best	to	study	this.	The	intellectual	footprint	of	this	dichotomy	can	be	
seen	in	theories	about	governing	sustainability	and	climate	transitions.	For	example,	in	
writing	about	the	politics	of	climate	change,	Giddens	(2009)	puts	forward	the	notion	of	
an	ensuring	state	to	describe	a	government	that	simultaneously	encourages	innovative	
action	 and	 flexibility	 whilst	 also	 providing	 socio-economic	 structures	 that	 guarantee	
pro-environmental	 outcomes	 wherever	 possible.	 Similarly,	 Geels	 (2004;	 2014)	 has	
analysed	the	interplay	between	social	institutions	and	technical	innovations	to	explore	
previous	 and	 future	 transitions	 towards	 new	 socio-technical	 regimes.	 This	 focus	 on	
institutions	–	such	as	markets,	public	policies	and	governance	arrangements	–	as	sites	
of	 structure-agency	 interplay	 is	 particularly	 useful	 for	 understanding	 the	politics	 and	
power	dynamics	of	otherwise	 technically-oriented	analyses	of	 low-carbon	 transitions	
(Geels,	2014;	Kern,	2011;	Meadowcroft,	2011).	
Institutionalist	thought	has	traditionally	been	concerned	with	the	way	social	structures	
have	emerged	and	continue	to	shape	the	future	of	societies	 (Blyth,	2002:	Hay,	2004;	
Pierson,	2004;	Powell	and	DiMaggio,	2012).	It	has	informed	work	on	different	ways	of	
governing	 environmental	 issues	 through	 and	 beyond	 the	 state,	 including:	 natural	
resource	 management,	 conservation,	 pollution	 and	 climate	 change	 (Ostrom,	 2012;	
Hoffman	and	Ventresca,	2002;	Young,	1994).	This	work	analyses	the	influence	of	both	
‘formal’	 aspects,	 such	 as	 rules	 and	 resources,	 as	 well	 as	 ‘informal’	 aspects	 such	 as	
norms	and	ideas	(Hoffman	and	Ventresca,	2002).	Recognising	the	dynamic	relationship	
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between	 these	 formal	 and	 informal	 aspects,	 ‘new	 institutionalism’	 gives	 more	
consideration	 to	 the	 role	 of	 agency,	 considering	 how	 individuals	 can	 deliberately	
change	 institutions	 in	order	 to	shape	what	 is	possible	now	and	 in	 the	 future	 (Peters,	
2011;	Powell	and	DiMaggio,	2012;	Schmidt,	2010).	
Broadly	speaking	new	institutionalism	includes	four	different	strands	(rational	choice,	
historical,	 sociological,	 and	 discursive),	 each	 with	 its	 own	 set	 of	 assumptions	 and	
theories	for	explaining	institutional	stability	and	change	(see	figure	1.2).	Given	recent	
calls	for	more	analyses	of	power,	agency	and	ideas	 in	transitions	studies,	sociological	
and	discursive	institutionalism	is	well	placed	to	respond	e.g.	by	studying	the	way	ideas	
and	discourses	interact	with	interests,	norms	and	culture.		
	
Figure	 1.2:	 Four	 types	 of	 new	 institutionalism	 and	 their	 overlapping	 interests	 (RI	 =	
rational	 choice,	 HI	 =	 historical,	 SI	 =	 sociological,	 DI	 =	 discursive).	 Source:	 Schmidt,	
(2011).	
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The	sociological	and	discursive	approaches	recognize	the	importance	of	discourse	and	
its	influential	role	in	actors’	strategies	during	moments	of	crisis	(Fligstein	and	McAdam,	
2012).	 This	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 in	 existing	 analyses	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 climate	
change	 legislation	 in	 the	 UK	 (see:	 Carter	 and	 Jacobs,	 2014;	 Lorenzoni	 and	 Benson,	
2014).	 The	 strategic	 actions	 (discursive	 practices)	 of	 the	 climate	 policy	 community	 –	
including	 non-government	 stakeholders	 –	 are	 vital	 for	 putting	 the	 broad	 issue	 of	
climate	change	on	the	political	agenda	(Pralle,	2009;	Bailey	and	Compston,	2012),	but	
also	 for	 challenging	 deeply	 entrenched	 cultural	 norms	 and	 producing	 specific	
innovations	 in	 policy	 and	 governance.	 It	 is	 here	 that	 discursive	 institutionalism	 can	
offer	a	dynamic	reading	of	how	ideas	about	governing	(climate	change)	are	articulated,	
challenged,	and	enacted	in	power	relations	and	throughout	the	policy	process	(Glynos	
and	Howarth,	2008;	Hay,	2004;	Schmidt,	2010).	
1.1.2.3. Theories	of	the	policy	process:	observing	changes	over	time	
Public	policymaking	is	an	apt	place	to	observe	the	push	and	pull	of	state	structures	and	
individual	actions,	especially	around	issues	such	as	climate	change	that	affect	so	many	
aspects	of	society.	Many	theories	of	the	policy	process	have	evolved	over	time,	partly	
in	response	to	the	growing	complexity	of	globalized	environmental	 issues	 i.e.	moving	
on	from	a	linear	description	of	discrete	stages	(including:	agenda	setting,	formulation,	
legitimization,	 implementation,	 evaluation	 etc.),	 to	 appreciate	 the	 cyclical	 and	 often	
overlapping	 relationship	 between	 these	 stages	 and	 ever-changing	 circumstances	
(figure	 1.3).	 Interestingly,	 this	 heuristic	 is	 also	 present	 in	 the	 transitions	 governance	
literature,	 which	 stresses	 the	 cyclical	 nature	 of	 innovation	 and	 experimentation	 to	
encourage	reflexivity	in	decision-making	and	governance	(figure	1.4).		
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Figure	1.3:	The	policy	cycle.	Source:	Cairney	(2013)	
	
Figure	1.4:	The	transition	management	cycle.	Source:	Loorbach	(2010)	
Ranging	 from	 positivist	 empirical	 approaches	 through	 to	 more	 constructivist	 and	
interpretive	schools	of	thought,	theories	of	the	policy	process	have	mobilised	this	ideal	
type	view	of	policymaking	in	order	to	analyse	exactly	how	it	plays	out	in	reality.	There	
are	 some	 key	 differences	 between	 these	 approaches	 that	 hinge	 on	 their	 ontological	
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and	 epistemological	 assumptions	 about	 what	 policy	 is	 and	 how	 it	 ought	 to	 be	
understood	 (for	 a	 summary	 see:	 Sabatier	 and	Weible,	 2014).	 A	 convincing	 case	 has	
been	made	for	constructivist	approaches	on	the	basis	of	 their	ability	to	politicize	the	
policymaking	 process	 i.e.	 to	 expose	 the	 power	 relations	 between	 actors	 (and	
structures)	 and	 the	 presumed	 norms,	 ideas	 and	 discourses	 through	 which	 they	 are	
enacted	 (Béland	 and	 Cox,	 2010;	 Fischer,	 2003;	 Glynos	 and	Howarth,	 2008;	 Schmidt,	
2010).	This	 is	particularly	pertinent	 to	 the	case	of	 climate	policy,	which	has	arguably	
been	 depoliticized	 through	 an	 over-reliance	 on	 technical	 and	 scientific	 discourses	
(Kuzemko,	2016;	Scoones	et	al.,	2015;	Swyngedouw,	2014).		
To	illustrate,	in	the	case	of	the	UK’s	flagship	climate	policy,	the	CCA,	an	interests-based	
explanation	uses	a	realist	view	of	power	to	argue	that	political	circumstances	aligned	
to	 make	 innovation	 in	 this	 area	 something	 that	 was	 in	 everybody’s	 best	 interests	
(Carter	 and	 Jacobs,	 2014;	 Lockwood,	 2013).	 Whilst	 this	 analysis	 does	 point	 to	 the	
importance	of	entrepreneurial	 individuals	 in	building	this	coalition,	a	more	discursive	
reading	 offers	 additional	 explanations	 of	 how	 such	 radical	 institutional	 change	 was	
brought	 about	 through	 new	 ideas	 and	 inter-personal	 interactions	 (Lorenozni	 and	
Benson,	2014).	
Given	 the	 importance	of	 the	2015	Paris	Agreement	and	 the	proliferation	of	national	
legislation	 described	 above,	 research	 into	 domestic	 climate	 policy	 has	 enjoyed	 a	
resurgence	after	a	period	of	critique	and	pessimism	associated	with	previous	 failings	
(Bäckstrand,	 2010;	Bulkeley	 and	Newell,	 2010;	Okereke,	 2007).	 For	 instance,	 climate	
policy	 innovation,	 experimentation	 and	 entrepreneurship	 are	 the	 subject	 of	 recent	
special	issues,	edited	volumes	and	highly	cited	articles	(e.g.	Jordan	and	Huitema,	2014;	
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Boasson,	 2014;	 Bulkeley	 and	 Castán	 Broto,	 2013).	 Successive	 discursive	 and	
governance	turns	in	the	political	sciences	means	that	much	of	this	literature	now	pays	
greater	attention	 to	 the	 role	of	discursive	practices	and	non-state	actors	 throughout	
the	 policy	 process.	 This	 new	 wave	 of	 climate	 policy	 research	 raises	 some	 critical	
questions,	which	this	thesis	engages	with	directly,	such	as:	
• What	is	the	relationship	between	flagship	strategies	and	specific	policy	outputs	
and	 implementation	 (Jordan	 and	 Huitmea,	 2014;	 Howlett,	 2014;	 Lockwood,	
2013)?	
• How	 are	 policies	 revised	 and	 calibrated	 over	 time,	 especially	 in	 response	 to	
political	and	economic	pressures	(Bauer	et	al.,	2012;	Howlett	and	Kemmerling,	
2017;	Maor,	2014)?	
• How	 does	 government	 policymaking	 and	 climate	 governance	 interact	 with	
other	 jurisdictional	 levels	 and	 sites	 of	 authority	 (Bäckstrand	 et	 al.,	 2017;	
Boasson,	2014;	Jordan	et	al.,	2015;	Scoones	et	al.,	2015)?	
1.1.2.4. Rationale	for	the	thesis	
The	 expectation	 being	 placed	 on	 nation	 states	 with	 regards	 to	 delivering	
transformational	social	change	towards	a	low-carbon	future	has	reached	new	heights.	
Following	 the	 submission	 of	 162	 Intended	 Nationally	 Determined	 Contributions	
(INDCs)	 covering	190	parties	 to	 the	UNFCCC	and	 the	 recent	proliferation	of	 national	
climate	 legislation	 there	 is	 now	 a	 pressing	 need	 for	 research	 that	 examines	 the	
likelihood	 of	 such	 pledges	 being	 delivered;	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘post-Paris	
agenda’.	Building	on	the	leaders	and	laggards	literature,	as	well	as	established	theories	
of	 a	 green	 state,	 this	 thesis	 offers	 a	 timely	 and	 critical	 analysis	 of	 a	 self-proclaimed	
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‘climate	 leader’.	 This	 entails	 consideration	 of	 how	 this	 position	 shapes	 the	 UK’s	
relationship	to	international	climate	governance	regimes	(specifically	the	UNFCCC	and	
the	EU),	as	well	as	 its	domestic	politics.	By	studying	the	political	dynamics	of	climate	
change	and	the	policy	process	associated	with	meeting	its	CCA	targets,	the	case	study	
reveals	 some	of	 the	 structural	 challenges	 faced	by	 states	 and	policy	 actors	 pursuing	
transformational	 change	 during	 turbulent	 political	 and	 economic	 times.	 Accordingly,	
the	 findings	will	contribute	to	both	the	case	specific	debates	 in	 the	UK,	as	well	as	 to	
broader	discussions	of	environmental	statecraft	and	governance.	
The	use	of	new	–	rather	than	old	–	 institutionalist	 theory	 in	this	 thesis	 is	 justified	on	
the	 grounds	 that	 it	 incorporates	 greater	 consideration	 of	 human	 agency	 as	 well	 as	
formal	 and	 informal	 socio-political	 factors	 that	 are	 often	 overlooked	 or	
underdeveloped	in	the	climate	transitions	literature.	Following	this	logic,	the	choice	of	
a	 discursive	 form	 of	 institutionalism	 is	 intended	 to	 draw	 out	 the	 dynamic	 inter-
personal	 processes	 –	 such	 as	 the	 exchange	 of	 ideas	 and	 construction	 of	 discourses	
about	 climate	 change	 –	 that	 underpin	 government	 institutions	 and	 policies.	
Specifically,	this	means	that	the	formal	institutional	framework	of	the	CCA	and	its	long-
term	 legal	 targets	 for	 emissions	 reductions	 are	 not	 taken	 at	 face	 value,	 but	 are	
critically	 analysed	 to	 reveal	 the	 informal	 ideas	 and	 interactions	underpinning	 it.	 This	
case	study	also	provides	an	opportunity	to	test	the	utility	of	relatively	new	discursive	
intuitionalist	 concepts	and	 to	develop	 their	explanation	of	how	 ideas	and	discourses	
translate	into	policy	through	different	forms	of	power.	
By	 applying	 these	 analytical	 approaches	 to	 the	 subject	 of	 climate	 policymaking,	 this	
thesis	 complements	 large-n	 quantitative	 descriptions	 of	 policy	 outputs	 or	 emissions	
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trends	 (e.g.	Nachmany	et	 al.,	 2015)	with	 a	 qualitative	 account	of	 an	 exemplary	 case	
study	of	a	nation	with	strong	legislation	and	leadership	aspirations	that	have	begun	to	
face	 significant	 challenges	 (Lockwood,	 2013).	 The	 causal	 link	 between	 policies	 and	
emissions	trajectories	is	difficult	to	disentangle	from	wider	social	and	economic	trends,	
with	implementation	outcomes	varying	considerably	across	sectors	(CCC,	2011;	2014).	
Therefore	it	is	not	the	intention	of	this	thesis	to	say	categorically	whether	government	
strategies	 and	 policies	will	 produce	 transformational	 change;	 indeed,	 the	 CCC’s	 own	
modelling	 (figure	 1.5)	 suggests	 that	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	 (CCC,	 2017).	 Rather,	 it	 is	 to	
analyse	the	dynamics	of	the	policymaking	process	during	difficult	 times	to	reveal	the	
detailed	interplay	between	actors	and	institutions,	showing	how	they	influence	specific	
low-carbon	policies	as	well	as	wider	climate	governance	initiatives	beyond	the	central	
state.	 Such	 insights	 are	 particularly	 important	 for	 addressing	 fundamental	 questions	
about	the	nature	and	capacity	of	the	state’s	role	 in	governing	a	rapid	and	potentially	
disruptive	social	transition.	
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Figure	1.5:	The	projected	policy	gap	between	emissions	accounted	for	and	the	 legally	
binding	targets.	Source:	Committee	on	Climate	Change	(2017).	
1.1.3. Climate	Governance	
1.1.3.1. The	governance	turn	and	the	state	in	transition	
Critical	 questions	 about	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 in	 shaping	 social	 life	 have	 been	
reinvigorated	by	 globalization	and	 the	 ‘governance	 turn’	 in	public	 administration.	 To	
assert	 that	 the	 nation	 state’s	 form	 and	 functions	 are	 changing	 is	 somewhat	 of	 an	
aphorism.	Governmental	authority	in	different	areas	of	social	life,	and	the	institutions	
through	 which	 it	 is	 exercised,	 have	 always	 evolved	 over	 time.	 However,	 the	 crucial	
difference	 today	 (as	 compared	 to	 the	 decades	 following	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
modern	welfare	state)	is	that	external	pressures	are	forcing	the	change,	more	so	than	
the	 deliberate	 calculations	 of	 state	 architects	 (Pierre	 and	 Peters,	 2000).	 The	
globalization	 of	 economic	 systems,	 the	 digitalization	 of	 information	 and	
communication,	 and	 the	 cross-border	 effects	 of	 global	 environmental	 disasters	
challenge	 the	 capacity	 and	 credentials	 of	 existing	 modes	 of	 governing;	 ultimately	
		
25	
demanding	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	 arrangements	 and	 the	 reconfiguring	 of	 power	
relations	 among	 public,	 private	 and	 civic	 sectors	 (Hajer,	 2009;	 Delmas	 and	 Young,	
2009;	Žižek,	2011).	
From	such	a	governance	perspective,	nation	states	are	not	seen	as	homogenous	and	
distinct	entities	with	clearly	definable	boundaries.	Rather,	they	are	porous,	malleable,	
and	 overlapping	with	 non-governmental	 actors	 and	 sites	 of	 authority.	 The	 extent	 to	
which	this	conceptualization	is	empirically	evident	varies	between	different	countries	
and	 is	 affected	by	political	 institutions	 as	well	 as	 levels	 of	 civic	 freedom	and	private	
sector	activity.	The	central	hypothesis	is	that	states	that	embrace	such	integration	will	
be	 better	 able	 to	 adapt	 and	 respond	 to	 the	 challenges	 of	 globalization	 e.g.	 through	
increased	 opportunities	 for	 social	 learning,	 economies	 of	 scale	 and	 the	 efficient	
sharing	of	resources	and	responsibilities	 (Biermann	and	Pattberg,	2008;	Bulkeley	and	
Newell,	2010;	Ostrom,	2012;	Pierre	and	Peters,	2000).	
This	 is	not	 to	 suggest	 that	external	pressures	are	 the	only	drivers	of	 the	governance	
turn.	There	are	proponents	and	opponents,	each	with	different	ideas	about	the	role	of	
government;	 ranging	 from	 libertarian	 and	 free-market	 fundamentalism	 through	 to	
paternalistic	social	contracts	and	planned	economies.	In	Western	Europe	and	the	UK,	
the	 economic	 ideology	 of	 neoliberalism	 has	 been	 influential	 in	 driving	 a	 deliberate	
rollback	of	state	powers	and	regulation	based	on	the	argument	that	organisations	and	
individuals	would	make	‘better’	choices	without	government	intervention.	The	scale	of	
cuts	 to	 public	 institutions	 and	 the	 continued	political	 commitment	 to	 this	 agenda	 in	
the	 face	 of	 significant	 evidence	 contradicting	 its	 efficacy	 (e.g.	 the	 financial	 crash	 of	
2008,	which	followed	deregulation	of	the	financial	sector,	or	the	shortcomings	of	the	
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EU’s	 Emissions	 Trading	 Scheme	 (ETS)	 for	 incentivising	 emissions	 reductions)	 are	
testimony	 to	 the	 influence	 of	 ideas	 and	 their	 pervasive	 embodiment	 in	 governance	
arrangements	(Bailey	et	al.,	2011;	Crouch,	2011;	Pierre	and	Peters,	2000).	
The	impact	of	the	neoliberal	governance	agenda	on	state	institutions	and	policy	in	the	
UK	varies	across	sectors.	There	has	been	a	strengthening	of	some	influential	sectorial	
networks,	typically	made	up	of	large	private	organisations	e.g.	in	their	ability	to	lobby	
government	and	protect	 their	 interests	as	 the	state	 is	 ‘hollowed	out’	 (Rhodes,	1997;	
Richards	 and	 Smith,	 2002).	 However,	 because	 of	 neoliberalism’s	 tendency	 towards	
market-based	forms	of	governance,	it	can	be	argued	that	civil	society	has	not	enjoyed	
such	increases	in	power	and	influence	(Jessop,	2002;	Swyngedouw,	2005).	This	may	be	
partially	due	to	the	UK	polity	being	based	on	majority	rule	and	centralized	control	over	
policy	 discourses	 and	 practices,	 which	 is	 generally	 resistant	 to	 power	 sharing	 with	
other	governance	actors	e.g.	the	EU	(Pierre	and	Peters,	2000;	Schmidt,	20006;	2008).	
As	 a	 result,	 governance	 initiatives,	 such	 as	 the	 ‘Big	 Society’	 agenda	 for	 encouraging	
communities	 to	 deliver	 public	 services,	 lean	 towards	 an	 instrumentalist	 rationale	
(Catney	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Such	 restrictive	 forms	 of	 localism	 fail	 to	 fundamentally	 alter	
uneven	 power	 relations	 and	 fall	 short	 of	 the	 democratic	 and	 participatory	 potential	
promised	by	new	forms	of	governance	(Bäckstrand,	2010;	Fung,	2006).	
1.1.3.2. Multiple	 scales,	 levels	 and	 actors	 –	 examples	 from	 climate	 change	
governance	networks	
The	assumption	that	state-based	impediments	to	achieving	rapid	emissions	reductions	
can	 be	 overcome	 through	 the	 non-state	 governance	 alternatives	 has	 been	 a	 central	
theme	of	 social	 science	 debates	 about	 climate	 change	 for	 some	 time.	 The	 zero-sum	
politics	 of	 international	 climate	 regimes	 and	 national	 policy	 contexts	 have	 been	
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criticized	for	their	slow	progress	and	narrow	view	of	power	relations	(e.g.	Bailey,	2007;	
Harris,	2013).	In	response,	research	and	action	has	flourished	around	tackling	climate	
change	 through	 sub-national	 and	 trans-national	 arrangements	 involving	 multiple	
governance	 actors	 and	 scales	 (Bäckstrand,	 2010;	 Biermann	 and	 Pattberg,	 2008;	
Bulkeley	and	Newell,	2010;	MacKinnon,	2010).	This	trend	intensified	during	the	period	
between	the	failure	of	 the	Copenhagen	COP	 in	2009	and	the	optimism	of	the	recent	
Paris	 COP	 in	 2015;	 giving	 non-state	 actors	 (broadly	 defined	 as	 including	 civil	 society	
and	 private	 organisations)	 a	 key	 role	 in	 monitoring	 and	 influencing	 multilateral	
agreements	 as	 well	 as	 delivering	 national	 and	 transnational	 climate	 policy	 actions	
(Bäckstrand,	2017).	
Hybrid	and	non-state	 forms	of	governance	are	often	described	as	multi-actor	and/or	
multi-level	 or	 multi-scale.	 These	 categories	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 variety	 of	 actors	
involved	in	climate	governance	and	the	political-geographic	spaces	in	which	they	act.	
As	 a	 result,	 state	 institutions	 and	 spaces	 of	 authority	 (i.e.	 national	 borders)	 are	
conceptualized	 as	 just	 one	 component	 among	 a	 network	 of	 various	 policies	 and	
partnerships	 (Lemos	 and	 Agrawal,	 2006;	 MacKinnon,	 2010;	 Turmeer	 et	 al.,	 2010).	
Examples	include:	European	cross-border	energy	infrastructure	and	supply	chains	that	
involve	 states,	 energy	 companies	 and	 citizenries	 with	 overlapping	 jurisdictions	
(Eberlein,	 2008;	 Goldthau,	 2014),	 European	 and	 American	 city	 level	 voluntary	
agreements	on	climate	change	that	involve	local	government	institutions	but	operate	
transnationally	 (Broto	 and	 Bulkeley,	 2013),	 and	 global	 industry	 initiatives	 on	 pricing	
and	 reducing	 carbon	 emissions	 through	 market	 mechanisms,	 (which	 are	 often	
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facilitated	 by	 states)	 such	 as	 the	 EU’s	 ETS,	 the	 UNFCCC’s	 Clean	 Development	
Mechanism,	and	the	UK’s	Energy	Company	Obligation	(ECO).	
Thinking	 about	 such	 climate	 governance	 arrangements	 from	 a	 network	 perspective	
raises	questions	about	restructuring	power	relations	and	seeing	actors	as	horizontally	
connected	 instead	 of	 situated	 within	 hierarchical	 levels	 on	 a	 scale	 of	 political	
jurisdiction	 (e.g.	 from	 international	 to	 national	 to	 local)	 (Bulkeley,	 2005;	 Reed	 and	
Bruyneel,	 2010;	 Termeer	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 For	 instance,	 transnational	 networks	 of	 cities	
and	grassroots	organisations	share	resources,	information	and	advocacy	agendas	that	
would	otherwise	not	be	available	through	domestic	state-based	 institutions.	This	can	
be	emancipatory	for	local	actors	within	laggard	countries,	enabling	them	to	circumvent	
restrictive	 state	 funding	 and	 policies,	 and	 to	 develop	 their	 own	 innovations	 and	
collaborations.	 Such	 ‘interurban	 networks’	 are	 an	 example	 of	 what	 human	
geographers	refer	to	as	the	‘politics	of	scale’	i.e.	environmental	issues	and	their	social	
responses	that	span	multiple	territories	and	jurisdictions	(Leitner,	2005;	Swyngedouw,	
2004)	
However,	 theorizing	 governance	 networks	 as	 horizontal,	 contingent,	 innovative	 and	
dynamic	 does	 not	 simply	 dissolve	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 state	 or	 of	 structured	 power	
relations.	Hybrid	forms	of	governance,	such	as	markets	or	civic	spaces	where	the	state	
still	plays	a	 facilitating	role	or	 is	an	active	competitor,	are	 the	most	obvious	sites	 for	
observing	continued	government	influence.	In	these	contexts	more	prosaic,	and	even	
hegemonic,	forms	of	power	should	be	observed,	e.g.	in	the	discourses	and	practices	of	
seemingly	 ‘non-state’	 spaces	 such	 as	 grassroots	 climate	 movements,	 community	
projects	and	individual	behaviour	(Dean,	2010;	Shove,	2010;	Swyngedouw,	2005).		
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The	proliferation	of	 governance	networks	may	 represent	 increased	opportunities	 for	
innovation	 and	 social	 learning,	 but	 they	 do	 not	 necessarily	 represent	 a	 zero-sum	
reduction	in	state	power	(Davies,	2011;	Jessop,	2002;	2016).	This	enduring	lesson	from	
governance	studies	means	that	the	relationship	between	government	climate	policies	
and	 multi-actor	 /	 multi-site	 governance	 arrangements	 needs	 careful	 analysis	 to	
determine	whether	they	are	operating	in	synergy	to	accelerate	a	low-carbon	transition	
and	to	identify	any	tensions	that	are	limiting	the	speed	and	scale	of	this	progress.	
1.1.3.3. Governance	and	social	innovation	
Evaluations	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 new	 environmental	 /	 climate	 policies	 and	
governance	 arrangements	 have	 found	 mixed	 results	 for	 cases	 involving	 specific	
instruments,	actors	and	scales	e.g.	market	mechanisms	and	voluntary	agreements	that	
both	 complement	 and	 compete	 against	 existing	 policies	 (Bailey,	 2007;	 Jordan	 et	 al.,	
2005),	public-private	partnerships	that	either	reinforce	political	economic	influences	or	
help	 to	 diversify	 climate	 governance	 (Bäckstrand,	 2008;	 Pattberg,	 2010),	 and	 new	
connections	 between	 different	 cities	 and	 agendas	 in	 the	 urban	 politics	 of	 climate	
change	 (Bulkeley	 and	 Betsill,	 2013).	 At	 the	 aggregate	 level,	 some	 key	 interrelated	
factors	 shaping	 ‘good	 governance’	 outcomes	 include:	 policy	 integration	 and	
coordination,	the	distribution	of	agency,	monitoring	and	accountability,	perceptions	of	
legitimacy,	and	civic	participation	(Bäckstrand,	2008;	Fung,	2006;	Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen	
and	McGee,	2013;	Newig	and	Fritsch,	2009;	Hogl	et	al.,	2012).	
Despite	 mixed	 results	 in	 practice	 there	 is	 renewed	 optimism	 within	 the	 literature,	
which	 is	 being	 driven	 by	 the	 continued	 fragmentation	 of	 international	 governance	
arrangements	 (e.g.	 the	UNFCCC	 shift	 to	 INDCs	 and	 the	 developing	 European	 Energy	
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Union)	 and	 the	 increased	 focus	 on	 social	 drivers	 of	 low-carbon	 innovation	 and	
transformation	(Avelino	et	al.,	2017;	Feola,	2015;	Nalau	and	Handmer,	2015).		
For	 instance,	 building	 on	 Ostrom’s	 (2010;	 2012)	 earlier	 work	 on	 natural	 resource	
governance	 and	 alternatives	 to	 purely	 state-	 or	 market-based	 responses	 to	 climate	
change,	McGinnis	(2015)	makes	a	strong	case	for	the	added	value	of	having	multiple,	
and	overlapping,	sites	of	authority.	Advocates	of	such	‘polycentric	governance’	argue	
that	increased	connectivity	and	dispersed	authority	provides	greater	opportunities	for	
social	learning,	economies	of	scale	and	innovations	that	are	necessary	for	overcoming	
the	 inertia	 of	 high-carbon	 social	 structures	 and	 climate	 change	 politics	 (Cole,	 2015;	
Jordan	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 As	 per	 the	 debates	 about	 climate	 policy	 innovation	 discussed	
above,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 consider	 the	 political	 factors	 affecting	 the	 development	 of	
polycentricity	 in	 a	 given	 policy	 area,	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 its	 emergence	 and	
effectiveness	 can	 be	 evaluated	 (Bernstein	 and	 Cashore,	 2012;	 Jordan	 and	 Huitema,	
2014).	
Previous	studies	of	sustainability	transitions	governance	have	flagged	up	a	number	of	
social	 and	 political	 issues	 that	 can	 limit	 the	 uptake	 and	 up-scaling	 of	 low-carbon	
innovations,	 including:	 policy	 uncertainty,	 economic	 pressures,	 and	 simplistic	
assumptions	 about	 behaviour	 (Boons	 et	 al.,	 2013;	 Geels,	 2013;	 Kivimaa	 and	 Kern,	
2016;	Shove,	2010).	Recognition	of	these	limitations	is	a	reminder	that	bottom-up	and	
polycentric	forms	of	governance	and	social	innovations	are	proliferating	but	that	their	
impact	and	longevity	is	still	partly	determined	by	their	relationship	with	broader	social	
structures	(Kern,	2015;	Raven	et	al.,	2015).	In	their	conceptualization	of	transformative	
social	 innovation,	 Avelino	 et	 al.	 (2017)	 note	 that	 changes	 in	 actor	 relations	 and	
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narratives	 –	 such	 as	 might	 be	 associated	 with	 new	 forms	 of	 climate	 policy	 and	
governance	–	can	actually	be	disempowering	or	can	lead	to	undesirable	outcomes.	It	is	
not	 the	 existence	of	multiple	 governance	 actors	 and	 scales	per	 se	 that	matters,	 it	 is	
their	 strategic	 mobilization	 of	 both	material	 and	 ideational	 resources	 for	 increasing	
authority	and	legitimacy	in	order	to	overcome	entrenched	power	relations	and	to	plug	
the	‘action	gap’	on	climate	change	(Bushell	et	al.,	2017;	Fligstein	and	McAdam,	2011).	
The	climate	governance	literature	in	general,	and	in	particular	the	area	concerned	with	
sustainability	 transitions,	 has	 been	 criticized	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 theoretical	 rigor	 when	 it	
comes	 to	 politics	 and	 power	 (e.g.	Okereke	 et	 al.,	 2009;	 Smith	 and	 Stirling,	 2010).	 In	
response,	scholars	have	reached	out	to	human	geography,	political	science,	and	policy	
studies	 to	 incorporate	 considerations	 of,	 for	 example:	 scale,	 territory,	 institutions,	
agency,	 power	 relations,	 and	 ideas	 (Avelino	 and	 Rotmans,	 2009;	 Bulkeley,	 2005;	
Coenen	and	Truffer,	2012;	Geels,	2014;	Meadowcroft,	2011;	Reed	and	Bruyneel,	2010).	
Two	 areas	 of	 this	 interdisciplinary	 endeavour	 that	 are	 especially	 relevant	 for	
understanding	the	political	economy	and	governance	of	climate	change	in	the	UK	are:	
the	role	of	the	state	and	the	role	of	ideas.	They	can	be	successfully	explored	through	
analysis	 of	 the	 political	 and	 policy	 structures	 set	 out	 by	 governments	 as	well	 as	 the	
discursive	 interactions	 of	 governance	 actors	 who	 operate	 within,	 and	 beyond,	 this	
context	(Hajer,	2009;	Methmann	et	al.,	2013;	Van	Lieshout	et	al.,	2014).	By	drawing	on	
analytical	frameworks	that	focus	on	discourse,	power	and	agency	this	thesis	seeks	to	
strengthen	the	social	and	political	dimensions	of	the	climate	governance	literature.	
1.1.3.4. Rationale	for	the	thesis	
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Historically,	 the	 UK	 state	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 centralized	 political	 institutions	
and	 policymaking	 practices,	 but	 since	 the	 advent	 of	 globalization	 and	 neoliberalism	
successive	administrations	have	actively	pursued	a	small-state	agenda	 in	many	areas	
of	government.	By	diminishing	responsibilities	for,	and	involvement	in,	certain	aspects	
of	 social	 life	 the	UK	 state	has	 cut	 costs	 and	bureaucracy	but	 this	 retrenchment	may	
lead	 to	 questions	 being	 raised	 about	 government	 authority	 and	 legitimacy.	 As	 new	
forms	of	climate	policy	and	governance	emerge,	questions	of	democracy,	power,	and	
effectiveness	 need	 to	 be	 addressed.	 For	 instance:	 does	 government	 policymaking	
support	 innovative	 approaches	 to	 governance,	 how	 are	 power	 relations	 between	
government	and	non-government	actors	altered,	and	what	effect	do	these	have	on	the	
transformational	potential	of	low-carbon	initiatives?	
Climate	governance	arrangements	often	involve	multiple	actors	and	sites	of	authority	
as	 they	 target	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 that	 are	 embedded	 in	 so	many	 aspects	 of	
social	 life.	 By	 situating	 the	 UK	 case	 study	 within	 this	 polycentric	 context	 it	 will	 be	
possible	 to	 identify	 governance	 innovations	 without	 losing	 sight	 of	 the	 continued	
influence	 of	 state	 institutions	 and	 government	 policies.	 International	 relations	
involving	 the	 UNFCCC	 and	 the	 EU	 as	 well	 as	 domestic	 activities	 involving	 devolved	
authorities,	private	enterprise	and	local	communities	are	all	in	dialogue	with	the	UK’s	
climate	 policy	 framework	 and	 community.	 Analysing	 these	 relationships,	 in	 a	
neoliberal	 and	 climate	 leadership	 country	 context,	 will	 reveal	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
innovative	 governance	 arrangements	 can	 emerge	 –	 and	 have	 an	 impact	 –	 during	
turbulent	political	and	economic	times.	
1.1.4. Summary	
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Each	of	the	above	areas	of	academic	literature	offers	useful	concepts,	frameworks	and	
prescriptions	 for	 understanding	 and	 governing	 social	 responses	 to	 climate	 change.	
There	 are	 overlaps	 between	 them	 (e.g.	 systems	 thinking	 and	 the	 importance	 of	
institutions)	 as	 well	 as	 blind	 spots	 (e.g.	 understanding	 ideational	 factors	 and	 the	
distribution	 of	 agency	 across	 networks).	 In	 sum,	 this	 thesis	 sets	 out	 to	 examine	 the	
cross	cutting	socio-political	dimensions	that	are	under-theorised	and	under-studied	in	
each	 of	 these	 literatures,	 thereby	 advancing	 their	 epistemic	 foundations	 and	
encouraging	an	interdisciplinary	dialogue	between	them.	In	addressing	these	climate-
specific	 areas	 of	 social	 science,	wider	 social	 theories	 and	 contemporary	 debates	will	
also	 be	 touched	 upon.	 In	 particular,	 contributions	 are	 made	 to	 the	 long-running	
analysis	 of	 structure-agency	 dynamics	 as	 well	 as	 interpretivist	 conceptualisations	 of	
power	 and	 politics.	 Empirically,	 the	 position	 of	 the	 nation	 state	 in	 globalised,	
fragmented	and	polycentric	governance	arrangements	 is	examined,	offering	valuable	
insights	 to	 political	 science	 researchers	 and	 stakeholders	 involved	 in	 governing	
fundamental	 changes	 in	 contemporary	 society.	 The	 next	 section	 spells	 out	 the	
research	design	and	methodology	deployed	in	pursuit	of	these	contributions.	
1.2. Aim,	objectives	and	questions	
The	overarching	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	advance	a	social	scientific	understanding	of	how	
low-carbon	transitions	are	governed,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	capacity	of	national	
government	 institutions	 and	 policies	 to	 navigate	 periods	 of	 political	 and	 economic	
turbulence.	Distilled	from	the	academic	and	empirical	issues	described	above,	the	two	
main	 objectives	 that	 will	 achieve	 this	 aim	 are:	 1)	 to	 push	 existing	 research	 on	 the	
governance	of	transitions	towards	more	political	and	power-oriented	approaches,	and	
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2)	to	evidence	the	added	value	of	such	approaches	by	applying	them	to	an	exemplary	
case	 of	 ambitious,	 but	 faltering,	 national	 government	 leadership	 on	 climate	 change.	
These	 objectives	 are	 operationalized	 in	 the	 form	 of	 four	 specific	 research	 questions	
(with	corresponding	chapters	 in	the	thesis),	each	offering	interdisciplinary	theoretical	
advances	and	novel	empirical	contributions	(see	figure	1.6):	
1. To	 what	 extent	 does	 the	 current	 systems-based	 approach	 to	 describing	 and	
prescribing	 low-carbon	 transitions	 adequately	 address	 social	 and	 political	
dimensions,	and	how	can	social	theory	enhance	this	work?	
2. What	 are	 the	 fundamental	 ideas	 underpinning	 climate	 change	 governance	 in	
the	UK	and	how	are	they	articulated	and	institutionalized	over	time?	
3. How	do	political	 and	economic	pressures	 interact	with	 ideas	 and	 interests	 to	
produce	changes	in	climate	and	low-carbon	energy	policies?	
4. Can	the	 limitations	to	advancing	state-based	climate	policy	be	overcome	by	a	
more	polycentric	approach?	
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Figure	1.6:	Linkages	between	research	aims,	objectives	and	questions.	
1.3. Research	design	
1.3.1. Philosophy	of	science	
Successive	 waves	 of	 critique	 of	 the	 natural	 scientific	 paradigm	 –	 particularly	 its	
assumption	 that	 truths	 about	 reality	 can	 be	 observed	 objectively	 and	 are	 thus	
independent	 of	 subjective	 influences	 –	 have	 lead	 to	 fierce	 debates	 about	 what	
constitutes	 an	 appropriate	 philosophy	 of	 (social)	 science.	 Acknowledging	 many	 of	
these	 long	 running	debates,	Critical	Realism	seeks	 to	bridge	 the	philosophical	 chasm	
that	 separates	 the	 positivism	 of	 natural	 science	 from	 the	 constructionism	 of	 critical	
social	 science.	 In	 short,	 it	 does	 this	 by	 accepting	 that	 there	 are	 multiple	 theories	
(epistemological	relativism)	about	the	same	world	(ontological	realism),	which	are	not	
merely	different	for	the	sake	of	being	different	but	which	offer	more	or	less	significant	
descriptions	i.e.	there	is	a	rationale	for	choosing	one	explanation	or	methodology	over	
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another	 (Archer	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 Danermark	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 Informing	 the	 design	 of	 this	
thesis,	 a	 critical	 realist	 philosophy	 of	 science	 demands	 that	 the	 research	 addresses	
both	objective	and	subjective	components	of	climate	change	politics,	and	that	it	does	
so	 by	 combining	 theoretical	 flexibility	 with	 a	 clear	 justification	 for	 endorsing	
explanations	 of	 the	 interplay	 between	 social	 structures	 and	 human	 agency	 (Jessop,	
2005).	
The	 dialectical	 relationship	 between	 ontology	 and	 epistemology	 is	 central	 to	 critical	
realism	(Bhaskar	and	Norrie,	1998).	This	reflects	idea	of	a	‘double	hermeneutic’	coined	
by	 Giddens	 (1984),	 wherein	 social	 research	 co-evolves	 with	 the	 very	 thing	 it	 is	
researching.	In	practice	this	means	that	what	can	be	known	and	expressed	about	the	
world	 is	always	mediated	by	 the	participant’s	and	researcher’s	particular	history	and	
context	 i.e.	 knowledge	 about	 society	 is	 made	 up	 of	 objective	 and	 subjective	
components	(Jessop,	2005;	Yanow,	2000).	As	such,	a	certain	amount	of	self-reflexivity	
is	required	on	the	part	of	the	researcher.	
For	this	thesis,	critical	realism	demands	a	methodology	and	analysis	that	takes	account	
of	 verifiable	 empirical	 facts,	 such	 as	 climate	 change,	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions,	
economic	calculations	and	policy	decisions	as	well	as	the	accounts	and	interpretations	
of	 individuals	 involved	 in	 articulating,	 enacting	 and	 mediating	 theses	 realities.	 A	
qualitative	case	study	is	well	suited	to	such	an	endeavour	(see	section	1.3.2.	for	a	full	
justification)	 and	has	 a	 rich	multi-disciplinary	 history	 of	 application	within	 the	broad	
school	of	critical	realism	(Easton,	2010).		
In	 terms	 of	 the	 social	 theories	 and	 analytical	 frameworks	 deployed,	 the	 thesis	
deliberately	 tends	 towards	more	 interpretivist	 forms	 in	 order	 1)	 to	 supplement	 the	
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predominance	of	empiricist	studies	within	this	field	(academic	justification),	and	2)	to	
address	the	inherently	personal	dimensions	of	understanding	socio-political	responses	
to	climate	change	(empirical	and	methodological	justification).	Heeding	Healy’s	(2017)	
call	 to	 avoid	 the	 ‘nuance	 trap’	 prevalent	 in	 contemporary	 social	 theory,	 the	 use	 of	
multiple	theories	is	not	presented	as	valuable	in	and	of	itself	(e.g.	in	the	name	of	ever-
increasing	heterogeneity	and	detail)	but	as	a	means	 towards	 ‘useful’	 theoretical	 and	
empirical	contributions	(e.g.	addressing	questions	of	theoretical	parsimony	and	future	
empirical	 research	priorities).	 In	sum,	 following	the	philosophy	of	critical	 realism	and	
the	relativist	pragmatism	of	Morton	(2013)	and	Rorty	(1999),	this	research	rejects	the	
pursuit	 of	 a	 ‘meta-language’	 or	 ‘truth’	 in	 social	 science.	 Instead	 it	 offers	 a	
demonstration	of,	and	reflections	on,	 the	ability	of	multiple	discourses	to	 inform	the	
unavoidably	political	discussion	of	how	to	research	and	influence	effective	governance	
towards	a	climate	compatible	future.	
1.3.2. Methodology	
1.3.2.1. Ensuring	qualitative	quality	
Arguably,	many	environmental	social	science	and	policy	decision-making	processes	are	
marked	by	a	methodological	conservatism	that	 focuses	narrowly	on	quantitative	and	
experimental	 designs	 (Denzin	 and	 Giardina,	 2008).	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 of	 the	
political	 sciences,	 where	 econometrics	 and	 positivist	 methods	 of	 policy	 analysis	 are	
often	 perceived	 to	 carry	 most	 epistemological	 value	 and	 potential	 for	 impact	 (see:	
Pawson,	 2006;	 Sabatier	 and	 Weible,	 2014;	 Winter,	 2000).	 It	 is	 also	 true	 of	 policy	
practice,	 where	 the	 UK	 Government’s	 Magenta	 Book	 offers	 guidance	 on	 the	 best	
		
38	
methods	 for	 evaluating	 policies,	 classifying	 non-experimental	 designs	 as	 ‘weak’	 or	
‘risky’	(see:	Campbell	and	Harper,	2012).	
However,	there	is	also	a	strong	tradition	of	qualitative	work	in	this	field,	which	argues	
that	 text-based	 analysis	 of	 public	 and	 private	 statements	 and	 dialogues	 is	 equally	
important	to	the	study	of	socio-political	processes	(Béland	and	Cox,	2010;	Davoudi	et	
al.,	 2015).	 In	 the	 context	of	 responding	 to	 climate	 change,	 such	qualitative	methods	
are	appropriate	for	studying	the	politics	of	climate	policy	and	governance	because	they	
explore	the	way	individuals	think	and	talk	and	act	(discursive	practice)	and	thus	reveal	
their	values,	beliefs,	worldviews	and	strategic	attempts	to	influence	other	people	and	
the	policymaking	process	(Beamer,	2002;	Fischer,	2003;	Methmann	et	al.,	2013;	Veltri	
et	 al.,	 2014).	 Such	 qualitative	 insights	 are	 seen	 as	 understudied	 yet	 essential	 to	
understanding	 how	 contentious	 social	 transformations	 towards	 a	 low	 carbon	 future	
will	be	achieved	(Feola,	2015;	O’Brien	and	Sygna,	2013).	
Further	 strengthening	 the	 methodological	 case	 for	 the	 quality	 and	 resonance	 of	
qualitative	research,	Tracy	(2010)	synthesises	a	broad	spectrum	of	markers	to	produce	
eight	 universal	 criteria,	 which	 can	 be	met	 using	 different	 principles,	 techniques	 and	
methods.	Examples	of	how	this	thesis	meets	each	criterion	are	as	follows:	
1. Worthy	topic	–	the	politics	of	climate	change	and	energy	in	the	UK	is	relevant	
to	 many	 stakeholders,	 and	 is	 timely	 and	 significant	 given	 the	 urgency	 of	
mitigating	dangerous	 impacts	 from	global	warming	and	given	 recent	political	
and	economics	trends	that	make	this	difficult	e.g.	nationalism	and	austerity.	
		
39	
2. Rich	 rigor	 –	 the	 thesis	 draws	 on	 multiple	 theoretical	 frameworks	 to	 inform	
analysis	 of	 an	 expansive	 and	 rich	 data	 set	 relating	 to	 complex	 social	 and	
political	phenomena	over	an	eight-year	period.	
3. Sincerity	 –	 methodological	 decisions	 and	 limitations	 are	 made	 clear	
throughout	and	reflections	on	researcher	positionality	are	also	included.	
4. Credibility	 –	 thick	 descriptions	 of	 UK	 politics	 and	 policy	 details	 are	 provided	
throughout,	including	explanations	of	tacit	knowledge,	and	the	evidence	base	
includes	multiple	stakeholder	voices	and	data	sources	to	ensure	triangulation	
of	findings.	
5. Resonance	–	findings	regarding	the	individual	level	(e.g.	values	and	strategies)	
and	 the	 social	 level	 (e.g.	 power	 relations	 and	 structures)	 are	 presented	 in	 a	
critical	 way	 to	 stimulate	 discussion	 of	 transferable	 insights	 and	 enduring	
naturalistic	generalisations	about	the	politics	of	social	change.	
6. Significant	contribution	–	the	use	of	multiple	analytical	frameworks	produces	
significant	 multi-disciplinary	 theoretical	 contributions	 and	 heuristic	
recommendations	 for	 thinking	about	 social	 responses	 to	 climate	 change;	 the	
focus	on	strategic	action	and	agency	provides	practical	contributions	for	future	
policy	and	governance.	
7. Ethical	 –	 procedural	 and	 situational	 ethics	 are	 considered	 throughout	 the	
thesis,	particularly	where	individuals’	identities	and	their	expressed	views	may	
be	 politically	 sensitive	 e.g.	 in	 interviews	 with	 senior	 decision-makers	 and	
during	stakeholder	workshop	discussions.	
8. Meaningful	coherence	–	the	thesis	meets	its	stated	overarching	aim	by	using	
methods	 appropriate	 to	 the	 analysis	 of	 socio-political	 processes,	 by	 clearly	
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connecting	research	questions	to	findings	in	each	chapter,	and	by	synthesizing	
these	findings	 in	the	discussion	chapter	to	draw	out	key	themes	and	connect	
them	with	relevant	areas	of	literature.	
1.3.2.2. Case	study	design	and	the	UK	climate	policy	area	
The	use	of	case	studies	in	social	science	research,	and	particularly	by	critical	realist	and	
interpretivist	 scholars,	 is	widespread	 and	 can	 be	 justified	 on	 various	methodological	
and	 pragmatic	 grounds	 (Byrne	 and	 Ragin,	 2009;	 Easton,	 2010;	 Flyvbjerg,	 2006;	 Yin,	
2013).	 For	 instance,	 combining	 both	 rationales,	 Flyvbjerg	 (2001;	 2006)	 champions	
pragmatic	 knowledge	 production	 through	 case	 study	 research,	 or	 what	 he	 calls	
‘phronetic’	 social	 science.	Essentially,	he	argues	 for	 the	 ‘primacy	of	context’	 in	 social	
research,	situating	all	interpretations,	analysis	and	conclusions	in	their	specific	context	
(effectively	 rejecting	 the	 natural	 science	 edict	 that	 theories	 should	 be	 built	 on	 first	
principles).	 This	 approach	 doesn’t	 negate	 generalisations;	 but	 it	 seeks	 to	 advance	
knowledge	through	the	power	of	example	rather	than	the	power	of	universals.	
This	 line	 of	 reasoning	 sits	 well	 with	 the	 relativist	 epistemology	 of	 critical	 realism	
described	above,	and	has	informed	the	selection	of	the	UK	as	an	exemplary	case	study	
of	 a	 turbulent	 climate	 transition.	 Using	 the	 terminology	 of	 Yin	 (2013),	 this	 thesis	
presents	a	‘holistic’	case	study	of	UK	climate	politics	at	the	aggregate	level	but	does	so	
by	drawing	on	 ‘embedded’	 case	 studies	 (e.g.	 examples	of	 specific	 climate	policy	and	
governance	arrangements)	in	each	of	the	three	empirical	chapters.	The	exact	contours	
of	 these	embedded	 cases	 are	described	 in	 each	 chapter.	At	 the	 aggregate	 level,	 the	
case	 study	 focuses	 on	 national	 level	 governmental	 practices,	 but	 even	 this	 involves	
overlapping	political	and	legal	scales	and	jurisdictions	(e.g.	UNFCCC,	EU,	devolved	and	
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local	 authorities).	 Incorporating	 evidence	 from	 these	 multiple	 contexts	 provides	 a	
picture	of	 the	contemporary	nation-state	as	non-reified	and	porous	–	 i.e.	one	site	of	
the	 construction	 of	 climate	 politics	 among	 many	 –	 and	 thus	 avoids	 the	 risk	 of	
perpetuating	a	methodological	nationalism	(Chernilo,	2008).	
Noting	 the	 methodological	 limitations	 of	 using	 a	 hierarchical	 conceptualization	 of	
political	scale	(Brenner,	2001),	this	thesis	avoids	the	temptation	to	split	the	case	study	
into	 discrete	 levels.	 Accordingly,	 the	 particular	 assemblages	 of	 policies	 and	
stakeholders	 studied	 herein	 are	 viewed	 as	 networks	 of	 practices	 and	 actors,	 whose	
borders	 are	 overlapping	 and	 ever	 changing	 but	 are	 temporarily	 defined	 by	 the	
researcher	 through	 a	 process	 of	 snowballing	 and	 discovery	 in	 the	 field	 (see:	 Gobo,	
2008).	Such	an	approach	 fits	with	a	 realist	methodology	of	qualitative	case	selection	
and	 sampling	 (Emmel,	 2013)	 and	 resonates	 with	 the	 relational	 social	 theory	 and	
network	governance	 literature	to	which	the	thesis	seeks	to	make	a	contribution	(e.g.	
Bäckstrand,	2010;	Bulkeley,	2005;	Chernilo,	2008).	
1.3.2.3. Data	collection	and	triangulation	
Three	 different	 sources	 of	 qualitative	 data	 were	 used	 to	 provide	 the	 empirical	
foundations	 for	 the	 thesis:	 written	 records,	 interviews	 and	 workshop	 discussions.	
Written	 records	 were	 gathered	 in	 their	 original	 format,	 whereas	 interviews	 were	
recorded	and	then	transcribed	verbatim	by	the	researcher,	workshop	discussions	were	
transcribed	shorthand	by	three	observers	(the	researcher	plus	two	co-organisers)	and	
then	compiled.	Specific	sampling	criteria	and	strategies	are	described	in	each	chapter,	
but	in	general	the	methodological	rationale	was	theoretical	(to	build	hypotheses)	and	
purposive	(to	bound	the	research	subject)	(see	Emmel,	2013).	
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Throughout	 the	 research,	 the	 overarching	 rationale	 for	 gathering	 documents	was	 to	
use	 them	 as	 a	 form	 of	 triangulation,	 corroborating	 verbal	 accounts	 and	 informing	
abductive	 reasoning	 throughout	 iterative	waves	of	 data	 collection	 and	analysis	 (See:	
Charmaz,	 2014;	 Emmel,	 2013;	Manzano,	 2016;	Wetherell,	 2001).	 Thus,	 strict	 criteria	
were	not	 set;	 rather	 the	 researcher’s	 knowledge	of	 the	 subject	 (e.g.	 policies)	 and	of	
sources’	reputations	(e.g.	political	stances)	was	used	to	mediate	data	gathering	(for	a	
methodological	 discussion	 of	 this	 see:	 Yanow,	 2000).	 Wherever	 these	 texts	 have	
directly	informed	the	analysis	they	have	been	cited	in	full	in	the	references	section	of	
each	article	and	chapter.	
For	 example,	 government	 policy	 documents	 such	 as	 consultations,	 proposals	 and	
legislation	 provided	 detailed	 information	 about	 instrument	 design	 and	 governance.	
Reports	 by	 semi-independent	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 CCC	 or	 select	 committees	
provided	more	critical	 in-house	evaluations	of	government	activities	as	well	as	a	host	
of	 secondary	 data	 sources	 that	 could	 be	 followed	 up.	 Regarding	 the	 discursive	
construction	of	climate	politics	and	policy,	public	statements	by	key	stakeholders	such	
as	policymakers,	business	 leaders,	scientific	experts	and	political	commentators	were	
analysed.		Media	reporting	of	key	debates	and	decisions	was	also	considered,	drawing	
on	 specialist	 climate	 change	 sources	 such	 as	 Carbon	 Brief	 and	mass	 media	 sources	
such	as	tabloid	and	broadsheet	newspapers.	
Interviews	with	elite	actors	and	those	involved	in	the	broad	climate	policy	community	
are	 a	 vital	 way	 of	 accessing	 the	 beliefs,	 values	 and	 perceptions	 of	 individuals,	 and	
uncovering	 how	 these	 ideational	 elements	 have	 influenced	 outputs	 and	 strategic	
actions	 (Beamer,	 2002).	 Again,	 an	 iterative	 process	 of	 recruitment	 was	 undertaken,	
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relying	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 on	 recommendations	 from	 previous	 interviewees	 that	may	
have	 skewed	 the	 sample	 but	 was	 controlled	 for	 by	 using	 a	 ‘critical	 snowballing’	
method	(see:	Noy,	2008).		
A	 total	of	55	 interviews	were	 conducted	with	48	 individuals	 from	across	 the	 climate	
policy	 community	 (descriptions	 are	 provided	 in	 each	 empirical	 chapter).	 Given	 the	
large	number	and	range	of	stakeholders	in	the	climate	policy	area,	the	voices	included	
in	 this	 thesis	 are	 representative	 rather	 than	exhaustive	 (Yanow,	2000).	 For	 example,	
interviews	 were	 carried	 out	 with	 government	 actors	 to	 discuss	 policymaking,	 with	
NGOs	to	discuss	consultations	and	lobbying,	with	climate	and	energy	sector	specialists	
to	 discuss	 the	 low-carbon	 economy,	 with	 senior	 academics	 and	 commentators	 to	
discuss	 changes	 over	 time,	 and	 with	 media	 organisations	 and	 journalists	 to	 discuss	
narrative	strategies.	 Interviewees	were	also	recruited	through	their	participation	 in	a	
series	of	stakeholder	workshops.		
Climate	policy	stakeholders	from	a	range	of	sectors	–	similar	to	those	outlined	above	–	
were	 invited	 to	 take	 part	 in	 three	 workshops	 (n=28,	 27,	 and	 15)	 facilitated	 by	 the	
researcher	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 ESRC’s	 Centre	 for	 Climate	Change	 Economics	 and	Policy	
and	 DECC	 and	 DEFRA.	 The	 overarching	 purpose	 of	 the	 workshop	 discussions	 and	
activities	 was	 for	 stakeholders	 to	 deliberate	 the	 social	 dimensions	 of	 climate	
transitions	 and	 to	 discuss	 the	 possible	 innovations	 in	 policy	 and	 governance.	
Participants	 were	 free	 to	 share	 information	 under	 the	 Chatham	 House	 Rule,	 which	
allowed	the	content	to	be	used	as	data	for	the	thesis	but	not	be	directly	attributed	to	
any	 individual	or	organisation.	Discussion	 facilitation	was	 light-touch	and	was	carried	
out	 by	 the	 researcher	 and	 two	 colleagues	 from	DECC,	with	 the	 intention	 of	 eliciting	
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information	 that	 could	 help	 answer	 research	 question	 four	 (see	 figure	 1.6).	 The	
political,	 power	 and	 professional	 dynamics	 among	 attendees	 and	 facilitators	 during	
such	 deliberative	 exercises	 are	 unavoidable	 and	 difficult	 to	 control	 for,	 but	 was	
incorporated	into	the	analysis	where	possible	(Fischer,	2003).	This	issue	of	participant-
researcher	positionality	is	discussed	further	in	the	next	section.		
1.3.3. Positionality	and	ethics	
The	researcher’s	own	identity,	positionality	with	regards	to	participants,	and	methods	
of	 interaction	in	the	research	context	are	all	unavoidable	aspects	of	qualitative	 inter-
personal	 research	 (Marshall	 and	 Rossman,	 2014).	 Considering	 these	 factors	 is	
especially	important	in	interpretive	research,	where	interview	dialogues	are	a	process	
of	 eliciting	 and	 even	 co-producing	 a	 particular	 account	 of	 social	 reality	 (e.g.	 about	
climate	policy)	 (Manzano,	 2016;	 Yanow,	2000).	As	data	 collection	was	 carried	out	 in	
distinct	 waves	 over	 a	 period	 of	 three	 years,	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 reflect	 on	 my	
engagements	with	participants	over	 time	 (Pillow,	2003).	 Throughout	 the	 research	all	
data	 collection	 and	 handling	 processes	 were	 governed	 by	 a	 strict	 code	 of	 conduct	
approved	by	the	University	of	Leeds	Ethics	Committee.	
Firstly,	my	own	prior	knowledge	and	assumptions	about	the	UK	case	are	evident	in	the	
choice	 and	 phrasing	 of	 the	 research	 aims,	 objectives,	 and	 questions.	 As	 outlined	 in	
sections	 1.1.1.	 to	 1.1.4.,	 much	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 literature	 suggests	 that	
governments	 will	 find	 it	 extremely	 difficult	 to	 intervene	 in	 society	 to	 produce	
transformational	 and	 rapid	 changes.	 It	 is	 this	 assumption,	 not	 a	 partisan	 conviction	
about	 the	particulars	of	 the	UK	context,	which	 informed	my	 research	design.	Having	
never	been	a	member	of	a	political	party	or	an	employee	of	government	I	was	able	to	
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approach	 the	 topic	 of	 governmental	 capacity	 with	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 (political)	
ideological	 detachment.	 Formal	 assessment	 after	 12	 months,	 and	 10	 supervision	
meetings	per	annum,	provided	further	scrutiny	of	the	research	design	and	practices	to	
ensure	academic	rigor	and	to	avoid	personal	bias.	
Secondly,	 with	 regards	 to	 recruiting	 and	 conducting	 interviews,	 this	 position	 of	
‘outsider’	was	simultaneously	limiting	and	helpful	(see:	Dwyer	and	Buckle,	2009).	Most	
interviewees	 were	members	 of	 specialist	 professions,	 often	 with	 high	 profile	 public	
reputations.	This	 instantly	positioned	me	at	a	critical	distance,	often	being	perceived	
(and	 treated)	 with	 suspicion	 or	 guardedness.	 By	 guaranteeing	 anonymity	 to	
participants	 I	was	 able	 to	provide	 a	 safe	 space	 for	 expressing	personal	 opinions	 and	
also	to	utilise	a	snowball	method	of	recruitment	–	allowing	participants	to	breach	their	
own	 anonymity	 to	 provide	 introductions	 if	 they	 chose	 to	 do	 so.	 As	 part	 of	 the	
recruitment	process	interviewees	were	provided	with	a	brief	overview	of	the	research	
aims	and	details	about	data	handling	(see	appendix	A).	
My	 own	 position	 as	 a	 critical	 and	 questioning	 researcher,	 presumably	 perceived	 as	
having	 a	 normative	 interest	 in	 seeing	 successful	 climate	policy	 and	 governance,	 also	
encouraged	 interviewees	 to	 offer	 personal,	 not	 just	 party	 line	 or	 professional,	
interpretations.	 The	 interviews	 took	 place	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 locations	 and	 followed	 a	
different	format	each	time	depending	on	the	interviewee’s	expertise	(see	appendix	B	
for	 an	 example	 of	 the	 interview	 topic	 guide).	 Some	 were	 conducted	 remotely	 via	
telephone	or	Skype,	which	did	not	pose	any	additional	ethical	considerations	but	did	
limit	 my	 ability	 to	 make	 in-situ	 observations	 and	 build	 rapport	 (King	 and	 Horrocks,	
2010).	 Face	 to	 face	 interviews	 took	 place	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 locations	 including	 private	
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offices	 and	 public	 spaces,	 each	 raising	 a	 different	 set	 of	 power	 dynamics	 and	
interpersonal	issues	(see:	Elwood	and	Martin,	2000).	
Lastly,	the	three	stakeholder	workshops	all	took	place	at	the	offices	of	DECC,	involving	
large	 and	 small	 group	 discussions	 as	 well	 as	 presentations	 and	 output	 building	
exercises.	Throughout	this	process,	two	members	of	CCCEP	(including	myself)	and	two	
members	 of	 DECC	 assumed	 the	 role	 of	 facilitators.	 Thus,	 it	 was	 possible	 for	 me	 to	
shape	the	agenda	and	broad	discussion	topics	to	ensure	my	research	questions	were	
being	addressed,	whilst	excluding	myself	from	the	substantive	discussions	themselves.	
This	 positioned	me	 in	 an	 awkward	 space	 somewhere	 between	 outsider	 and	 insider	
(Dwyer	 and	 Buckle,	 2009),	 and	 also	 encouraged	 me	 to	 engage	 in	 ‘uncomfortable	
reflexivity’	 whereby	 I	 was	 forced	 to	 consider	 the	 extent	 to	 which	my	 own	 research	
objectives	and	participation	were	shaping	each	iteration	of	the	workshop	series	e.g.	as	
compared	 to	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 co-organisers	 and	 participants	 (Pillow,	 2010).	
Because	of	the	co-production	aims	of	the	workshops	(see	appendix	C	for	an	example	of	
the	brief	given	to	participants),	they	are	best	described	as	participatory	action	research	
as	opposed	to	ethnographic	observation	of	policymaking	(Kindon	et	al.,	2009).	
1.4. Thesis	overview	and	key	contributions	
The	thesis	contains	a	number	of	theoretical	and	empirical	contributions,	relating	to	the	
two	main	research	objectives	(figure	1.6),	which	are	distributed	across	the	remaining	
five	chapters.	Chapter	2	begins	with	a	critical	review	of	prevailing	theories	of	climate	
transitions.	Chapters	3,	4,	and	5	provide	the	empirical	case	study	work,	detailing	 the	
turbulent	 politics	 and	 policy	 of	 climate	 change	 in	 the	 UK	 between	 2006	 and	 2016.	
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Chapter	 6	 draws	 together	 the	 key	 findings	 of	 the	 preceding	 chapters,	 synthesizing	
them	into	recommendations	and	implications	for	research	and	practice.	
Chapter	2	 sets	 the	 conceptual	 scene	 for	 the	 thesis	by	 raising	 the	 critical	 question	of	
how	societies	can	achieve	a	 transformational	 response	to	climate	change.	 It	answers	
research	question	1	by	highlighting	the	inherent	limitations	to	the	currently	dominant	
systems	thinking	approach	of	theorizing	and	governing	climate	transitions.	This	recent	
academic	 debate	 is	 advanced	 by	 drawing	 on	 the	 political	 geography	 term	 of	
‘assemblage’	 to	 replace	 the	 ontology	 of	 systems	 with	 one	 of	 spatially	 diffused	 and	
contingent	 networks,	 and	 the	 sociological	 notion	 of	 ‘social	 fields’	 to	 show	 how	
institutional	 entrepreneurs	 within	 these	 networks	 draw	 on	 influential	 ideas	 during	
times	of	crisis	to	drive	significant	change.	
Chapter	3	addresses	research	question	2,	theorizing	and	empirically	demonstrating	the	
influence	of	ideas	and	discourses	on	what	was	previously	perceived	to	be	a	consensual	
and	ambitious	climate	policy	institution	in	the	UK.	Discursive	institutionalism	provides	
the	 overarching	 analytical	 framework	 for	 this	 chapter,	 but	 its	 explanatory	 power	 is	
enhanced	 through	 a	 description	 of	 three	 types	 of	 ideational	 power.	 This	
complementary	 set	 of	 concepts	 is	 used	 to	 illustrate	 the	 way	 policymakers	 and	
stakeholders	used	and	altered	discourses	of	climate	economics	and	governance	to	fit	
with	a	broader	austerity	agenda.	Significantly,	this	chapter	suggests	that	the	ideational	
and	discursive	foundations	of	the	UK’s	climate	policy	is	not	as	strong	as	it	appears	on	
paper	and	is	already	being	undermined	by	political	and	economic	pressures.	
Chapter	 4	 picks	 up	 on	 the	 previous	 chapter’s	 concerns	 about	 retrenchment	 and	
provides	 a	 more	 empirically	 oriented	 examination	 of	 climate	 policy,	 specifically	
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emissions	reductions	targets	and	low-carbon	energy	supply.	It	explores	the	arguments	
around	 the	 economic	 case	 for	 these	 policies,	 using	 documentary	 analysis,	 media	
coverage,	and	interviews	to	show	how	different	actors	perceive	them	as	more	or	less	
proportionate	 (research	 question	 3).	 These	 arguments	 typically	 evoke	 economic	
language	 (e.g.	 policy	 bubbles	 and	 over-investment)	 to	 legitimize	 and	 professionalise	
the	discourse,	but	doing	so	covers	up	for	some	politically	motivated	decisions	around	
the	 time	 of	 an	 election	 and	 on	 certain	 contentious	 agendas	 such	 as	 shale	 gas	 and	
nuclear	energy.	
Chapter	5	 is	 concerned	with	 the	 structure-agency	dialectic	 and	 the	way	government	
institutions	 and	 actors	 are	 positioned	 in	 the	 (post-)austerity	 policy	 landscape.	
Stakeholder	 workshops	 and	 interviews	 are	 used	 to	 explore	 the	 climate	 policy	
community’s	 strategies	 and	 responses	 to	 the	 previously	 identified	 barriers.	 Using	
polycentric	governance	as	an	ideal-type	framework,	this	chapter	points	to	examples	of	
non-central-government	 actors	 in	 driving	 governance	 and	 policy	 innovation.	 This	
finding	echoes	much	of	the	optimism	of	the	environmental	governance	literature,	but	
it	 does	 so	 cautiously	 and	 with	 new	 evidence	 to	 show	 that	 the	 government	 power	
relations	and	rationales	continue	to	be	influential	(research	question	4).	
Chapter	6	briefly	 restates	 the	answers	 to	all	 four	 research	questions	before	drawing	
them	together	to	outline	their	key	theoretical	and	empirical	contributions	i.e.	meeting	
the	two	research	aims.	These	are	synthesized	into	two	overarching	themes,	each	with	
a	number	of	implications	for	academic	research	and	policy	practices.	One	theme	refers	
to	 the	 inherent	 limitations	 to	 state-led	 social	 change,	 reconfirming	previous	 findings	
about	 the	difficulty	of	mainstreaming	 climate	goals	 into	government	but	also	 raising	
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new	 concerns	 about	 the	 tendency	 towards	 incrementalism	 and	 a	 growing	 gap	
between	 rhetoric	and	action.	The	other	 theme	 refers	 to	 the	way	 low	carbon	 futures	
are	described,	contested	and	constructed	through	social	and	political	processes.	Most	
significantly,	the	findings	of	this	thesis	demonstrate	the	need	for	greater	attention	to	
such	 discursive	 practices	 and	 the	 way	 they	 can	 worsen	 or	 ameliorate	 periods	 of	
difficult	 transition.	 The	 chapter	 and	 thesis	 conclude	with	 a	 set	 of	 reflections	 on	 the	
research	 process	 and	 the	 value	 of	 its	 outcomes	 for	 future	 researchers	 and	
policymakers	in	the	UK	and	beyond.		
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Abstract	
There	 is	 a	 growing	 imperative	 for	 responses	 to	 climate	 change	 to	 go	 beyond	
incremental	 adjustments,	 aiming	 instead	 for	 society-wide	 transformation.	 In	 this	
context,	 socio-technical	 (ST)	 transitions	 and	 social-ecological	 (SE)	 resilience	 are	 two	
prominent	normative	agendas.	Reviewing	 these	 literatures	 reveals	how	both	 share	a	
complex-systems	epistemology	with	 inherent	 limitations,	often	producing	managerial	
governance	 recommendations	 and	 foregrounding	 material	 over	 social	 drivers	 of	
change.	 Further	 interdisciplinary	 dialogue	 with	 social	 theory	 is	 essential	 if	 these	
frameworks	 are	 to	 become	 more	 theoretically	 robust	 and	 capable	 of	 informing	
effective,	 let	 alone	 transformational,	 climate	 change	 governance.	 To	 illustrate	 this	
potential,	 ideas	 from	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari’s	 political	 writing	 as	 well	 as	 other	
approaches	 that	utilize	 the	notion	of	 social	 fields	 (as	opposed	 to	 socio-	 systems)	are	
combined	to	more	fully	theorize	the	origins	and	enactment	of	social	change.	First,	the	
logic	 of	 systems	 is	 replaced	 with	 the	 contingency	 of	 assemblages	 to	 reveal	 how	
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pluralism,	 not	 elitism,	 can	 produce	 more	 ambitious	 and	 politicized	 visions	 of	 the	
future.	 In	 particular	 this	 view	encourages	us	 to	 see	 social	 and	ecological	 tensions	 as	
opportunities	 for	 thinking	 and	 acting	 differently	 rather	 than	 as	 mere	 technical	
problems	to	be	solved.	Secondly,	the	setting	of	social	fields	is	introduced	to	situate	and	
explain	the	power	of	ideas	and	the	role	of	agency	in	times	of	uncertainty.	The	potential	
of	 such	 insights	 is	 already	 visible	 in	 some	 strands	 of	 climate	 change	mitigation	 and	
adaptation	research,	but	more	needs	to	be	done	to	advance	this	field	and	to	bring	 it	
into	 dialogue	 with	 the	 mainstream	 systems	 based	 literature.
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2.1. Introduction	
The	policy	implications	of	the	Fifth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	
on	Climate	Change	(IPCC,	2014b)	(IPCC)	are	both	deep	and	wide	ranging.	In	particular,	
the	 contribution	 of	 Working	 Group	 II	 (IPCC,	 2014a)	 calls	 for	 timely	 and	 significant	
society-wide	transformational	change.	Such	an	undertaking	will	need	to	secure	broad	
scientific,	 political	 and	 civic	 input	 and	 support	 in	 order	 to	maximize	 the	diversity	 of,	
and	 buy-in	 for,	 multiple	 pathways	 of	 change	 toward	 a	 climate	 compatible	 future.	
Whether	through	the	IPCC	or	any	other	social	institution,	the	way	climate	and	society	
relations	 are	 conceptualized	 greatly	 influences	 the	 way	 their	 co-evolution	 is	
interpreted	 and	 responded	 to	 (Hulme,	 2010).	 Thus,	 when	 such	 large-scale	 and	
deliberate	transformations	of	society	are	invoked,	questions	of	representation,	ethics	
and	 sustainability	 immediately	 arise	 (O’Brien,	 2012,	 Feola,	 2015).	Whose	 envisioned	
future	 are	 we	 pursuing	 and	 along	 which	 pathways?	 Who	 bears	 the	 cost	 of	 the	
transformation	and	who	reaps	the	benefits?	What	weighting	is	given	to	environmental,	
social	 and	economic	priorities?	 Interdisciplinary	 social	 science	 that	draws	on	 insights	
from	social,	political,	economic	and	behavioural	research	is	well	placed	to	help	answer	
such	questions	(Feola,	2015,	ISSC/UNESCO,	2013,	Sovacool,	2014,	Stirling,	2011).	
Within	 the	 climate	 change	 literature	 transformational	 responses	 to	 environmental	
change	are	generally	defined	by	their	scale,	novelty	and/or	spatial	reach	compared	to	
incremental	 strategies	 (Burch	et	al.,	2014,	Kates	et	al.,	2012,	Park	et	al.,	2012).	Such	
significant	 levels	 of	 change	 that	 affect	 fundamental	 aspects	 of	 society	 are	 likely	 to	
involve	 multiple	 social	 processes.	 Based	 on	 reviews	 of	 the	 global	 environmental	
change	 literature	 these	 processes	 can	 be	 grouped	 into	 a	 typology	 of:	 practical	
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innovations	 in	 technology,	 management	 strategies	 and	 behaviour,	 political	 contests	
between	 incumbents	 and	 challengers	 over	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 game	 (i.e.	 how	 society	
functions)	 and	 personal	 explorations	 of	 individual	 and	 collective	 beliefs,	 values	 and	
worldviews	 (Feola,	2015,	O’Brien	and	Sygna,	2013,	Shove	and	Walker,	2010).	One	of	
the	 greatest	 challenges	 for	 environmental	 social	 science	 is	 to	 address	 these	
interrelated	aspects	of	social	change	in	a	balanced	and	interwoven	way.	
Climate	 change	 mitigation	 –	 the	 act	 of	 reducing	 anthropogenic	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions	–	is	often	characterized	as	a	social	and	technological	problem	with	social	and	
technological	 solutions	 e.g.	 involving	 over-consumption	 and	 polluting	 infrastructure	
that	can	be	directly	remedied	through	behaviour	change	and	 low-carbon	technology.	
Accordingly,	 the	 Socio-Technical	 (ST)	 systems	 framework	 explores	 the	 interrelated	
social	 and	 technological	 processes	 through	 which	 sustainability	 innovations	 emerge	
and	are	consolidated	(Geels,	2004,	Haxeltine	et	al.,	2013).	Climate	change	adaptation	–	
the	act	of	responding	to	anticipated	and	present	impacts	of	climate	change	–	has	been	
guided	 more	 by	 Social-Ecological	 (SE)	 systems	 research	 that	 emphasizes	 the	
interdependence	of	 society	 and	ecosystems,	 stressing	 that	 successful	 responses	 to	 a	
changing	climate	will	require	high	levels	of	adaptive	capacity	(Adger	et	al.,	2011,	Folke	
et	 al.,	 2005).	As	 these	 frameworks	 share	 a	 common	 foundation	 in	 ‘complex	 systems	
thinking’,	there	have	been	attempts	to	draw	theoretical	and	applied	lessons	between	
the	 two	 (Fischer-Kowalski	 and	Rotmans,	 2009,	 Foxon	et	 al.,	 2009,	 Park	 et	 al.,	 2012).	
However,	 conceptual	 blind	 spots	 remain	 (most	 notably	 around	 issues	 of	 power	 and	
politics),	suggesting	that	the	systems	epistemology	itself	may	well	be	the	barrier	to	a	
fuller	understanding	of	social	change.	Ultimately	both	frameworks	could	benefit	from	
extra-disciplinary	considerations	reaching	beyond	the	boundaries	of	systems	thinking	
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to	engage	with	more	explicitly	sociological	and	political	modes	of	thought	(Markard	et	
al.,	 2012,	 Meadowcroft,	 2011,	 Scrase	 and	 Smith,	 2009,	 Smith	 and	 Stirling,	 2010).	
Reviewing	and	expanding	on	these	claims,	this	article	presents	two	examples	of	such	
interdisciplinary	 endeavours	 that	 could	 inform	 transformational	 climate	 change	
research	and	practice.	
2.2. Socio-Technical	transitions	and	climate	change	mitigation	
The	notion	of	a	ST	system	emerged	from	the	technology-oriented	field	of	 innovation	
studies.	 Through	 a	 series	 of	 perspective	 widening	 turns,	 the	 influence	 of	 social	
institutions	and	practices	were	also	integrated.	Much	of	this	 influence	coincided	with	
the	 emergence	 of	 Science	 and	 Technology	 Studies,	 which	 problematized	 linear	
understandings	of	scientific	and	technological	 innovation	by	drawing	attention	to	the	
values,	 intentions,	 meaning-making	 and	 subversive	 involvement	 of	 humans	 at	 all	
stages	of	research	and	practice	(Geels,	2004,	Smith	et	al.,	2010).	Examples	ranged	from	
the	small	scale	to	the	 large;	solar	panels	being	used	to	dry	 laundry	or	mosquito	nets	
used	 for	 fishing	 through	 to	 low-carbon	 energy	 options	 that	 either	 decentralize	 or	
consolidate	existing	supply	chains	and	their	associated	web	of	power	relations.	Social	
theory	 too	 benefited	 from	 a	 closer	 focus	 on	 human	 and	 non-human	
(technological/ecological)	relations	by	breaking	down	such	conceptual	dichotomies	to	
reveal	their	effect	on	socially	embedded	processes	of	domination	and	power	(Latour,	
1990,	 Latour,	 2009).	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 radical	 work	 has	 fed	 into	 ST	 systems	
research	varies	greatly	across	 the	 literature	but	overall	 is	minimal.	At	 its	most	 social	
the	 ST	 system	 is	 an	 interdisciplinary	 construct	 encapsulating	 the	 prevailing	modus	
operandi	 of	 a	 given	 (sector	 of)	 society	 and	 its	 embedded	 technological	 artefacts.	
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Typically,	 it	 is	 toward	 the	 normative	 goal	 of	 sustainability	 that	 this	 work	 points,	
prescribing	 transition	 pathways	 towards	 new	 and	 more	 desirable	 relationships	
between	 society	 and	 technology.	 More	 historical	 ST	 research	 has	 addressed	
technological	development	over	longer	periods	of	time,	drawing	useful	insights	about	
the	 co-evolution	 of	 their	 attendant	 social	 institutions	 (Bijker,	 1997,	 Geels,	 2005,	
Sovacool,	 2009).	 This	 work	 has	 been	 a	 timely	 reminder	 for	 innovation	 studies	 and	
sustainability	 transitions	 enthusiasts	 to	 heed	 the	 power	 of	 entrenched	 interests	 and	
ideas	 (Kern,	2011)	but	 it	 features	 less	prominently	 in	 the	climate	change	area	of	 this	
field.	
Much	 of	 the	 ST	 transitions	 literature	 presents	 a	 multi-level	 perspective	 of	 change.	
Therein,	 desirable	 change	 towards	 sustainability	 is	 understood	 to	 result	 from	 the	
modulation	of	three	simultaneous	scalar	pressures:	instability	within,	and	competition	
among,	 ST	 regimes	 (meso	 level),	 successful	 innovations	 from	 smaller	 niches	 (micro	
level)	 and	 changes	 in	 the	broader	 social	 and	material	 landscape	 (macro	 level)(Geels,	
2004,	Geels	 and	 Schot,	 2007).	Whilst	 this	may	 sound	 inclusive,	 the	main	 focus	 is	 on	
practical	issues	(e.g.	behaviour	change,	technology,	management	strategies)	with	only	
limited	 consideration	 of	 the	 institutional	 context	 and	 even	 less	 sensitivity	 to	 the	
interpretations,	 values	 and	 intentions	 of	 actors.	 With	 regards	 to	 climate	 change	
mitigation,	 ST	 transitions	 seek	potential	 social	 (e.g.	 low-carbon	 lifestyle	 choices)	 and	
technical	(e.g.	deploying	low-carbon	technology)	‘solutions’,	often	presenting	them	as	
desirable	 recommendations	 for	 any	 given	 sector	 or	 strata	 of	 society	 (Bergman	 and	
Eyre,	 2011,	 Foxon,	 2011,	 Heiskanen	 et	 al.,	 2010,	 Moloney	 et	 al.,	 2010).	 Granted,	
flexibility	 in	 implementation	 is	 advised	 but	 the	 socio-cultural	 context	 and	 political	
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implications	 of	 adopting	 certain	 solutions	 over	 others	 is	 rarely	 considered	 in	 great	
depth.	
The	potentially	technocratic	narrative	of	a	ST	transition	leaves	little	room	for	exploring	
more	 personal	 and	 political	 drivers	 of	 change	 i.e.	 the	 complex	 nature	 of	 agency	
(Jørgensen,	 2012,	 Rickards	 et	 al.,	 2014,	 Shove,	 2010,	 Shove	 and	 Walker,	 2010),	
contestation	(Manuel‐Navarrete,	2010,	Scrase	and	Smith,	2009,	Swyngedouw,	2013)	
and	 discursive	 diversity	 (Bailey	 and	 Wilson,	 2009,	 Stirling,	 2011).	 Whilst	 some	 ST	
research,	such	as	the	historical	strand	cited	above,	does	 include	political	 institutional	
and	 actor-oriented	 elements,	 attempts	 to	 include	 them	 in	 contemporary	 climate	
change	research	is	hindered	by	a	pervasive	tendency	toward	reductive	methodologies	
that	quantify,	model	and	control	 their	effects	 (Ruth	et	al.,	 2011,	Wangel,	2011).	 The	
mediating	 role	 of	 these	 dynamic	 social	 factors	 on	 the	 very	 practical	 innovations	
described	 in	most	ST	 studies	 is	often	under-acknowledged.	Thus,	 it	may	be	 this	 very	
blind	 spot	 that	 prevents	 applied	 ST	 transitions	 initiatives	 from	 achieving	 the	
transformational	changes	they	seek	and	which	are	demanded	of	them	by	the	urgency	
of	mitigating	dangerous	climate	change	(Avelino	and	Rotmans,	2009,	Geels,	2014,	Kern	
and	Smith,	2008).	Consequently,	the	potential	of	adopting	concepts	and/or	theorizing	
in	conjunction	with	non-system	based	perspectives	has	been	recognized	(Geels,	2011).	
Initial	 responses	 from	 ST	 scholars	 have	 suggested	 fruitful	 theoretical	 developments	
(Avelino	and	Rotmans,	2009,	Geels,	2011)	leading	to	several	meta-reviews	that	call	for	
a	much	more	politicized	and	 interdisciplinary	 research	agenda	 (Markard	et	al.,	2012,	
Meadowcroft,	 2011,	 Smith	 and	 Stirling,	 2010,	 Stirling,	 2014,	 van	 den	 Bergh	 et	 al.,	
2011).	
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2.2.1. Transition	management	
The	shortcomings	of	a	predominantly	behavioural	and	technical	view	of	social	change	
are	 pertinent	 to	 the	 part	 of	 ST	 systems	 literature	 that	 deals	 with	 governance,	 also	
known	 as	 Transition	Management	 (TM).	 Following	 the	multi-level	 narrative	 outlined	
above,	TM	seeks	to	simultaneously	destabilize	the	existing	regime	whilst	fostering,	and	
up	scaling,	niche	level	innovation	(Smith	and	Stirling,	2010).	The	very	idea	of	governing	
or	purposively	managing	change	 in	complex	systems	would	seem	paradoxical	 to	 first	
generation	 systems	 theorists	 who	 adopted	 the	 term	 ‘complex’	 precisely	 to	 describe	
the	unpredictable	and	nonlinear	nature	of	cause	and	effect	in	certain	systems	(Ropohl,	
1999).	Despite	 their	 apolitical	 overtones,	 processes	 such	as	 emergence,	 co-evolution	
and	 self-organization	 have	 been	 built	 into	 the	 lexicon	 of	 ST	 governance	 (Grin	 et	 al.,	
2010,	Loorbach,	2010).	For	example,	the	undesirable	attributes	of	a	given	system	(e.g.	
high	levels	of	emissions	from	the	transport	sector)	are	targeted	through	changes	to	the	
constituent	 elements	 (e.g.	 transportation	 technology)	 and	 their	 functions	 (e.g.	 non-
essential	 and	 inexpensive	 aviation).	 Combing	 this	 strategy	 with	 principles	 from	 the	
wider	 governance	 literature	 TM	 seeks	 to	 produce	 fundamental	 change	 in	 the	
attributes	and	functions	of	ST	systems	through	the	following	levers:	
• Strategic	–	envisioning	of	futures,	pathways	and	long-term	goals	
• Tactical	–	setting	agendas	through	negotiating	and	coalition	building	
• Operational	–	experimenting	with	and	implementing	projects	
• Reflexive	–	monitoring,	evaluating	and	learning	from	feedback		
Whilst	 this	 governance	 toolkit	 is	 based	 on	 the	 theoretical	 foundations	 of	 a	 complex	
systems	view	of	the	world	that	is	favoured	by	environmental	social	sciences	and	other	
	 
67	
67	
fields	 working	 on	 ‘wicked	 problems’	 its	 practical	 applications	 run	 into	 significant	
problems.	This	 is	not	because	ST	systems	are	 inevitably	unpredictable	or	random	but	
because	they	are	subject	to	a	range	of	socio-political	processes	that	are	largely	absent	
from	 a	 systems	 epistemology.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 institutionalised	 ideas	 and	 power	
relations	which	provoke/mediate/resist	social	change	are	grossly	under-appreciated	by	
a	 governance	 style	 that	 breaks	 society	 down	 into	 broadly	 consensual,	 experimental	
and	self-organising	systems.		
This	appears	particularly	problematic	in	governance	contexts	with	weak	accountability	
(e.g.	 fossil	 fuel	extraction	 in	un-democratic	countries),	where	political	 institutions	are	
entrenched	 in	 a	 dominant	 logic	 (e.g.	 economic	 growth	 at	 all	 costs)	 and	 wherever	
hegemonic	power	 is	exercised	(e.g.	global	capitalism).	 It	 is	acknowledged	even	 in	TM	
itself	 that	 ‘only	 a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 actors	will	 be	 involved	 in	 strategic	 and	
tactical	activities’	(Grin	et	al	2010,	p156),	suggesting	that	already	influential	actors	are	
most	 likely	 to	 secure	 a	 presence	 at	 the	 crucial	 envisioning	 stage.	 Who	 defines	 the	
parameters	 and	 pathways	 of	 the	 transition	 is	 a	 fundamental	 yet	 under-explored	
question.	 As	 a	 result,	 some	 TM	 initiatives	 may	 not	 be	 achieving	 their	 desired	
transformational	 ends	 because	 the	 steering	 committee	 is	 made	 up	 of	 dominant	
members	of	society	who	have	a	vested	interest	in	retaining	or	only	partially	reforming	
the	status	quo	(Kern	and	Smith,	2008).	Further,	should	a	momentum	for	change	begin	
to	 accelerate	 too	 quickly,	 then	 these	 actors	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 protect	 their	 own	
interests	 –	 possibly	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 already	 marginalised	 (Eames	 and	 Hunt,	
2013).	However,	 it	would	not	suffice	to	merely	replace	those	responsible	for	steering	
the	transition	with	the	marginalised	and	disaffected.	Common	to	both	scenarios	is	the	
problem	of	a	relatively	small	number	of	actors	without	either	the	will	or	the	power	to	
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unite	and	govern	something	as	fragmented	and	diverse	as	human	society	toward	one	
consensual	vision	of	a	sustainable	future.	
This	 particular	 limitation	 stems	 in	 part	 from	 the	 system	 perspective’s	 use	 of	 the	
ecological	 concept	 of	 isomorphism	 (Holling,	 2001)	 –	 the	 idea	 that	 systems	 have	 a	
tendency	to	develop	a	similarity	in	structure	or	shape	as	they	evolve.	This	is	illustrated	
succinctly	by	 the	ST	 transitions	narrative	of	a	more	sustainable	niche	 ‘up	scaling’	 i.e.	
converting	and	absorbing	resistance	as	it	develops	until	a	critical	mass	is	reached	and	
the	 whole	 system	 tips	 toward	 this	 new	 configuration.	 Two	 key	 assumptions	
underpinning	 this	 view	of	 social	 change	are	objectionable.	 First,	whilst	 it	may	 sound	
like	a	story	of	bottom-up	innovation,	and	triumph,	the	practice	of	TM	described	above	
depends	on	benevolent	 top-down	 intervention	and	guidance.	 It	 is	 up	 to	 a	privileged	
few	to	select,	incubate	and	then	mainstream	their	preferred	low-carbon	technologies	
and	behaviours.	Secondly,	TM	generally	rejects	the	possibility	of	abrupt	and	disjointed	
change.	 Its	 narrow	 view	 of	 power	 as	 an	 entrenched	 and	 static	 force	 to	 be	 chipped	
away	at	leads	to	the	counter-intuitive	principle	of	radical	change	in	incremental	steps	
expressed	by	the	mantra	of	‘more	evolution	than	revolution’	(Rotmans	et	al.,	2001).	It	
is	a	short	step	from	here	to	the	assumption	that	 fundamental	change	can	only	avoid	
causing	catastrophic	collapse	or	 inducing	 insurmountable	 resistance	 in	an	 incumbent	
regime	 if	 it	 emerges	 through	 an	 isomorphic	 process	 choreographed	 by	 an	 elite	
vanguard.	
Such	managerialist	forms	of	governance	overlook	the	way	existing	power	relations	can	
be	 reproduced	 through	 the	 very	 political	 institutions	 and	 social	 arrangements	
responsible	 for	 pursuing	 sustainability	 (Scrase	 and	 Smith,	 2009).	 This	 failure	 to	
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acknowledge	the	variety	of	discursive	and	 ideational	motives	behind	decision-making	
at	multiple	 levels	 by	multiple	 actors	 downplays	 the	 daily	 struggle	 of	 strategists	 and	
practitioners	to	either	accelerate	or	resist	transformational	change	(Bailey	and	Wilson,	
2009,	Wesselink	 et	 al.,	 2011,	 Rickards	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 It	 is	worth	 noting	 here	 that	 this	
democratic	 tension	 –	 which	 is	 a	 recurring	 theme	 within	 the	 field	 of	 sustainable	
development	–	is	by	no	means	peculiar	to	TM.	As	the	imperative	for	wide-spread	social	
action	on	sustainability	grows	 it	 is	vital	 that	accountability	and	democratic	process	 is	
not	simply	assumed,	made	implicit	or	even	put	on	hold	(Hendriks,	2009)	but	is	instead	
‘opened	up’	(Stirling,	2011).	
Partly	due	to	these	shortcomings	many	climate	change	mitigation	initiatives	guided	by	
elite	 driven	 variations	 of	 TM	 will	 continue	 to	 fall	 short	 of	 the	 transformational	
imperative	 for	 rapid	 and	 drastic	 emissions	 reductions.	 For	 instance,	 in	 many	 high-
emitting	countries,	long-term	policy	goals	(such	as	the	UK’s	80%	reduction	in	emissions	
by	 2050)	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 short-term	 political	 cycles	 (Voß	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Not	 only	 is	
there	 an	 incentive	 for	 policymakers	 to	 delay	 strong	 action	 until	 after	 they	 are	 re-
elected	or	are	no	longer	in	power	(Howlett,	2014)	but	there	is	ample	opportunity	for	
doing	 so	 through	 institutionalized	 political	 processes	 (reviews,	 debates,	 vetoes	 etc.)	
that	 are	 difficult	 to	 circumvent	 (Munck	 af	 Rosenschöld	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Here	 we	 can	
expect	to	see	more	conservative	climate	policymaking	e.g.	labelling	existing	actions	as	
pro-climate	rather	than	novel	or	innovative	actions	capable	of	accelerating	low-carbon	
trajectories	(Howlett,	2014,	Jordan	and	Huitema,	2014,	Upham	et	al.,	2014).	
	Despite	 the	 seemingly	 global	 allure	 of	 transition	 discourses,	 TM	 may	 be	 equally	
problematic	 if	 applied	 by	 emerging-emitters	 and	 low-income	 countries	 where	 its	
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implicit	assumption	–	or	outright	ignorance	–	of	democratic	procedure	could	be	easily	
exploited	by	ruling	elites	and	unaccountable	 institutions	 (Escobar,	2015,	Lawhon	and	
Murphy,	2012).	Ultimately	the	ST	systems	framework	favours	a	process	of	innovation	
based	 on	 consensus	 over	more	 contentious	 politics	 and	 pluralistic	 pathways	 (Bailey	
and	Wilson,	2009,	McFarlane,	2009,	Stirling,	2011).	Describing,	as	well	as	prescribing,	
society-wide	 transformations	 capable	 of	 unprecedented	 emissions	 reductions	 will	
require	 a	 much	 greater	 awareness	 of	 how	 competing	 worldviews	 and	 political	
processes	govern	the	pursuit	of	sustainability	transitions.		
2.3. Social-ecological	resilience	and	climate	change	adaptation	
Placing	 society	 within,	 alongside	 or	 before	 its	 natural	 environment	 entails	 different	
ontological	and	epistemological	commitments	that	can	lead	to	very	different	forms	of	
politics	and	governance	(Fischer-Kowalski	and	Rotmans,	2009,	Latour,	2009,	Nordhaus	
and	Shellenberger,	2007).	The	1960s	and	70s	were	a	key	era	for	the	idea	of	ecological	
limits	to	economic	growth	and	the	emergence	of	a	holistic	complex	systems	approach	
to	 studying	 society-environment	 interactions	 (Nordhaus	 and	 Shellenberger,	 2007,	
Røpke,	2004).	The	study	of	Social-Ecological	(SE)	systems	places	the	interdependence	
of	 societies	 and	 ecosystems	 in	 the	 spotlight;	 it	 is	 broadly	 applied	 in	 the	 (social)	
environmental	sciences	and	has	a	great	deal	to	say	about	process	of	change.	Drawing	
heavily	on	systems	theory	and	ecology,	the	influential	book	Panarchy	(Gunderson	and	
Holling,	2001)	developed	an	adaptive	cycle	conceptualization	of	change,	arguing	that	
social	systems,	in	conjunction	with	the	ecosystems	they	depend	on,	can	maintain	their	
vital	functions	through	cycles	of	creative	destruction	and	recourse	to	multiple	states	of	
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equilibrium.	 According	 to	 this	 view,	 the	 direction	 of	 travel	 in	 times	 of	 change	 is	
determined	by	the	presence	and	interaction	of	three	attributes:		
• Potential	–	utilizing	sources	of	capital	for	strategic	action		
• Connectivity	–	regulating	practices	and	mediating	shocks		
• Resilience	–	maintaining	vital	functions	through	recourse	to	multiple	states		
In	the	context	of	adapting	to	the	impacts	of	climate	change	this	theoretical	framework	
has	been	criticized	for	lacking	empirical	validity	and	for	paying	insufficient	attention	to	
human	 livelihoods	and	their	 institutionalized	contexts	 (Berman	et	al.,	2012,	Plummer	
and	 Armitage,	 2007).	 Its	 applications	 appear	 almost	 exclusively	 concerned	 with	
management	strategies	and	contain	minimal	consideration	of	how	these	are	situated	
within	 wider	 political	 structures	 or	 how	 they	 might	 be	 interpreted	 –	 and	 thus	
responded	 to	 in	 discourse	 and	 practice	 –	 by	 actors	 with	 differing	 values	 and	
worldviews	(Berkes	and	Jolly,	2002,	Folke,	2006,	Nelson	et	al.,	2007).	These	limitations	
become	 more	 profound	 as	 climatic	 uncertainty	 increases	 across	 time	 and	 space,	
putting	pressure	on	SE	systems	to	be	prepared	for	the	worst	(Vermeulen	et	al.,	2013).	
In	 these	 instances,	 where	 pre-emptive	 and	 transformational	 action	 is	 called	 for,	 a	
much	more	politicized	 theory	of	 change	will	 need	 to	be	 evoked	 (Kates	 et	 al.,	 2012).	
Questions	around	why	certain	SE	system	states	appear	more	viable	than	others	cannot	
be	adequately	answered	using	the	descriptive	terminology	of	multiple	equilibrium	and	
creative	destruction.	As	with	ST	transitions,	what	is	missing	from	the	SE	system	theory	
of	 change	 is	 a	 dynamic	 understanding	 of	 power,	 i.e.	 how	 and	why	 do	 these	 system	
attributes	and	processes	serve	the	interests	of	some	whilst	inhibiting	those	of	others?	 	
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2.3.1. Adaptive	co-management	of	resources	
Following	 the	 adaptive	 cycle	 theory,	 SE	 systems	 research	 often	 advocates	 a	 form	of	
multi-actor	 governance	 using	 networks	 to	 increase	 resource	 pools,	 connectivity	 and	
opportunities	 for	 social	 learning	 (Folke	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 Based	 on	 studies	 of	 natural	
resource	management	practices,	this	process	of	‘adaptive	co-management’	pursues	SE	
resilience	 through	 polycentric,	 participatory	 and	 accountable	 processes	 –	 thereby	
achieving	a	diversity	of	input,	good	compatibility	between	knowledge	and	context	and	
a	safeguard	against	overlooking	issues	of	social	justice	(Armitage	et	al.,	2008,	Lebel	et	
al.,	2006).	However,	as	with	TM,	in	practice	this	approach	faces	significant	barriers,	not	
least	 because	 the	 theoretical	 assumptions	 and	 practical	 traditions	 upon	 which	 it	 is	
based	were	developed	 for	 small-scale	 resource	management	without	 the	multi-level	
complexity	 of	 globalized	 social	 and	 political	 institutions.	 Reflexivity	 and	 learning	
through	experimentation	are	 laudable	–	 though	never	purely	 technical	–	governance	
principles	but	generalizing	lessons	and	prescribing	ideal	type	processes	should	be	done	
with	caution.	
Numerous	 attempts	 to	 impose	 ‘good	 governance’	 on	 the	 way	 societies	 adapt	 to	
ecological	variability	have	suffered	from	an	under-appreciation	of	power	relations	and	
cultural	difference,	or,	in	other	words,	from	institutional	incompatibility	(Foxon	et	al.,	
2009,	 Lebel	 et	 al.,	 2006,	 Smith	 and	 Stirling,	 2010).	 For	 instance,	 when	 international	
institutions	 such	 as	 the	 UNFCCC	 or	 the	 World	 Bank	 propose	 various	 market-driven	
adaptation	 initiatives	 such	 as	 payments	 for	 ecosystem	 services	 or	 natural	 disaster	
insurance	 schemes,	 they	 rely	 on	 the	 smooth	 translation	 of	 a	 set	 of	 neoclassical	
economic	 assumptions	 that	 are	 often	 fundamentally	 at	 odds	with	 the	 socio-cultural	
norms	 of	 their	 intended	 destination	 (Methmann	 et	 al.,	 2013,	 Okereke	 et	 al.,	 2009,	
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Schipper,	 2006).	 Whilst	 these	 assumptions	 may	 be	 deeply	 embedded	 within	 the	
functioning	 of	 advanced	 liberal	 democracies,	 it	 is	 not	 so	 the	 world	 over.	 Fully	
recognizing	 and	 expressing	 the	 social,	 cultural	 and	 political	 peculiarities	 of	 other	
societies	–	who	often	happen	to	be	the	ones	most	at	risk	of	dangerous	climate	change	
impacts	–	is	a	task	that	may	well	be	beyond	the	aggregated	discourses	of	mainstream	
international	 forms	 of	 climate	 governance	 (Escobar,	 2015,	 Okereke	 et	 al.,	 2009,	
Swyngedouw,	2013),	especially	those	that	perceive	environmental	problems	through	a	
decontextualized	SE	systems	lens.	
Climate	 change	 adaptation	 research	 that	 does	 not	 solely	 rely	 on	 a	 SE	 system	
perspective	 has	 engaged	 with	 some	 of	 these	 issues	 e.g.	 culture,	 perception	 and	
behaviour	 (Adger	 et	 al.,	 2009,	 Grothmann	 and	 Patt,	 2005,	 Lorenzoni	 et	 al.,	 2007).	
Insights	 from	 this	 work,	 particularly	 around	 power	 and	 agency,	 can	 be	 productively	
incorporated	into	the	SE	systems	perspective.	However,	as	with	many	interdisciplinary	
dialogues	there	are	epistemological	and	normative	limitations.	For	example,	the	notion	
of	an	institutional	entrepreneur	–	which	has	striking	similarities	to	the	niche	innovators	
found	in	ST	transitions	–	has	gained	conceptual	currency	in	SE	systems	research.	This	
idea	builds	in	part	on	Folke	et	al.	(2005)	in	emphasizing	social	learning	and	leadership	
in	adaptive	governance	but	also	in	part	as	a	response	to	the	criticisms	levelled	against	
climate	policies	 that	cast	 individuals	as	mere	 respondents	 to,	 rather	 than	carriers	of,	
transformational	 change	 (Shove,	 2010,	 Stirling,	 2011).	 Seen	 as	 the	 harbingers	 of	
disruptive	 innovation,	 these	 individuals	can	guide	systems	 in	 the	desired	direction	of	
adaptation	 depending	 on	 their	 levels	 of	 resources,	 power	 and	 positioning	 within	 a	
network	(Westley	et	al.,	2011,	Westley	et	al.,	2013).	However,	as	Rickards	et	al.	(2014)	
illustrate,	even	 senior	decision	makers	who	support	 strong	action	on	climate	change	
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are	 constrained	 by	 their	 social	 milieu,	 often	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 transformational	
society-wide	 change	 is	 moot.	 One	 encouraging	 aspect	 of	 this	 research	 is	 the	
acknowledgement	 of	 actors’	 capacities	 for	 agitation	 i.e.	 for	 proactively	 opening	
windows	of	opportunity	to	drive	social	and	political	change	(Blyth,	2002,	Westley	et	al.,	
2013).	Bringing	the	discourses,	practices,	strategies	and	(most	of	all)	the	interactions	of	
various	influential	actors	(e.g.	social	movement	leaders,	boundary	organizations,	local	
activists,	 social	 entrepreneurs	 and	 policymakers)	 into	 sharper	 focus	 may	 reveal	
undercurrents	of	discontent	and	conduits	for	innovation.	
Many	climate	change	adaptation	 initiatives	based	on	the	SE	systems	perspective	aim	
to	increase	a	society’s	levels	of	potential,	connectivity	and	especially	resilience.	Yet,	to	
derive	 a	 policy	 or	 governance	 mandate	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 resilience	 in	 the	
short-term	 leads	 to	 adaptation	 in	 the	 long-term	 runs	 directly	 into	 criticisms	 of	
reactionary	conservatism,	deterministic	thinking	and	political	naivety	(Rose,	2011).	For	
instance,	the	capacity	to	maintain	the	vital	functions	of	a	given	social	system	may	not	
always	 be	 exercised	 in	 a	 progressive	 or	 desirable	 manner,	 particularly	 from	 the	
viewpoint	 of	 the	 oppressed	 and	 marginalized	 who	 would	 rather	 see	 more	 radical	
change.	In	this	form,	resilience	may	be	seen	as	an	apology	for	incrementalism	similar	
to	that	of	the	isomorphism	of	TM	where	restorative	stability	is	preferred	to	disruptive	
alternatives.	 For	 this	 reason	 human	 geographers	 and	 other	 scholars	 working	 on	
international	 development	 and	 security	 have	 been	 particularly	 critical	 of	 the	 rise	 of	
resilience	 as	 a	 new	 interdisciplinary	 norm.	 Some	 see	 this	 conservative	 form	 of	
resilience	 as	 depoliticizing	 climate	 change	 and	 reinforcing	 a	 neoliberal	 form	 of	
governing	that	is	responsible	for	escalating	socio-economic	inequality	and	vulnerability	
(Evans	and	Reid,	2014,	Joseph,	2013,	Swyngedouw,	2010,	Walker	and	Cooper,	2011).	
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In	 response	 to	 such	 rebuttals,	 the	 transformational	 potential	 of	 the	 concept	 has	
become	 increasingly	 discussed	 and	 much	 empirical	 work	 has	 been	 done	 to	 track	
exactly	 how	 SE	 systems	 enact	 and	 achieve	 their	 resilience	 in	 times	 of	 crisis	 and	
evolution.	 For	 instance,	 in	 relation	 to	 climate	 change	adaptation,	 Pelling	 (2010,	p79)	
proposes	the	following	typology:	
• Resilience	 –	 Functional	 persistence	 in	 a	 changing	 environment.	 Change	 in	
technology,	management	practice	and	organization.	
• Transition	–	Realize	the	full	potential	through	the	exercise	of	rights	within	the	
established	 regime.	 Change	 in	 practices	 of	 governance	 to	 secure	 procedural	
justice;	this	can	in	turn	lead	to	incremental	change	in	the	governance	system.	
• Transformation	 –	 Reconfigure	 the	 structures	 of	 development.	 Change	
overarching	political-economy	regime.	
As	societal	responses	to	climate	change	move	toward	the	transformational	end	of	this	
continuum,	 issues	of	 justice,	 legitimacy,	authority	and	representation	will	need	to	be	
foregrounded	(Kates	et	al.,	2012,	Pelling,	2010).	However,	this	may	prove	impossible	–	
both	in	theory	and	in	practice	–	from	within	the	confines	of	a	SE	systems	discourse	that	
defines	 resilience	 as	 an	 apolitical	 property,	 characteristic	 or	 function.	 If	
transformational	social	change	is	to	be	achieved	in	an	empowering	and	pro-poor	way	
then	 a	 more	 politicized	 view	 of	 climate	 change	 adaptation	 is	 needed	 to	 expose,	
problematize	and	resist	the	on-going	reproduction	of	harmful	power	relations	(Béné	et	
al.,	 2014,	 Evans	 and	 Reid,	 2014,	 Walker	 and	 Cooper,	 2011).	 However	 it	 should	 be	
noted	that	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	transformation	itself	should	become	another	new	
uncritical	normative	goal	–	every	norm	should	have	its	critique.	As	some	research	has	
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shown,	 stability	 and	 security	 may	 sometimes	 be	 preferable	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	
maladaptation	 to	 climate	 change	 (Fazey	 et	 al.,	 2009,	Wise	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Ultimately,	
responding	 to	 climate	 change	 should	 be	 seen	 not	 as	 a	 technical	 problem	 to	 be	
managed	away	but	as	an	opportunity	to	radically	rethink	and	rebuild	social,	ecological	
and	economic	relations	(Manuel‐Navarrete,	2010).	
2.3.2. Politics	 and	 power	 in	 systems:	 furthering	 an	 interdisciplinary	
research	agenda	
The	above	review	has	outlined	considerable	gaps	in	the	explanatory	power	of	ST	and	
SE	 frameworks,	 especially	 when	 applied	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 society-wide	
transformational	 change.	 In	 particular,	 the	 enabling/constraining	 effects	 of	 political	
structures	 and	 socially	 embedded	 power	 relations	 are	 under-theorized.	 Without	
examining	the	mediating	role	of	politics	and	power	in	times	of	uncertainty	and	change	
these	perspectives	will	 only	 offer	 partial	 explanations	 for	why	 truly	 transformational	
responses	to	climate	change	are	still	so	rare.	Before	illustrating	how	social	theory	may	
improve	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 origins	 of	 transformational	 agendas	 and	 their	
agitation	for	expression,	a	brief	survey	of	existing	interdisciplinary	work	in	this	vein	is	
presented.	
In	 addition	 to	 highlighting	 the	 hegemony	 of	 neoliberal	 ideas	 about	 unrestricted	
markets	and	individualism	(Joseph,	2013,	Methmann	et	al.,	2013,	Swyngedouw,	2013)	
critics	of	the	mainstream	climate	change	and	systems	research	agenda	have	suggested	
importing	concepts	from	other	disciplines	as	well	as	combining	them	with	completely	
different	perspectives.	 For	 instance,	 in	order	 to	get	at	 the	 ‘politics	behind	policy’,	 to	
(re)	 politicize	 TM	 and	 adaptive	 governance,	 Meadowcroft	 (2011)	 and	 Kern	 (2011)	
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suggest	 turning	 to	 political	 science	 for	 guidance	 in	 three	 crucial	 areas	 of	 analysis:	
interests,	institutions	and	ideas.	Resonating	with	the	work	of	O’Brien	and	Sygna	(2013)	
and	Shove	and	Walker	(2010)	on	practical,	political	and	personal	aspects	of	responding	
to	global	environmental	change,	this	way	of	dividing	up	(but	not	disconnecting)	a	given	
context	 of	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 or	 adaptation	 immediately	 opens	 socially-
oriented	lines	of	questioning:	whose	interests	do	practical	changes	in	technology	and	
behaviour	serve,	how	are	political	institutions	constraining	or	enabling	transformations	
in	society,	and	which	 ideas	are	shaping	 the	process	of	change	and	 inspiring	personal	
engagement?		
In	addition,	Scrase	and	Smith	(2009)	and	Manuel‐Navarrete	(2010)	offer	a	fairly	blunt	
and	 politically	 realist	 view;	 without	 a	 fundamental	 redistribution	 of	 power	 and	
resources	 the	 diaspora	 of	 existing	 niche	 level	 innovations	 and	 social	 movements	
pursuing	 a	 low-carbon	 future	 will	 never	 flourish.	 However,	 the	 types	 of	 power	
(instrumental,	discursive,	material	etc.)	 that	are	 to	be	addressed	will	 vary	depending	
on	researchers’	and	practitioners’	epistemologies.	Pertinent	to	all	of	these	suggestions	
is	 the	thorny	 issue	of	cost	and	benefit	distribution,	especially	given	the	high	demand	
on	 political	 capital/feasibility	 entailed	 in	 any	 transformational	 change	 (Smith	 and	
Stirling,	2010).	The	need	to	be	explicit	and	transparent	when	discussing	and	calculating	
distributive	processes	and	outcomes	is	of	central	concern	to	climate	change	and	social	
change	researchers	alike.	This	is	just	one	reminder	of	the	need	to	reinterpret	how	and	
why	technical	 information	about	ST	and	SE	systems	 is	being	presented	as	a	rationale	
for	pursuing	reformist	rather	than	radical	responses	to	climate	change.	
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Addressing	 some	of	 these	 issues	 common	 to	both	 systems	 theory	and	 social	 science	
more	broadly	requires	good	interdisciplinary	research.	As	Bailey	&	Wilson	(2009)	note,	
much	work	 on	 ST	 transitions	 and	 SE	 resilience	 does	 not	 actually	 theorize.	 Instead	 it	
presents	a	 framework	 that	 tries	 to	 identify	and	describe	system	processes	 through	a	
techno-centric	 or	 eco-centric	 lens,	 neglecting	 a	 host	 of	 social	 theory	 insights	 and	
predictions	about	human	agency	and	power	in	times	of	change.	But	they	also	point	out	
that	this	need	not	be	a	permanent	limitation;	 it	may	in	fact	enable	creative	dialogue.	
Previous	 interdisciplinary	 interventions	 have	 explored	 the	 applicability	 of	 different	
power	concepts	within	a	transitions	framework	(Avelino	and	Rotmans,	2009),	opened	
a	dialogue	between	ST	and	SE	systems	(Foxon	et	al.,	2009,	Park	et	al.,	2012,	Fischer-
Kowalski	 and	 Rotmans,	 2009),	 and	 sought	 to	 deepen	 the	 description	 of	 social	
processes	 (Rauschmayer	 et	 al.,	 2015,	 Armitage	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 However,	 in	 varying	
degrees,	conceptual	blind	spots	(e.g.	ideas	and	agency)	remain,	as	does	a	problematic	
tendency	towards	technical	rather	than	political	forms	of	governance.	
Several	 literature	reviews	have	noted	this	 limitation	and	proposed	a	more	politicized	
direction	for	research	(Lawhon	and	Murphy,	2012,	Markard	et	al.,	2012,	Meadowcroft,	
2011).	 This	 cross-fertilization	has	expanded	 the	 scope	and	ambition	of	 some	applied	
transitions	 work	 (Haxeltine	 et	 al.,	 2013)	 but	 its	 influence	 on	 the	 theoretical	
foundations	of	systems	theory	–	as	applied	to	sustainability	and	climate	change	–	has	
been	 limited	 (Geels,	 2011,	 Geels,	 2014).	 Despite	 these	 efforts,	 there	 may	 still	 be	
fundamental	 limitations	 to	 adopting	 a	 systems	 based	 view	 of	 social	 change.	 Social	
processes	 such	 as	 interpersonal	 relations,	 ideas,	 discourse	 and	 strategic	 action	 are	
capable	 of	 generating	 and	 enacting	 transformational	 change	 but	 they	 cannot	 be	
implicitly	assumed	or	partially	and	clumsily	bolted	on	to	what	is	at	heart	a	functionalist	
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epistemology.	 A	more	 comprehensive	 engagement	with	 concepts	 from	 social	 theory	
can	help	to	critically	examine	these	processes	as	well	as	demonstrate	their	influential	
role	in	shaping	social	responses	to	climate	change.	
2.4. The	seeds	of	change	
The	 writings	 of	 Gilles	 Deleuze	 and	 Felix	 Guattari	 contain	 numerous	 concepts	 of	
relevance	 to	 ecological	 thought	 and	 environmental	 politics	 (Buchanan	 and	 Thoburn,	
2008,	Deleuze,	1994,	Guattari,	2005,	Herzogenrath,	2009).	Collaborating	after	the	1968	
social	movements	 in	Paris,	 they	 combined	philosophy	and	psychology	 to	propose	an	
approach	to	political	activism	that	emphasised	subjects	over	systems	i.e.	agency	over	
structure	 (Goodchild,	1996).	Their	work	 shares	 some	ontological	and	epistemological	
assumptions	with	complex	systems	thinking,	inasmuch	as	they	view	society	as	made	up	
of	 networked	 connections	 among	 actors	 evolving	 in	 unpredictable	 non-linear	 ways.	
However,	 by	 describing	 this	 as	 a	 spatially	 and	 temporally	 contingent	 ‘assemblage’	
rather	 than	 as	 a	 definable	 system	 they	 emphasised	 the	 creative	 potential	 of	 ever-
changing,	 and	 often	 conflicting,	 relations	 between	 actors	 (human	 and	 non-human	
alike).	 Accordingly,	 the	 discord	 and	 instability	 of	 micropolitics	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	
consensus	 and	 isomorphism	 of	 management	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 most	 potent	
opportunities	for	innovation	and	change	(Scott-Cato	and	Hillier,	2010).	
In	 practice,	 this	 position	 supports	 recent	 calls	 for	 more	 pluralistic	 and	 positive	
environmental	politics	 that	 can	bring	conflicting	worldviews	 together	 in	 search	of	an	
adequate	response	to	the	threats	of	global	climate	change	(Escobar,	2015,	Nordhaus	
and	Shellenberger,	2007,	Stirling,	2011).	However,	 inclusivity	alone	 is	not	enough,	as	
the	 repeated	 shortcomings	 of	 international	 climate	 negotiations	 attest.	 Genuinely	
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participatory	and	novel	 interactions	will	have	to	take	place	 in	 less	aggregated	arenas	
i.e.	not	 just	multi-actor	governance	dancing	to	the	tune	of	top-down	prescriptions	or	
the	seemingly	unassailable	logic	of	globalized	economic	markets	(Manuel‐Navarrete,	
2010).	 Social,	 cultural	 and	 political	 différence	 ought	 to	 be	 celebrated	 for	 its	
provocations	 (differing)	not	 its	 legitimizing	 (deferring)	effects.	As	political	 theories	of	
learning	suggest,	in	the	context	of	environmental	policy	we	can	expect	macropolitical	
structures	 (e.g.	 institutions	 and	 paradigms)	 to	 produce	 incremental	 or	 ‘of	 a	 kind’	
change	 (Bailey	 and	 Wilson,	 2009,	 Munck	 af	 Rosenschöld	 et	 al.,	 2014)	 and	 the	
micropolitical	 (e.g.	 personal	 networks	 and	 social	 movements)	 to	 produce	 radically	
alternative	 discourses	 and	 practices	 (Bailey	 and	 Wilson,	 2009,	 Folke	 et	 al.,	 2005,	
Pelling,	2010).		
To	 illustrate,	 the	 governments	 and	 industries	 of	 most	 wealthy	 countries	 –	 and	 the	
international	institutions	they	dominate	–	have	predominantly	sought	to	reform	rather	
than	 rethink	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 arrangements	 responsible	 for	 anthropogenic	
climate	 change	 e.g.	 through	 ecological	 modernization	 and	 green	 capitalism.	 Yet,	
however	hegemonic	 such	discourses	of	global	capitalism	may	seem	there	are	always	
cracks	in	the	system	to	be	found	and	exploited.	Contradicting	Lukes’	(1974)	notion	of	a	
totalizing	 cognitive	 form	 of	 power,	 Deleuze	 and	 Guattari	 remind	 us	 of	 the	 creative	
potential	 of	 inter-subjectivity	 (Goodchild,	 1996),	 of	 the	 destabilizing	 effect	 of	 actors’	
expressive	 and	 material	 capacities	 when	 they	 come	 together	 and	 collide	 with	 each	
other	and	with	the	status	quo.	Whether	in	the	economic	degrowth	road	to	emissions	
reductions	or	the	post-development	approach	to	climate	change	adaptation,	there	are	
numerous	 transformational	discourses	and	practices	 that	 reject	 the	very	 foundations	
of	more	reformist	agendas	(Escobar,	2015).		
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So	what	does	all	this	add	to	the	ST	and	SE	narratives	of	change?	One	major	advantage	
is	that	it	affords	actors	a	latent	capacity	–	or	agency	potential	–	that	is	obscured	by	the	
systems	 perspectives	 i.e.	 a	 potential	 to	 be	 and	 to	 act	 in	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 ways	 in	
relation	 to	other	actors	or	 systems	and	across	 time	and	space.	 It	 thereby	makes	 the	
contingency	 rather	 than	 the	 functionality	 of	 systems	 more	 analytically	 important	
(DeLanda,	2006)	or,	in	simpler	words,	who	and	why	rather	than	the	how	and	when.	In	
practice,	this	prompts	us	to	look	more	closely	at	a	given	individual’s	or	a	society’s	low-
carbon	 initiatives;	 are	 they	 temporary	 commitments?	 Are	 they	 contradicting	 their	
espoused	 values?	 Or	 are	 these	 efforts	 potentially	 transformative	 inasmuch	 as	 they	
seek	 to	 replace	 the	 framing	 of	 industrial	 growth	 with	 one	 of	 human-environment	
wellbeing?	
Similarly,	 as	 vulnerable	 societies	 seek	 to	 build	 resilience	 and	 pre-emptively	 adapt	 to	
climate	 change,	 are	 they	 prioritizing	 economic	 functions,	 communal	 ways	 of	 life	 or	
ecosystem	 integrity?	Which	actors	and	 institutions	are	 responsible	 for	 governing	 the	
transformation	and	why	might	they	seek	to	steer	 it	 in	a	certain	direction?	Answering	
such	 questions	will	 require	 consideration	 of	 different	 actors’	 ideas	 and	 interests	 but	
also	 the	 socio-cultural	 peculiarities	 of	 their	 interactions	 with	 one	 another.	 Without	
such	micropolitical	 detail,	 descriptions	 of	 social	 change	will	 always	 tend	 toward	 the	
aggregate,	 eliding	 the	 daily	 creative	 conflict	 of	 actors,	 networks	 and	 worldviews	 in	
favour	of	broad	conclusions	about	structure,	management	and	hegemony.	Perhaps	the	
biggest	challenge	this	poses	to	ST	and	SE	frameworks	is	the	need	to	look	beyond	the	
system.	Dissolving	the	discrete	levels	and	borders	of	the	multi-level	perspective	or	the	
SE	system	might	open	up	their	actors	and	 institutions	to	potentially	transformational	
engagement	with	fundamentally	alien	discourses	and	practices.	
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Beyond	 the	 tangible	 benefit	 of	 bringing	 forth	 novel	 responses	 to	 climate	 change	 –	
which	 should	 not	 be	 understated	 given	 the	 current	 reformist	 agenda’s	 protracted	
failure	 and	 the	 growing	 appetite	 for	 transformational	 alternatives	 –	 this	 perspective	
may	also	provide	concrete	lessons	for	improving	mitigation	and	adaptation	outcomes.	
For	example,	energy	and	climate	change	researchers	mobilizing	this	sort	of	conceptual	
lens	have	produced	 interesting	readings	of	supply-demand	 instability	 (Bennett,	2005,	
Strengers	 et	 al.,	 2014)	 as	 well	 as	 insights	 into	 the	 political-ethical	 issues	 of	 energy	
distribution	 and	 justice	 (Eames	 and	 Hunt,	 2013,	 Walker	 and	 Day,	 2013).	 In	 both	
instances	 disruptive	 actors	 problematize	 the	 technical	 assumptions	 of	 low-carbon	
transition	 narratives,	 offering	 vital	 lessons	 about	 unintended	 consequences,	 the	
mutability	of	 technology	and	the	nuances	of	 the	social	context.	Similarly,	 in	 terms	of	
public	 engagement	 with	 the	 environmental	 policy	 process,	 differences	 in	 rationales	
(e.g.	 instrumental,	 legalistic,	 technocratic	 or	 subversive)	 abound	 due	 to	 the	 way	
participation	 is	 defined	 and	 enacted	 in	 different	 political	 institutional	 contexts	
(Wesselink	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 these	 potentially	 conflicting	 discursive	
practices	 may	 produce	 creative	 friction	 and	 radical	 alternatives	 but	 they	 also	 pose	
serious	problems	to	the	successful	functioning	of	climate	policy	and	governance.			
Vital	 to	 all	 of	 these	 accounts	 is	 the	 possibility	 for	more	 relational	 and	 interpretivist	
descriptions	 of	 power	 to	 be	 made	 available	 (Allen,	 2008,	 McFarlane,	 2009).	 Such	
approaches	are	arguably	well	suited	to	the	pursuit	of	transformational	outcomes	that	
necessarily	 involve	 changes	 in	worldviews,	 values	 and	 beliefs	 (Avelino	 and	Rotmans,	
2009,	Manuel‐Navarrete,	2010,	 Smith	et	al.,	 2005).	As	 Jørgensen	 (2012)	and	Shove	
(2010)	both	point	out,	such	a	detailed	and	ideational	view	of	agency	is	largely	omitted	
by	 the	 structural	 emphasis	 of	 systems	 frameworks.	 	 This	 oversight	 will	 need	 to	 be	
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remedied,	 particularly	 as	 more	 complex	 and	 networked	 forms	 of	 climate	 change	
governance	 (e.g.	 transnational	 low-carbon	 cities	 initiatives	 and	 multi-regional	
ecosystem	 management)	 continue	 to	 proliferate,	 placing	 greater	 stress	 on	 social	
institutions	 to	 accommodate	 and	 articulate	 the	 desired	 outcomes	 of	 very	 different	
types	of	actors	(Hoffmann,	2011,	Jordan,	2008,	Okereke	et	al.,	2009).	Paying	attention	
to	 these	 dynamics	 may	 facilitate	 novel	 responses	 to	 climate	 change.	 It	 may	 enable	
more	 reflexive	and	 inclusive	 forms	of	 governance	but	 it	may	also	 throw	 light	on	 the	
fundamental	incompatibility	or	limited	reach	of	generalized	mitigation	and	adaptation	
initiatives.	
2.5. Social	fields	
If	 the	notion	of	micropolitics	 encourages	us	 to	 consider	 the	origins	of	 social	 change,	
then	 we	 still	 need	 to	 explore	 how	 it	 gets	 enacted.	 For	 social	 theories	 explicitly	
concerned	 with	 the	 creative	 dualism	 of	 structure	 and	 agency,	 transformational	
strategies	are	usually	described	as	being	both	constrained	and	enabled	by	the	existing	
rules	of	the	game,	but	also	as	having	the	capacity	to	shape	the	structures	of	the	social	
fields	 in	 which	 they	 are	 enacted	 (Bourdieu,	 1977,	 Bourdieu,	 1993,	 Fligstein	 and	
McAdam,	 2012,	 Giddens,	 1984).	 Fligstein	 and	McAdam	 (2012)	 describe	 these	 social	
fields	 as	 ’socially	 constructed	 arenas	 within	 which	 actors	 with	 varying	 resource	
endowments	vie	for	advantage’	(p10)	and	where	there	are	‘shared	(which	is	not	to	say	
consensual)	understandings	about	the	purpose	of	the	field,	 relationships	to	others	 in	
the	field	(including	who	has	power	and	why),	and	the	rules	governing	legitimate	action’	
(p9,	parentheses	in	original).		Crucially	the	role	of	agency	is	foregrounded	in	a	way	that	
links	actors’	intentions	and	influence	to	the	personal	–	or	ideational	–	realm.	
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To	 some	 extent	 the	 ST	 and	 SE	 frameworks	 have	 incorporated	 similar	 insights	 from	
instititionalist	theory,	addressing	agency-structure	dynamics	in	their	analyses	through	
the	 concepts	 of	 path	 dependency	 and	 vested	 interests.	 However,	 this	 has	 mostly	
produced	research	on	instances	of	continuity	or	processes	of	long-term	change	(Geels,	
2004,	 Hoffman	 and	 Ventresca,	 2002,	 Thornton	 et	 al.,	 2012),	 neglecting	 the	 more	
sociological	 strands	 of	 this	 discipline	 that	 account	 for	 values,	worldviews,	 discourses	
and	power	relations	 in	 times	of	change	 (Blyth,	2002,	Cleaver,	2002,	Vatn,	2005).	The	
important	 role	of	 institutions	or	 social	 fields	 in	 steering	 responses	 to	climate	change	
and	 environmental	 crises	 cannot	 be	 understated.	 For	 instance,	 much	 research	 on	
adaptation	has	learnt	from	the	well-rehearsed	critiques	of	international	development	
by	 acknowledging	 the	 dangers	 of	 overriding	 or	 ignoring	 locally	 situated	 practices	
associated	 with	 public	 goods,	 biodiversity	 and	 social	 action	 (Berman	 et	 al.,	 2012,	
Young,	2002,	Hoffman	and	Ventresca,	2002,	Paavola	et	al.,	2009).	This	is	precisely	why	
we	need	to	pay	greater	attention	to	the	struggles	to	resist,	rethink	and	replace	those	
institutions	that	continue	to	fail	to	articulate	the	plural	values	and	priorities	of	society.	
Characterizing	 climate	 change	 as	 an	 amplifier	 of	 existing	 social,	 economic	 and	
ecological	problematics	can	be	particularly	instructive	here.	Rather	than	a	stand-alone	
problem	 with	 a	 technical	 solution,	 mitigation	 and	 adaptation	 imperatives	 combine	
with	 the	 already	 present	 agitations	 of	marginalized	 groups	 to	 call	 into	 question	 the	
current	 rules	 of	 the	 game,	 presenting	 a	 highly	 visible	 opportunity	 to	 negotiate	
alternatives	(Hulme,	2010).	In	social	movements	this	is	often	referred	to	as	an	episode	
of	 contention	 (Fligstein	 and	McAdam,	 2012)	 and	 in	 political	 science	 as	 a	window	 of	
opportunity	(Zahariadis,	2007).	What	both	point	to	is	the	influential	power	of	ideas	and	
agency	 in	 questioning	 and	 reshaping	 a	 social	 field	 (Blyth,	 2002).	More	 precisely	 it	 is	
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their	power	to	problematize;	the	moment	when	social	ills	are	diagnosed	and	remedies	
prescribed	through	recourse	to	scientific,	economic,	moral	and/or	political	discourses	
(Rabinow	and	Rose,	2003).		
Such	 moments	 can	 be	 pivotal	 as	 they	 are	 never	 politically	 neutral	 or	 technically	
impartial	and	can	have	 long	 lasting	consequences.	For	 instance,	defining	greenhouse	
gases	 as	 a	 market	 failure	 that	 could	 be	 internalized	 has	 produced	 dysfunctional	
emissions	trading	schemes	that	favour	already	powerful	industrial	actors	and	continue	
to	fall	short	of	their	own	modest	objective	to	put	a	meaningful	price	on	pollution.	So	
too	 with	 adaptation,	 seeing	 vulnerability	 as	 simply	 an	 information/expertise	 deficit	
produces	 knowledge	 and	 technology	 transfer	 initiatives	 that	 may	 be	 incompatible	
with,	or	even	harmful	to,	their	recipients’	ways	of	life.		
For	actors	concerned	with	countering	these	top-down	discourses	it	is	not	sufficient	just	
to	have	access	 to	 resources	 (e.g.	 varieties	of	 capital;	 economic,	 social,	 political),	 it	 is	
their	 entrepreneurial	 and	 innovative	 utilization	 –	 creating	 uncertainty	 and	 offering	
compelling	critiques	and	alternatives	–	that	matters	(Paavola	and	Adger,	2005,	Phillips	
and	Tracey,	2007).	Some	strands	of	SE	resilience	research	have	begun	to	include	such	
considerations	in	their	framework	via	the	notion	of	transformational	agency	(Westley	
et	 al.,	 2013);	 something	 that	 is	 carried	 by	 certain	 individuals	 involved	 in	 adaptive	
ecosystem	management.	The	scope	for	developing	this	work	is	promising	and	certainly	
reaches	 beyond	 localized	 natural	 resource	 management	 practices.	 Examples	 where	
this	 line	of	 research	has	proved	 insightful	 include:	 climate	policymaking	 that	 favours	
low-carbon	energy	(Hess,	2013),	innovative	policy	processes	(Upham	et	al.,	2014)	and	
integration	of	 climate	goals	 into	economic	 trade	 rules	 (Evans	and	Kay,	2008).	Vitally,	
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and	in	correspondence	to	the	above	section	on	the	seeds	of	change,	this	focus	on	the	
interpretive	aspects	of	 agency-structure	dynamics	before,	during	and	after	moments	
of	crisis	has	helped	to	explain	how	seemingly	marginal	ideas	can	gain	influence	within	
and	across	multiple	social	fields.		
In	social	fields	where	shared	interests	and	understandings	exist	between	actors	there	
is	more	at	stake	than	mere	instrumental	power	or	rational	competition.	There	exists	a	
microcosm	of	cognitive	and	communicative	relations,	a	multiplicity	of	values	and	the	
potential	 for	 creative,	 but	 also	 troublesome,	 conflict.	 If	 these	 sociological	 and	
ideational	 dimensions	 are	 made	 explicit	 –	 e.g.	 through	 more	 representative	 and	
deliberative	forms	of	democratic	governance	(Dryzek,	2010,	Fischer,	2003)	–	then	our	
understanding	 of	 how	 they	 affect	 transformational	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 and	
adaptation	 may	 be	 improved	 and	 they	 may	 be	 harnessed	 toward	 producing	 more	
significant	outcomes	 (Dryzek	and	Lo,	2014,	Few	et	al.,	2007,	Fisher,	2010).	Assessing	
the	 influence	 of	 cognitive-communicative	 exchanges	 between	 certain	 actors,	
particularly	 during	 periods	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 crisis,	 has	 certainly	 enriched	 our	
understanding	of	 how	political	 institutions	 change	or	 persist	 (Lorenzoni	 and	Benson,	
2014,	 Schmidt,	 2010),	 but	 what	 is	 required	 now	 is	 an	 expansion	 of	 this	 type	 of	
research,	 to	address	more	 informal	and	 sprawling	 social	 fields.	 The	borders	of	 social	
fields	 are	 permeable	 and	 overlapping,	 capable	 of	 crossing	multiple	 levels,	 territories	
and	 temporalities	 (especially	 where	 climate	 change	 is	 concerned).	 This	 flexibility	 is	
both	 a	 challenge	 to	 practitioners	 and	 scholars	 to	 remain	 attuned	 to	 their	 dynamic	
relational	qualities	and	an	opportunity	for	those	same	qualities	to	produce	and	enact	
genuinely	transformational	change.	
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2.6. Conclusion	
Transformational	 social	 change	 can	 be	 said	 to	 involve	 a	 broad	 set	 of	 interrelated	
processes	that	are	practical,	political	and	personal	in	nature.	In	the	context	of	climate	
change	 mitigation	 and	 adaptation	 two	 prominent	 agendas	 (ST	 transitions	 and	 SE	
resilience)	 both	 utilize	 a	 systems	 perspective	 to	 address	 some	 of	 these	 issues.	
However,	certain	conceptual	blind	spots	(particularly	regarding	politics,	power,	agency	
and	 ideas)	 have	 not	 only	 limited	 the	 scope	 of	 their	 analyses	 but	 have	 also	 led	 to	
problematic	 governance	 prescriptions.	Whilst	 some	 strands	 of	 TM	 and	 adaptive	 co-
management	 do	 acknowledge	 the	 existence	 of	 competing	 visions	 for	 a	 climate	
compatible	 future,	 in	 general	 there	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 try	 to	 control	 this	 potentially	
creative	force	through	a	process	of	isomorphism,	managerialist	steering	and	consensus	
building.	Reflexivity	and	social	 learning	is	encouraged	by	both	approaches	but	little	 is	
said	 of	 how	 ideas	 and	 influences	 mediate	 this	 process	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 this	
reinforces	 an	 incremental	 rather	 than	 transformational	 trajectory.	 Such	 an	 approach	
will	not	only	favour	technical	and	behavioural	solutions	to	climate	change	but	 it	may	
do	 so	 in	 a	 politically	 naïve	 way	 that	 struggles	 to	 challenge	 the	 dominant	 ideas	 and	
institutional	 inertia	 of	 societies	 that	 have	high/rising	 emissions	 and	 large	 swathes	of	
vulnerable	communities.	
In	response,	we	may	turn	to	social	theories	–	where	power,	politics	and	social	relations	
are	 of	 central	 concern	 –	 for	 insights	 and	 provocations.	 If	 ST	 and	 SE	 systems	 are	 to	
become	 more	 productive	 interdisciplinary	 frameworks	 capable	 of	 politically	
contextualized	 climate	 governance	 prescriptions	 then	 they	 will	 need	 more	 socially	
oriented	 theories	 of	 change.	 First,	 focusing	 on	 the	 contingent	 relations	 between	
various	actors	(human	and	nonhuman)	and	their	assemblages	(e.g.	heavy	industry	or	a	
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local	 community)	 instantly	 opens	 up	 possibilities	 for	 more	 radical	 innovation	 and	
adaptability	 beyond	 the	 discursive	 confines	 of	 a	 functionalist	 system	 perspective.	
Second,	 the	 interpretive	and	strategic	actions	of	 influential	actors	before,	during	and	
after	 moments	 of	 crisis	 and	 agitation	 need	 to	 be	 made	 explicit.	 Tracking	 these	
processes	 across	 space	 and	 time	 exposes	 both	 the	 creative	 potential	 of	 social	
interactions	and	the	institutionalized	rules	of	the	game	that	enable	or	constrain	them.	
Immediately,	 critical	 questions	 emerge	 around	why	 some	mitigation	 and	 adaptation	
actions	 are	 successful	 or	 not	 and	 to	 what	 extent	 they	 capable	 of	 driving	
transformational	 change.	 Or	 in	 other	 words,	 whose	 vision	 of	 a	 climate	 compatible	
future	is	being	pursued	and	along	which	pathways.	
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Abstract	
As	 climate	 change	 policies	 and	 governance	 initiatives	 struggle	 to	 produce	 the	
transformational	 social	 changes	 required,	 the	 search	 for	 stand	 out	 case	 studies	
continues.	Many	 have	 pointed	 to	 the	 period	 between	 2005	 and	 2008	 in	 the	United	
Kingdom	as	a	promising	example	of	national	level	innovation.	With	strong	cross-party	
consensus	and	a	first-of-its-kind	legislation	the	UK	established	itself	as	a	climate	policy	
leader.	However,	early	warning	signs	suggest	 that	 this	 institutionalised	position	 is	 far	
from	 secure.	 Through	 a	 novel	 application	 of	 discursive	 institutionalism	 this	 article	
presents	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	role	of	ideas	in	unravelling	this	ambition	under	the	
Conservative-Liberal	 coalition	 administration	 (2010-2015).	 Discursive	 interactions	
among	 policymakers	 and	 other	 political	 actors	 were	 dominated	 by	 ideas	 about	
governmental	 responsibility	 and	 economic	 austerity,	 establishing	 an	 atmosphere	 of	
climate	 policy	 scepticism	 and	 restraint.	 By	 situating	 this	 conspicuous	 and	 influential	
process	 of	 bricolage	 within	 its	 institutional	 context,	 the	 importance	 of	 how	
policymakers	 think	 and	 communicate	 about	 climate	 change	 is	 made	 apparent.	 The	
power	of	ideas	to	influence	policy	is	further	demonstrated	through	their	cognitive	and	
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normative	 persuasiveness,	 by	 imposing	over	 and	 excluding	 alternatives,	 and	 in	 their	
institutional	 positioning.	 It	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 despite	 innovative	 legislation,	
institution	building	and	strategic	coordination	between	different	types	of	governance	
actors	the	ideational	foundations	of	ambitious	climate	change	politics	 in	the	UK	have	
been	undermined.	
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3.1. Introduction	
Global	 environmental	 issues	 such	 as	 anthropogenic	 climate	 change	 continue	 to	be	 a	
significant	 political	 agenda	 at	 multiple	 levels,	 not	 least	 for	 nation	 states.	 As	 inter-,	
multi-	 and	 trans-national	 environmental	 governance	 initiatives	 proliferate,	 the	
domestic	politics	of	climate	change	leaders	(and	laggards)	has	become	of	wide	interest	
(Andresen	 and	 Agrawala,	 2002;	 Fankhauser	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Liefferink	 et	 al.,	 2009;	
Schreurs	and	Tiberghien,	2007).	In	2008,	the	United	Kingdom	(UK)	Government	passed	
the	Climate	Change	Act	(CCA),	a	first-of-its-kind	legislation	legally	binding	the	UK	to	an	
ambitious	 greenhouse	 gas	 emission	 reduction	 target	 of	 80%	 below	 1990	 levels	 by	
2050.	The	implications	were	significant,	 institutionalising	climate	change	as	a	political	
issue	 within	 the	 UK	 but	 also	 diffusing	 its	 ambition	 and	 policy	 framework	 to	 other	
contexts	(Gummer,	2014;	Hill,	2009;	cf.	Pielke	Jr,	2009).	
The	 political	 and	 institutional	 circumstances	 surrounding	UK	 climate	 politics	 and	 the	
CCA	 have	 since	 received	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 attention	 (Bowen	 and	 Rydge,	 2011;	 Carter,	
2014;	 Carter	 and	 Jacobs,	 2014;	 Lockwood,	 2013;	 Lorenzoni	 and	 Benson,	 2014).	 This	
article	presents	a	critical	and	detailed	analysis	of	changes	in	the	way	climate	change	is	
thought	 about	 and	 discussed	 since	 that	 heyday.	 Between	 2010	 and	 2015	 a	
Conservative-Liberal	 coalition	 government	 was	 responsible	 for	 continuing	 this	
ambitious	climate	policy	agenda	within	the	context	of	a	global	and	national	economic	
recession.	 Given	 the	 tendency	 of	 policymakers	 to	 backtrack,	 or	 stall,	 on	 previous	
commitments	 during	 difficult	 political	 and	 economic	 periods	 (Bauer	 et	 al.,	 2012;	
Howlett,	2014)	this	 is	a	timely	moment	to	ask:	what	happens	to	the	underlying	ideas	
and	does	it	matter?	
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The	 Stern	 Review’s	 (Stern,	 2007)	 presentation	 of	 early	 climate	 change	 action	 as	
economically	 rational	was	pivotal	 in	 the	UK	case	 (Carter	and	 Jacobs,	2014).	Also,	 the	
idea	 of	 five-yearly	 carbon	 budgets	 to	 keep	 successive	 governments	 on	 track,	 and	
accountable,	to	the	2050	target	was	important	(Bows	et	al.,	2006).	Discourses	of	low-
carbon	business	opportunities,	correcting	previous	policy	failures	and	a	moral	sense	of	
urgency	all	helped	to	secure	support	from	private	actors,	policymakers	and	civil	society	
respectively	 (Lorenzoni	and	Benson,	2014).	Some	of	 these	 ideas	and	discourses	were	
formally	 institutionalised	 in	 a	 new	 government	 Department	 for	 Energy	 and	 Climate	
Change	 (DECC)	 and	 a	 semi-independent	 Committee	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (CCC).	 As	 a	
result,	 energy	 and	 climate	 goals	 became	 entangled	 through	 an	 increasingly	 complex	
mix	of	instruments,	discourses	and	strategies	designed	to	simultaneously	achieve	low-
carbon,	 secure	 and	 affordable	 energy	 –	 known	 as	 the	 ‘trilemma’	 (Kern	 et	 al.,	 2014;	
Rogers-Hayden	et	al.,	2011).		
Despite	the	 formal	nature	of	 this	 institutionalisation,	doubts	about	 its	 longevity	have	
been	 raised	 (Lockwood,	 2013),	 especially	 as	 the	 ‘competitive	 consensus’	 among	
political	actors	supporting	it	quickly	fell	away	after	the	2010	national	election	(Carter,	
2014).	In	response	to	these	warnings,	and	also	to	calls	from	climate	policy	innovation	
scholars	 for	 more	 research	 into	 post-adoption	 complexities	 (Jordan	 and	 Huitema,	
2014),	this	article	tracks	the	nature	and	impact	of	subsequent	changes	in	the	ideas	and	
discourses	of	UK	climate	politics.		
In	 section	 2	 the	 merits	 of	 a	 constructivist	 approach	 to	 studying	 political	 ideas	 and	
institutions	 are	 outlined.	 Section	 3	 summarises	 the	 methodology	 and	 case	 study	
materials.	Section	4	shows	how	economic	rationality	and	the	normative	positioning	of	
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government	 remained	 important	 ideas	but	 that	 their	 initial	emphasis	on	early	action	
and	leadership	faltered	under	the	strain	of	austerity.	In	light	of	these	findings	section	5	
raises	 concerns	 about	 a	 consensus	 approach	 to	 climate	 change	politics	 and	explores	
the	political	 institutional	 context	 in	more	detail.	 Section	6	 concludes	with	 reflections	
on	the	analytical	 framework’s	contribution	to	the	study	of	 ideas	 in	policy	and	the	UK	
case	study’s	relevance	for	climate	change	politics	and	governance	in	other	contexts.	
3.2. Ideas	are	more	than	just	another	variable	
Political	science,	policy	analysis	and	governance	studies	have	all	increasingly	sought	to	
account	 for	 the	 importance	 of	 ideas	 and	 discourse	 in	 shaping	 political	 processes	
(Fischer,	2003;	Gofas	and	Hay,	2010;	Hajer	and	Versteeg,	2005;	Hajer	and	Wagenaar,	
2003;	Kütting	and	Lipschutz,	2012;	Yanow,	2000).	The	 influence	of	 this	 constructivist	
turn	can	be	seen	in	prominent	theories	of	the	policy	process	where	only	a	handful	of	
staunchly	empiricist	approaches	continue	to	ignore	or	black	box	issues	of	subjectivity	
(Cairney,	2011;	Sabatier,	2007).	Reactionary	attempts	have	been	made	to	incorporate	
ideas	 as	 one	 more	 controllable	 variable	 within	 a	 positivist	 philosophy	 of	 science	
(regarding	policy	see:	Pawson,	2006)	so	as	to	‘not	have	to	swallow	the	contaminated	
epistemological	water	of	postmodernism	in	order	to	enjoy	the	heady	ontological	wine	
of	 constructivism’	 (Keohane,	 2000:	 129).	 However,	 far	 from	 treating	 ideas	 as	 free-
floating	epiphenomena,	many	constructivists	have	explicitly	linked	them	to	traditional	
political	 entities	 such	 as	 institutions,	 interests	 and	 policy	 change	 (Béland	 and	 Cox,	
2010;	Hajer,	1996).	
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The	limitations	of	only	partially	considering	ideas	is	apparent	in	some	of	the	research	
on	environmental	policy	 innovations	and	 institutions	mentioned	above.	For	example,	
Patashnik	 (2008)	 and	 Pierson	 (2004)	 both	 subsume	 the	 role	 of	 ideas	 under	 an	
explanation	of	politics	as	path-dependent,	thereby	failing	to	fully	grasp	their	diversity	
and	potential	for	driving	change.	However,	these	political	realist	accounts	tell	us	little	
about	the	ideational	and	discursive	processes	through	which	these	actors	interact	and	
through	which	climate	policies	are	enabled	or	undermined.	To	illustrate,	Lorenzoni	and	
Benson	 (2014)	 compare	 such	 an	 approach	 with	 the	 more	 constructivist	 discursive	
institutionalism	 (DI)	 framework,	 demonstrating	 the	 latter’s	 ability	 to	 explain	 the	
influence	 of	 climate	 economics	 ideas	 and	 the	 discursive	 interactions	 among	 civil	
society,	politicians	and	business	leaders	that	produced	near	unanimous	support	for	the	
CCA.		
This	article	extends	the	application	of	a	constructivist	approach,	and	DI	in	particular,	to	
present	a	comprehensive	account	of	how	ideas	and	discourse	have	continued	to	shape	
UK	climate	politics.	Accordingly	ideas	and	discourse	are	treated	as	particular	forms	of	
power	and	political	processes	differentiated	 from,	but	 interrelated	with,	other	 forms	
such	 as	 laws,	 institutions	 and	 structures.	Within	 the	 language	 of	 DI,	 Carstensen	 and	
Schmidt	 (2015:	 4)	 define	 ideational	 power	 as	 ‘the	 capacity	 of	 actors	 (whether	
individual	 or	 collective)	 to	 influence	 actors'	 normative	 and	 cognitive	 beliefs’.	 This	 is	
done	through	three	observable	processes:	the	persuasion	to	accept	and	adopt	certain	
views	 (power	 through	 ideas),	 the	 imposition	 of	 ideas	 and	 exclusion	 of	 alternatives	
(power	over	ideas),	and	the	production	of	subject	positions	as	well	as	the	constraining	
of	what	 can	 be	 legitimately	 considered	 (power	 in	 ideas)	 (ibid.).	 Given	 this	 analytical	
		
102	
depth	the	 intention	is	not	to	simply	claim	that	 ‘idea	A	caused	policy	B’	but	to	offer	a	
more	qualitative	account	of	how	ideational	elements	affect	the	way	actors	 interpret,	
influence	and	enact	climate	policy.	
3.2.1. Rethinking	institutionalised	ideas	
Adopting	a	broadly	Habermasian	understanding	of	discourse	as	communicative	action	
(Habermas	et	al.,	1990)	DI	 focuses	on	 the	 interactions	between	actors	and	 the	 ideas	
they	carry,	 thereby	 reducing	 the	emphasis	on	entrenched	 formal	 structures	 found	 in	
other	 schools	 of	 institutionalist	 thought.	 This	 sensitivity	 to	 interpersonal	 dynamics	
makes	 it	 a	 suitable	 framework	 for	 analysing	 the	 post-adoption	 politics	 of	 the	 CCA,	
where	 policymakers	 and	 other	 actors	 began	 to	 negotiate	 their	 preferred	 pathways	
towards	 implementation.	 It	 is	 in	 these	 personal	 and	 micropolitical	 exchanges	 that	
climate	policy	ideas	are	re-formed,	supporting	or	disrupting	the	achievement	of	long-
term	targets.	
Following	Schmidt	(2008,	2010)	the	analytical	components	of	DI	can	be	clearly	defined	
to	 produce	 a	 framework	 incorporating	 ideas,	 discourses	 and	 institutions	 (see	 table	
3.1).	 Ideas	fall	across	three	levels	ranging	from	implicit	values	(philosophy)	to	general	
assumptions	 or	 principles	 (program)	 and	 specific	 solutions	 (policy)2.	 For	 example,	
hidden	 social	 norms	 as	 well	 as	 more	 explicit	 assumptions	 about	 the	 scientific,	
economic	 or	 cultural	 nature	 of	 climate	 change	 are	 all	 as	 important	 as	 the	 practical	
actions	of	 risk	assessments	and	carbon	budgeting.	 Further,	 two	 types	of	overarching	
																																																						
2	 This	 typology	 echoes	 Hall’s	 (1993)	 corresponding	 three	 orders	 of	 policy	 change	 but	 is	
deliberately	more	expansive,	incorporating	normative	and	non-scientific	ideas	in	its	description	
of	what	constitutes	the	institutionalisation	of	a	policy	arrangement.	
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ideas	are	particularly	adept	at	tying	together	these	three	levels:	normative	 ideas	that	
provide	prescriptions	by	 linking	values	to	appropriate	courses	of	action	and	cognitive	
ideas	that	guide	analysis	by	appealing	to	prevalent	logics	and	interests.	
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Table	3.1:	DI	concept	definitions	and	examples	of	their	applicability	to	the	case	study	
	 Concept	 Definition	 Application	
Id
ea
s	
Level	
Philosophy	 –	 rarely	 explicit	 or	
contested	 ideas,	 values,	
principles	and	knowledge.	
Links	 between	 (political)	
ideology	and	climate	change.	
Program	 –	 assumptions	 and	
organising	 principles	 that	 define	
the	problem	and	its	solutions.	
Debates	 within	 government	
about	 how	 to	 define	 and	
respond	to	climate	change.	
Policy	 –	 specific	 solutions	 to	
specific	problems.	
The	 CCA,	 carbon	 budgets	 and	
related	policies.		
Type	
Normative	 –	 connect	 the	 three	
levels	 by	 referring	 to	 values	 and	
appropriateness.	
How	 UK	 climate	 politics	
challenges	or	conforms	to	social	
expectations.	
Cognitive	 –	 connect	 the	 three	
levels	 by	 appealing	 to	 prevalent	
logic	and	interests.	
The	 rationalities	 of	 science,	
economics,	politics,	culture	etc.	
D
is
co
ur
se
s	
Representation	
Via	 multiple	 forms	 –	 narratives,	
myths,	 frames,	 collective	
memories,	 stories,	 scripts,	
scenarios,	images	etc.	
How	 climate	 change	 is	
presented	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 how	
this	shapes	the	message.	
Interaction	
Coordination	 –	 among	 policy	
actors	 to:	 create,	 elaborate	 and	
justify.	
The	 mediating	 role	 of	
entrepreneurs	 and	 the	
allegiances	of	different	actors.	
Communication	–	among	political	
actors	to:	present,	deliberate	and	
legitimize.	
Strategies,	 media	 coverage,	
public	 engagement	 and	 the	
transmission	of	messages	about	
climate	change.	
In
st
itu
tio
ns
	 Form	
Simple	–	unified	governance.	 Climate	 policymaking	 at	
Parliament	 and	 its	 style	 of	
engagement	 with	 other	 actors	
throughout	the	process.		
Compound	 –	 dispersed	
governance.	
Specifics	
Convincing	 messages	 follow	
expected	patterns,	are	logical	and	
are	pitched	at	the	right	audiences	
in	the	right	ideational	setting.	
How	 climate	 ideas	 and	
discourses	 differ	 within	
government	 and	 how	 they	
interact	 with	 their	 institutional	
setting.	
	
Put	simply,	discourse	 refers	 to	 the	 ‘exchange	of	 ideas’	among	actors	 (Schmidt,	2011:	
56).	These	interactions	take	a	variety	of	forms	(e.g.	myths,	stories,	and	scenarios)	but	
their	common	goal	is	to	represent	ideas.	There	are	two	types	of	discursive	interaction:	
coordination	 among	 actors	 responsible	 for	 developing	 policy	 and	 communication	
between	 these	 actors	 and	 other,	 less	 centrally	 placed,	 political	 stakeholders.	 The	
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relative	importance	and	influence	of	these	types	of	discourse	is	partially	determined	by	
the	institutional	context.	In	a	simple,	or	unified,	polity	communicative	discourse	will	be	
most	 prominent,	 as	 policy	 actors	 make	 decisions	 centrally	 and	 then	 seek	 to	 justify	
them	whereas	 in	a	compound,	 or	dispersed,	 contexts	 coordinative	discourse	 is	more	
pronounced	as	multiple	actors	are	involved	throughout	the	policy	process.	Lastly,	it	is	
assumed	that	the	particulars	of	the	institutional	context	(e.g.	expected	logics,	patterns	
and	audiences)	need	to	be	adequately	addressed	if	these	ideas	and	discourses	are	to	
be	influential.	
Having	been	applied	 in	numerous	policy	areas	at	national	and	 international	 levels	DI	
has	 become	 established	 alongside,	 but	 also	 differentiated	 itself	 from,	 rational-actor,	
historical	 and	 sociological	 variants	 of	 institutionalism	 (see:	 Bell,	 2012;	 Peters,	 2011;	
Schmidt,	2010).	Perhaps	the	most	obvious	and	popularising	difference	is	its	emphasis	
on	change	rather	than	stability.	By	stressing	the	dynamic,	as	opposed	to	deterministic,	
nature	of	 institutions,	DI	has	 leant	 itself	almost	exclusively	 to	studies	of	moments	of	
change	 (cf.	 Hope	 and	 Raudla,	 2012).	 Ironically,	 unless	more	 longitudinal	 studies	 are	
undertaken,	 this	may	 serve	 to	 reinforce	 the	view	of	 the	policy	process	as	 sequential	
and	equilibrium	seeking	 i.e.	 there	 is	 stability,	 then	a	 radical	change	that	 is	 studied	 in	
detail,	then	a	return	to	stability.	
In	order	to	increase	the	DI	framework’s	sensitivity	to	incremental	changes,	the	notion	
of	 ideational	 bricolage	 as	 theorised	 by	 Carstensen	 (2011)	 can	 be	 instructive.	 Herein	
ideas	 are	 understood	 as	 being	 comprised	 of	 a	web	 or	 related	 elements	 of	meaning	
whose	 presence,	 linkages,	 and	 relative	 importance	 are	 prone	 to	 change	 over	 time.	
These	 mutations	 are	 incremental	 enough	 to	 be	 overlooked,	 or	 even	 deliberately	
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downplayed,	 but	 their	 cumulative	 effect	 and	 influence	 on	 policy	 can	 be	 significant	
(ibid).	By	 combining	 this	with	Schmidt’s	 conceptualisation	of	 ideas	and	 institutions	 it	
becomes	 possible	 to	 see	 how	 the	 different	 elements	 of	 meaning	 contained	 within	
normative	and	cognitive	ideas	are	situated	and	evolving	across	three	levels.		
In	 figure	 3.1	 overarching	 cognitive/normative	 ideas	 are	 represented	 as	 being	
comprised	of	smaller	ideas	spanning	the	three	levels.	Reinterpreting	these	as	a	web	of	
elements	 of	 meaning	 enables	 a	 detailed	 description	 of	 their	 linkages	 and	
stability/changes.	For	example,	over	time	from	t1	to	t2,	a	given	element	may	stay	the	
same	 (e1),	 its	 relative	prominence	may	change	 (e2	 shrinks),	or	 it	may	be	completely	
replaced	by	an	alternative	(e3	becomes	e4).	Mapping	this	web	onto	the	three	levels	of	
DI	 offers	 a	 useful	 typology	 for	 defining	 the	 elements	 of	meaning	 and	 showing	 their	
distribution.	
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Figure	 3.1:	 A	 representation	 of	 ideas	 as	 a	 changing	 web	 of	 related	 elements	 of	
meaning,	situated	across	the	three	levels	of	DI.	Adapted	from	Carstensen	(2011).	
	
3.3. Methods	
Discourse	analysis	was	carried	out	on	transcripts	of	semi-structured	interviews	carried	
out	 between	May	 and	 September	 2015.	 In	 order	 to	 address	 the	 research	 questions	
most	 efficiently	 interviewees	 were	 selected	 for	 their	 close	 proximity	 to	 UK	 climate	
policymaking	and	politics	circa	2008-2015.	In	line	with	the	DI	framework,	interviewees	
were	purposively	selected	for	their	status	as	either	policy	actors	(involved	in	designing	
and	 planning	 policies)	 or	 general	 political	 actors	 (involved	 in	 deliberating	 and	
legitimising	 policies).	 Following	 Yanow	 (2000),	 individuals	 from	 different	 types	 of	
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organisations	regularly	involved	in	climate	policy	and	politics	were	recruited	to	ensure	
a	 representative	 range	 of	 perspectives	 (see	 table	 3.2).	 Interviews	 with	 such	 policy	
elites	are	a	useful	and	valid	tool	for	analysing	otherwise	hard	to	reach	aspects	of	the	
political	process	such	as	decision	makers’	beliefs	and	values	(Beamer,	2002).	Given	the	
exclusive	nature	of	such	networks	a	critical	snowball	recruitment	method	(Noy,	2008)	
was	used,	relying	on	the	notion	of	‘reputation’	to	recruit	key	individuals	(Farquharson,	
2005).	To	avoid	reverting	to	a	narrow	definition	of	reputation	as	merely	authoritative,	
interviewees	 were	 also	 asked	 to	 consider	 ‘thought	 leaders’,	 prominent	 non-state	
actors,	and	individuals	with	insightful	positions.	
Transcripts	 were	 analysed	 for	 evidence	 of	 types	 of	 ideas,	 accounts	 of	 discursive	
interactions	 and	 descriptions	 of	 institutional	 contexts.	 This	 approach	was	 applied	 to	
the	 interviewees’	explicit	accounts	as	well	 as	 to	 their	more	 implicit	assumptions	and	
indirect	utterances	(e.g.	underlying	philosophical	principles	and	assumptions).	In	other	
words,	 texts	 were	 analysed	 for	 both	 their	 content	 and	 function	 as	meaning-making	
discourses.	The	same	analytical	approach	was	applied	 to	 relevant	publically	available	
documentary	 data	 sources	 (e.g.	 policy	 documents,	 government	 reports,	 public	
statements,	 and	 media	 articles),	 thereby	 enabling	 a	 triangulation	 of	 the	 findings.	
Although	 the	 emphasis	 of	 DI	 and	 this	 article	 is	 on	 interactions	 between	 actors	 and,	
thus,	 on	 verbal	 accounts,	 documents	 were	 particularly	 illustrative	 with	 regards	 to	
communicative	 discourses.	 Here	 texts	 were	 primarily	 treated	 as	 discursive	 practices	
intended	to	present	and	legitimise	certain	ideas	about	climate	change.	
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Table	3.2:	Description	of	Interviewees	
Organisation	type	 Role	 Code	 Total	
Policy	actors	 	
Central	
Government	
Politicians,	 advisers	 and	 committee	members	
involved	 in	 climate	 change,	 energy	 and	
economics	
PM	 7	
Civil	service	 Senior	 strategists	and	policy	officials	 involved	
in	international	and	domestic	climate	change,	
energy	and	economics	
CS	 4	
Political	actors	 	
Non-Governmental	
Organisations	
(pressure	groups)	
Senior	 analysts	 and	 knowledge	 brokers	
representing	 stakeholders	 in	 climate	 change	
action	and	international	development	
NGO	 3	
Media	 Senior	editors	and	journalists	covering	climate	
change,	energy	and	the	environment	
EJ	 3	
Think	tank	 Senior	 advisers,	 consultants	 and	 knowledge	
brokers	 involved	 in	 climate	 change,	 politics	
and	energy	
TT	 3	
Private	sector	 Consultants	 working	 with	 private	 and	 public	
sectors	on	climate	change	and	energy	
PS	 2	
Academia	 Senior	academics	researching	climate	change,	
energy	 and	 politics	 and	 energy	 policy	 in	
Europe	
A	 3	
	 	 Subtotal:	25	
	
3.4. A	shift	in	the	institutionalisation	of	climate	change	ideas	
Prior	 to	 the	 general	 election	 in	 2010	 climate	 change	 had	 rapidly	 risen	 in	 political	
salience	 internationally	 and	 in	 the	 UK.	 Described	 as	 a	 ‘punctuated	 equilibrium’,	 this	
attention	 to	 environmental	 politics	 and	 the	 risk	 of	 dangerous	 impacts	 from	 climate	
change	 highlighted	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 existing	 policies	 to	 reduce	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions	 (Carter	 and	 Jacobs,	 2014;	 Lorenzoni	 and	 Benson,	 2014).	 Spurred	 on	 by	
private	 sector	 endorsement	 of	 the	 business	 case	 for	 a	 low-carbon	 economy	 and	 a	
vociferous	 civil	 society	 campaign,	 UK	 politicians	 were	 engaged	 in	 a	 ‘competitive	
consensus’	to	adopt	a	world-leading	climate	policy	framework	in	2008	(Carter,	2014).	
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However,	 as	 the	 recession	 dragged	 on	 and	 political	 attention	 turned	 away	 from	
climate	change	–	especially	after	the	2010	election	–	the	cost	of	implementing	climate	
policies	 became	 a	 contentious	 issue	 (Carter,	 2014;	 Ares,	 2011).	 As	 Lockwood	 (2013)	
has	 suggested,	 the	 political	 sustainability	 of	 the	 CCA	 began	 to	 look	 less	 assured.	
Changes	to	the	types	of	 ideas	and	discourses	associated	with	climate	policy	between	
2010	and	2015	are	a	key	indicator	of	this	uncertainty	and	its	effects	on	future	efforts	to	
reduce	emissions.	
3.4.1. Elements	of	meaning	across	three	levels	
3.4.1.1. Philosophy	
Given	 the	 dominance	 of	 neoliberalism	 and	 deregulation	 in	 UK	 politics	 it	 is	 perhaps	
unsurprising	that	the	philosophical	 level	of	 ideas	was	populated	with	concerns	about	
the	 failure	 of	 a	 centralised	 form	 of	 government	 to	 address	 the	 physical	 and	 social	
reality	of	climate	change.	Whilst	not	shared	by	all,	these	concerns	were	part	of	a	wider	
modernist	trust	in	the	potential	of	technological	innovation	and	economic	liberalism	to	
provide	 solutions.	 Similarly,	 the	 failure	 of	 any	 mainstream	 political	 ideology	 to	
convincingly	relate	to,	and	articulate,	the	social	complexity	of	climate	change	was	also	
mentioned.	For	example,	one	interviewee	noted	reluctance	among	the	political	élite	to	
confront	 ‘the	 confusing	 and	 incoherent	 fragments	 of	 postmodern	 politics’	 (CS1),	
suggesting	 that	 most	 intuitively	 attempt	 to	 depoliticise	 climate	 change	 whenever	
possible.		
Overall,	the	majority	of	ideas	identified	were	programmatic,	with	some	being	linked	to	
specific	 policy	 solutions	 such	 as	 setting	 carbon	 budgets	 and	 conducting	 risk	
assessments.	 Broadly	 speaking	 they	 followed	a	 logic	 of	 either	 1)	 climate	 change	 is	 X	
		
111	
and	 therefore	 governing	 it	 requires	 Y	 or	 2)	 climate	 policies	 are	 bad/good	 for	 the	
economy.	 Already	 this	 suggests	 a	 predominance	 of	 scientific	 and	 economic,	 rather	
than	 social	 or	 cultural,	 rationalities	 for	 addressing	 climate	 change.	At	 a	 general	 level	
this	 is	 an	 example	 of	 power	 in	 ideas,	 or	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 certain	 ways	 of	
thinking	that	requires	policymakers	to	base	decisions	on	certain	forms	of	evidence.	
3.4.1.2. Program	
Based	 on	 a	 belief	 in	 neoclassical	 rational-actor	 principles	 the	 first	 set	 of	 ideas	 often	
defined	 climate	 change	 as	 the	 archetypal	 ‘tragedy	 of	 the	 commons’	 writ	 large.	
Assumptions	about	the	need	for	top-down	targets	and	principles	of	good	governance	
were	quick	to	follow.	Whilst	common,	this	view	was	often	accompanied	by	a	resigned	
acceptance	that	there	has	been	a	 loss	of	political	appetite	 for	state	 intervention.	For	
instance,	climate	policymakers	 felt	 their	 range	of	options	 to	be	significantly	curtailed	
by	the	newly	 introduced	Better	Regulations	Framework	(BIS,	2013);	another	example	
of	 the	 exclusionary	 power	 of	 ideas.	 This	 new	 guidance	 applied	 to	 all	 government	
officials	 and	 institutionalised	 a	 ‘one-in	 two-out’	 rule	 based	 on	 an	 ‘incredibly	 narrow	
minded	view	of	regulation	as	a	purely	negative	burden’	(PM5).	In	practice	this	meant	
flagship	climate	regulations	and	taxes	were	significantly	weakened,	as	 in	the	cases	of	
the	 Emissions	 Performance	 Standard	 for	 fossil	 fuel	 power	 generators	 which	 ‘was	
completely	neutered’	(PS1)	during	its	development,	and	also	the	Carbon	Price	Support	
policy	which	was	frozen	within	a	year	of	being	introduced	(HMRC,	2014).	
Second,	 the	 economics	 of	 climate	 change	 remained	 a	 provider	 of	 best	 practice	
principles	 for	 climate	 policy.	 Central	 to	 this	 set	 of	 ideas	 is	 the	 cost-benefit	 ratio	
argument	 made	 by	 the	 Stern	 Review,	 stressing	 the	 cost	 effectiveness	 of	 early	
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mitigation	 action	 (Stern,	 2007).	 Among	 policymakers	 a	 shorthand	 heuristic	 for	 these	
ideas	was	the	principle	of	‘maximum	return	on	investment’,	which	was	favourably	seen	
as	helping	government	 to	 function	more	 like	a	business	and	as	wholly	sensible	given	
the	adage	that	government	never	has	enough	money	to	do	everything	it	wants	to.	By	
late	 2014	 the	 long-term	 relationship	 between	 the	 economy	 and	 climate	 change	 had	
not	been	invalidated	but	had	been	replaced	by	the	more	politically	salient	short-term	
relationship	between	the	economy	and	re-election.	
3.4.1.3. Policy	
Relying	 mostly	 on	 economic	 assumptions	 many	 climate	 policymakers,	 including	
ministers	 at	 DECC	 and	 the	 Department	 for	 Business,	 Innovation	 and	 Skills	 (BIS)	
continued	 to	 try	 and	bolster	 this	 early	 action	 imperative	 –	 citing	 positive	 feedbacks,	
investor	confidence	and	infrastructure	development	as	part	of	a	long-term	plan	–	but	
ultimately	 the	 short-term	 demands	 of	 saving	 public	 money	 eclipsed	 them.	 The	
overbearing	 presence	 of	 austerity	 even	 led	 policymakers	 to	 actively	 avoid	 some	
solutions;	 being	 told	 directly	 that	 ‘if	 it	 costs	money	 it	 isn’t	 going	 to	 happen’	 (PM1).	
More	 than	 just	 the	 coercive	power	 over	 ideas	 embodied	 in	 the	 Treasury’s	 ability	 to	
veto	policy	suggestions,	the	austerity	agenda	created	a	restrictive	atmosphere	within	
which	 policymakers	 pre-emptively	 excluded	 certain	 ideas	 based	 on	 an	 internalised	
assumption	 that	 only	 efficiency	 gains	 and	 ‘doing	 more	 with	 less’	 types	 of	 policies	
would	be	deemed	viable.	Whilst	the	range	of	specific	solutions	for	reducing	emissions	
was	 dwindling,	 policymakers	 were	 able	 to	 point	 towards	 carbon	 budgets	 and	 risk	
assessments	 as	 evidence	 of	 their	 continued	 –	 albeit	 strategic	 or	 even	 symbolic	 –	
actions	on	tackling	climate	change.	
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3.4.2. Weaving	a	convincing	web	of	meanings	
3.4.2.1. Losing	the	normative	mandate	to	lead	
Around	the	time	of	the	CCA	(2005-2008)	a	strong	normative	position	for	the	UK	as	a	
climate	 leader	emerged.	This	was	based	on	a	moral	 imperative	to	act	urgently	 in	the	
face	of	dangerous	climate	impacts	and	to	reap	the	benefits	of	correcting	hitherto	failed	
policies	 (Lorenzoni	 and	 Benson,	 2014).	 Since	 then,	 these	 elements	 of	meaning	 have	
significantly	diminished	and	been	joined	by	others	to	produce	a	shift	in	the	overarching	
normative	idea	about	the	government’s	role	in	tackling	climate	change	(see	figure	3.2).		
Figure	3.2:	 Changes	 in	prominence	of,	 and	 links	between,	 elements	of	 the	normative	
idea	of	UK	climate	governance.	
		
114	
As	predicted	by	Carter	 (2014),	 the	sense	of	urgency	and	momentum	associated	with	
the	 Big	 Ask	 civil	 society	 campaign	 and	 the	 competitive	 consensus	 among	 politicians	
dissipated	 after	 the	 2010	 national	 election.	 The	 prominence	 of	morally	 based	 ideas	
also	shrank	due	to	previously	abstract	notions	of	dangerous	impacts	being	redefined	as	
specific	manageable	risks	(see	figure	3.2)	via	the	UK	Climate	Change	Risk	Assessment	
programme	and	policies	 (DEFRA,	2012).	However,	 thanks	 to	deep-seated	democratic	
values	of	governmental	duty	and	accountability	this	norm	didn’t	dissipate	entirely.	The	
idea	of	 target	setting	also	remained,	enabling	politicians	to	point	 to	the	 flagship	CCA	
policy	and	carbon	budgets	when	challenged	with	critiques	or	when	positioning	the	UK	
as	a	climate	leader	on	the	international	stage.	
Two	new	additions	to	the	milieu	of	meanings	fundamentally	altered	the	way	the	idea	
of	leadership	was	expressed.	As	climate	change’s	political	salience	waned	the	meaning	
of	 leadership	 became	 more	 about	 acting	 responsibly	 than	 seeking	 out	 first-mover	
opportunities.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 direct	 benefits	 of	mitigation	 and	 adaptation	were	 no	
longer	enough	to	 justify	action,	there	needed	to	be	co-benefits	too.	One	policy	actor	
recalled:	
‘We	couldn’t	just	do	it	[climate	change]	for	the	sake	of	it;	we	had	to	make	up	
an	argument	as	well.’	(PM5)	
Further,	whatever	 the	 size	of	 the	mandate	 to	act	on	 climate	 change,	 its	 appropriate	
expression	 needed	 to	 be	 as	 decentralised	 as	 possible.	 This	 was	 exemplified	 by	 the	
Coalition’s	 Big	 Society	 agenda	 (Cabinet	 Office,	 2010),	 which	 extolled	 the	 innovative	
problem-solving	potential	of	shared	responsibility	and	non-state	actor	empowerment.	
Previously	civil	 society	and	 industry	had	vociferously	pressurised	government	 to	 lead	
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but	the	roles	had	been	reversed	and	they	were	now	being	asked	what	they	were	going	
to	do.	
3.4.2.2. Whose	numbers	count	most?	
Economics	continued	to	be	the	most	prevalent	cognitive	idea	through	which	to	grapple	
with	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 climate-society	 relationship.	 For	 instance,	 in	 successive	
reports	and	 recommendations	 to	Parliament	 the	Committee	on	Climate	Change	 (e.g.	
2008,	 2010,	 2013)	 deployed	 economic	 analyses	 to	 directly	 appeal	 to:	 the	 perceived	
long-term	 vision	 of	 politicians	 seeking	 to	 leave	 a	 legacy,	 publics	 concerned	 with	
infrastructure	 investment,	 and	 low-carbon	 enterprises	 looking	 for	 a	 stable	 business	
trajectory.	 However,	 through	 the	 adjustment	 of	 metrics	 and	 assumptions	 economic	
logic	can	be	coherently	applied	 in	support	of	very	different	policy	recommendations.	
This	is	an	epistemological	situation	that	policymakers	were	acutely	aware	of	and	which	
was	built	into	their	political	strategies:	
‘You’ve	got	three	departments	[DECC,	BIS,	Treasury]	all	doing	analysis	on	the	
same	 questions	 just	 because	 they	 don’t	 trust	 each	 other.	 For	 example,	 the	
Treasury	focused	more	on	short-term	values	and	so	off-shore	wind	was	hated	
whereas	DECC	saw	it	as	a	gamble	for	the	future.’	(PM4)	
As	austerity	 loomed	 large,	economic	discourses	began	 to	paint	a	different	picture	 to	
the	one	presented	by	 the	Stern	Review.	Concerns	were	 raised	about	 reducing	public	
spending,	protecting	energy	intensive	industries	and	maintaining	competitiveness	with	
the	rest	of	Europe.	In	2013/14	arguments	around	reviewing	the	fourth	Carbon	Budget	
presented	a	visible	example	of	these	competing	rationales.	A	chorus	of	support	to	be	
as	ambitious	as	economically	possible	swept	through	the	first	three	carbon	budgets	(in	
2008)	but,	in	contrast,	adopting	the	fourth	(in	2011)	required	direct	intervention	from	
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the	Prime	Minister	 and	 the	 addition	of	 several	 caveats	 including	 a	 chance	 to	 review	
and	 revise	 it.	 Although	 it	was	 ultimately	 upheld	 this	 challenge	 to	 the	 validity	 of	 the	
fourth	carbon	budget,	and	the	CCC’s	advice	more	generally,	set	a	precedent	for	future	
caveats	and	reviews	of	ambition.	
From	 the	 policymakers’	 perspective	 (self-labelled	 as	 pragmatic),	 pursuing	 long-term	
climate	 goals	 and	 low-carbon	 investment	 was	 overtaken	 by	 the	 imminent	 and	
interdependent	need	to	repair	the	economy	and	get	re-elected.	In	political	terms	this	
led	 to	 prioritising	 the	 interests	 of	 consumers/voters	 over	 those	 of	 the	 low-carbon	
sector	e.g.	reducing	energy	prices	by	cutting	subsidy	levies.	In	simple	economic	terms	
the	discount	rate	proposed	by	Stern	for	calculating	cost-benefit	ratios	into	the	future	
was	 rapidly	 adjusted	 to	 favour	 the	 present.	 Or,	 to	 put	 it	 another	 way,	 the	 political	
economy	of	climate	change	ideas	went	from	prioritising	long-term	diffused	benefits	to	
being	primarily	about	short-term	concentrated	costs	(see	figure	3.3).	
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Figure	3.3:	Changes	in	prominence	of,	and	links	between,	elements	of	the	cognitive	idea	
of	climate	change	economics.	
3.4.2.3. Normative	and	cognitive	cross-over	and	other	ideas	
Overall	the	various	elements	of	meaning	spanned	all	three	levels	of	ideas	in	much	the	
way	 that	 Schmidt	 (2010)	 anticipated;	 that	 is,	 with	 very	 little	 explicit	 reference	 to	
philosophical	 level	values	(e.g.	political	philosophy	or	 ideology),	and	an	abundance	of	
programmatic	 level	organising	principles	 (e.g.	 leadership,	 target	 setting,	markets	and	
subsidies).	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 note	 that	 developments	 in	 the	 cognitive	 and	
normative	ideas	described	above	did	not	happen	in	isolation	from	alternatives	or	from	
each	other.	For	instance,	arguably	accelerating	the	decline	of	a	government	leadership	
norm	 was	 the	 resurgence	 of	 the	 powerful	 cognitive	 idea	 of	 scepticism.	 Although	
climate	 science	 scepticism	 had	 become	 a	marginalised	 position,	 the	more	moderate	
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and	 politically	 acceptable	 position	 of	 ‘climate	 luke	warmism’	 emerged	 i.e.	 accepting	
the	 science	 but	 doubting	 the	 likelihood	 of	 severe	 impacts.	 When	 coupled	 with	 the	
belief	 that	government	 intervention	 is	 inefficient	 in	areas	of	unpredictability	or	 long-
term	 planning,	 this	 amounted	 to	 a	 form	 of	 ‘climate	 policy	 scepticism’.	 Further,	 the	
notion	of	co-benefits	appears	in	both	types	of	ideas	suggesting	it	to	be	a	pertinent	and	
malleable	 element;	 for	 instance	 several	 policy	 and	 political	 actors	 saw	 it	 as	 vital	 for	
keeping	 climate	 goals	 on	 the	 government’s	 agenda	 and	 as	 the	 only	 possible	way	 to	
secure	political	and	economic	resources	during	the	recession.	
3.4.3. Turning	down	the	volume	on	climate	change	discourse	
Despite	 speaking	 with	 a	 range	 of	 different	 actors,	 ideas	 about	 climate	 change	
appeared	in	a	limited	number	of	discursive	forms.	In	the	policy	sphere,	meteorological	
and	 economic	 scenario	 modelling	 was	 treated	 as	 the	 foundation	 of	 climate	 change	
knowledge.	 Repetitive	 policy	 scripts	 about	 tackling	 the	 energy	 trilemma	and	 abating	
risk	were	then	used	to	explain	what	was	being	done.	Even	among	wider	political	actors	
and	stakeholders	these	forms	were	the	most	prominent.	In	addition,	there	were	some	
polarised	 protagonist/antagonist	 driven	 narratives	 recurring	 in	 the	 media	 that	
functioned	 more	 as	 awareness	 raising	 devices	 than	 as	 a	 means	 of	 elaborating	 or	
deliberating	 responses	 to	 climate	 change.	 Given	 the	 evidence	 base	 and	 its	 focus	 on	
public	 policy	 (where	 scientific	 and	 economic	 evidence-based	 justifications	 and	 good	
versus	bad	plotlines	are	known	 to	 resonate	 loudest),	 this	narrow	 range	of	discursive	
representations	is	perhaps	unsurprising.		 	
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3.4.3.1. A	consensus	built	on	shallow	foundations	
The	day-to-day	political	 interactions	within,	and	along	the	fringes	of,	government	are	
such	that	a	summary	of	these	discursive	practices	can	only	ever	be	a	partial	snapshot.	
As	 has	 been	 shown,	 discourses	 of	 climate	 governance	 and	 economics	 were	
continuously	present,	although	not	necessarily	stable.	They	often	produced	boundary	
work3	 (e.g.	 annual	 reports,	 scenario	 models	 and	 framework	 policies)	 to	 help	
coordinate	 different	 types	 of	 actors	 around	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 ideas.	 A	 mixture	 of	
ideational	 coherence,	 strategic	 enactment	 and	 institutional	 context	 mediated	 their	
ability	to	coordinate	actors	around	specific	ideas.	Table	3.3	lists	some	examples	of	the	
discourses	used	by	interviewees	to	elaborate	and	justify	their	preferred	policy	options	
as	 well	 as	 the	 institutional	 context	 in	 which	 they	 were	 deployed	 and	 debated	 with	
various	 actors.	 Whilst	 they	 are	 not	 exhaustive	 or	 entirely	 representative,	 these	
examples	do	provide	insights	into	common	themes	and	the	importance	of	institutional	
venues	and	the	ideas	that	permeate	their	boundaries.	
	
	
	 	
																																																						
3	 Based	 on	 Gieryn’s	 (1983)	 original	 description	 of	 the	 way	 knowledge	 can	 be	 used	 to	
demarcate	areas	of	expertise	for	ideological	reasons.	
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Table	3.3:	Discursive	interactions	and	their	institutional	context	
Discourses	 Contexts	
High-level	commitments	to	climate	change	such	as	target	setting	
were	 generally	 supported	 but	 detailed	 and	 potentially	 divisive	
decisions	 were	 seen	 as	 the	 responsibility	 of	 more	 decentralised	
processes	and	actors.	
Central	
Government	
Positive	and	long-term	economics	backed	up	policy	decisions	and	
linked	 them	 to	 high-level	 targets	 but	 this	was	 hampered	 due	 to	
inconsistency	 caused	 by	 competing	 policy	 goals	 and	 Coalition	
politics.	
DECC	policy	
The	economics	of	emissions	reductions	and	the	science	of	climate	
risks	 were	 the	 foundations	 for	 long-term	 planning	 but	 were	
incongruent	 with	 dominant	 ideas	 about	 neoliberal	 governance	
and	austerity.	
CCC	consultations	
Austerity,	 small	 government,	 and	 climate	 science	 luke	 warmism	
produced	an	atmosphere	of	climate	policy	scepticism.	
Treasury	
negotiations	
Leadership	through	cross-party	consensus	building	and	appealing	
to	positive	investment	storylines.	
NGO	 and	 think	
tank	engagement	
Uncertainty	 was	 a	 central	 theme	 for	 both	 low	 carbon	 and	
industrial	actors	as	 they	appealed	 to	policymakers	 for	consistent	
economic	signals	and	policies.	
Private	 sector	
statements	
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Notwithstanding	more	detailed	disagreements,	the	CCC	and	DECC	consistently	aligned	
behind	 an	 overarching	 discourse	 of	 positive	 climate	 economics	 and	 necessary	
government	 involvement.	 Generally,	 support	 for	 this	 position	 from	 politicians	 was	
unreliable.	 Cabinet	 ministers	 and	 party	 leaders	 were	 keen	 to	 engage	 in	 high-level	
rhetoric	e.g.	approving	the	fourth	carbon	budget	and	signing	a	‘joint	pledge’	during	the	
2015	 election	 to	 remain	 committed	 to	 tackling	 climate	 change.	However,	 they	were	
not	 so	 forthcoming	 on	 specific	 climate	 policy	 solutions	 that	 could	 drive	 a	 rapid	 low-
carbon	 transition	 such	 as	 a	 power	 sector	 decarbonisation	 target	 or	 investing	 in	
domestic	energy	efficiency.	In	the	case	of	the	latter,	underperforming	policies	(e.g.	the	
Green	Deal)	 resulted	 in	a	big	 setback	 to	 the	UK’s	 attainment	of	 long-term	emissions	
reductions	(CCC,	2014).	
Both	of	the	CCC	Chairmen	(Lord	Turner,	previously	Director	General	of	the	Chamber	of	
British	Industry	and	then	Lord	Deben,	previously	Chairman	of	the	Conservative	Party)	
were	able	to	keep	potentially	hostile	business	leaders	and	Conservative	politicians	on	
side.	Similarly,	the	two	Secretaries	of	State	at	DECC	(Chris	Huhne	and	then	Ed	Davey)	
fought	effectively	to	make	the	economic	case	for	climate	change	a	visible	priority	and	
enlisted	 the	 help	 of	 other	 departments	 to	 mainstream	 climate	 goals	 across	
government	 (e.g.	working	with	BIS	 to	establish	 the	Green	 Investment	Bank).	Despite	
these	 coordinative	 efforts,	 the	 persuasive	 power	 of	 climate	 change	 economics	 was	
limited.	For	instance,	a	significant	countervailing	pressure	came	from	the	Treasury	who	
took	an	 increasingly	hostile	stance	 toward	climate	policies,	occasionally	aligning	with	
anti-regulation	politicians	and	high	carbon	industry	actors.	This	coordination	was	built	
around	 a	 salient	 counter-discourse	 of	 climate	 policy	 as	 expensive	 but	 also	 politically	
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dispensable	–	succinctly	expressed	in	the	Prime	Minister’s	often	quoted	dictum	to	‘get	
rid	of	the	green	crap’	(Schofield,	2013).	
Here	 the	 importance	 of	 institutional	 constraint/enabling	 is	 particularly	 clear.	 First,	
DECC	struggled	to	reconcile	 internal	 inconsistencies	to	do	with	both	policy	 (trilemma	
goals)	 and	politics	 (as	 a	 Liberal	Democrat	 led	department	 in	 a	Conservative	majority	
coalition).	 Second,	 the	 CCC	 was	 formally	 mandated	 to	 provide	 advice	 based	 on	
scientific	 and	economic	 rationalities	only.	Whilst	 their	 reports	were	well	 received	by	
most,	they	were	restricted	in	their	ability	to	engage	in	overtly	political,	and	therefore	
potentially	more	effective,	coordinative	discourses.	And	thirdly	the	Treasury,	due	to	its	
institutional	position	as	fiscal	overseer	and	the	pervasive	discourse	of	reducing	public	
spending,	 was	 able	 to	 occupy	 a	 contrary	 position	 vis-à-vis	 ambitious	 climate	 policy	
without	fear	of	being	isolated	or	losing	influence.	As	one	interviewee	quipped:		
‘If	 you	 work	 for	 the	 Treasury	 it	 is	 your	 job	 to	 be	 disliked	 so	 we	 should	 be	
reasonably	 understanding,	 but	 they	 have	 been	 increasingly	 overreaching.’	
(TT5)	
3.4.3.2. Telling	a	compelling	non-story	
It	 is	 important	to	note	that	the	communicative	 interactions	analysed	here	took	place	
among	actors	with	a	special	interest	in	climate	change	but	who	felt	that	it	commanded	
little	 attention	 or	 value	 in	 wider	 society.	 In	 fact,	 many	 actors	 –	 including	 central	
government	and	media	–	defined	climate	change	as	a	‘non-story’	and	made	a	strategic	
decision	not	 to	make	 it	a	central	 theme.	This	 is	a	clear	example	of	one	 idea’s	power	
over	the	alternative	view	that	climate	change	could	be	an	important	political	issue.	Not	
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what	little	there	was	towards	a	particular	view	of	climate	change	as	just	another	issue	
among	many	rather	than	as	something	cross-cutting	and	fundamental.	
Six	 communicative	 discourses	 and	 the	 way	 they	 were	 deliberated	 and	 legitimised	
certain	climate	programs	or	policies	were	identified	(see	table	3.4).	Again,	governance	
and	 economic	 ideas	 were	 prominent	 throughout.	 Emerging	 out	 of	 this	 assortment	
were	two	competing	meta-discourses:	1)	the	UK	is	leading	on	climate	change	through	
a	 long-term	 and	 positive	 economic	 plan,	 contra	 2)	 disagreement	 over	 energy	 and	
budget	priorities	is	undermining	the	UK’s	response	to	climate	change.	
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Table	3.4:	Communicative	discourses	and	the	climate	related	ideas	they	express	
Discourse	 Summary	
UK	as	leader	 Government	 has	 a	 responsibility	 to	 pursue	 first	 mover	
advantages	 and	 influence	 other	 actors	 to	 address	 public	 good	
problems	such	as	climate	change.			
Long-term	plan	 Target	setting	and	the	flexible	use	of	policy	levers	can	cope	with	
the	 uncertainties	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 are	 necessary	 for	
dealing	with	 the	 long-term	 impacts	 that	 reach	 beyond	 political	
cycles.	
Positive	economics	 Climate	 change	 is	 an	 investment	 opportunity	 that	 brings	 co-
benefits	and	political	capital.		
Dissensus	 The	 complexity	 of	 climate	 change	 demands	 more	 rigorous	
political	debate	and	a	decentralised,	market-driven	approach	to	
governance.	
Energy	transition	 Subsidies	 and	 energy	market	 signals	 can	 address	 climate	 goals	
but	 only	 if	 consumers	 are	 protected	 from	 significant	 costs	 and	
supplies	remain	secure.		
Budgeting	 Reducing	 public	 expenditure	 is	 a	 top	 priority	 therefore	 climate	
policies	should	be	discussed	in	terms	of	efficiency	and	return	on	
investment.	
	
The	UK’s	 leadership	 role	 in	 climate	 change	 governance	 lost	 its	 public	 appeal	 quickly	
after	 2008,	 retaining	 relevance	 only	 for	 a	 fairly	 narrow	 set	 of	 actors	 engaged	 in	
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international	 climate	 negotiations	 at	 the	 United	 Nations	 Framework	 Convention	 on	
Climate	 Change	 (UNFCCC).	 A	 telling	 sign	 of	 its	 diminished	 influence	was	 the	 relative	
absence	of	climate	change	from	the	electoral	campaigns	in	2015,	especially	given	their	
coincidence	with	 a	milestone	UNFCCC	 conference	 of	 the	 parties	 in	 Paris	 (COP21).	 In	
fact,	by	signing	a	joint	pledge,	party	leaders	were	able	to	gloss	over	the	fact	that	recent	
policy	 changes	 had	 knocked	 the	 UK	 off	 course	 to	 achieving	 its	 longer-term	 targets	
(CCC,	2014).	
Long-term	 planning	 and	 positive	 climate	 economics	 were	 central	 pillars	 of	 DECC’s	
communication	 strategy	 and	 were	 spelled	 out	 narratively	 through	 the	 language	 of	
carbon	 budgets,	 transition	 pathways	 and	 renewable	 energy	 roadmaps	 (e.g.	 2009,	
2011a,	 2011b).	 However,	 policymakers	 reported	 getting	 little	 traction	 beyond	 the	
usual	 low-carbon	 sector	 firms	 and	 environmental	 NGOs.	 Controlling	 the	 policy	
message	is	a	vital	form	of	power	over	ideas	 for	central	government	but	one	that	was	
largely	unsuccessful	in	this	case.	Instead,	aided	by	messages	from	the	Treasury,	some	
media	 organisations	 and	 climate	 policy	 sceptics	 reinforced	 a	 simplified	 economy-
environment	 trade-off	 characterisation	 in	 order	 to	 cast	 doubt	 on	 the	 government’s	
capacity	to	stay	the	course	as	a	climate	leader	during	constrained	economic	times.	
Open	 calls	 from	policymakers	 for	 a	 complete	 rethink	of	 the	UK’s	 leadership	position	
and	the	CCA	were	few	and	far	between	(see	speeches	by:	Osborne,	2011;	Patterson,	
2014).	 Indeed,	 post-legislative	 scrutiny	 conducted	 in	 2013	 (DECC,	 	 2013)	 broadly	
reaffirmed	 the	 government’s	 commitment	 to	 its	 level	 of	 ambition.	However,	 a	more	
measured	but	no	 less	damaging	discursive	 challenge	 to	 the	2008	consensus	did	gain	
ground.	 Climate	 policy	 sceptics	 within	 government	 were	 quick	 to	 amplify	
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disagreements	with	 the	 help	 of	mass	media’s	 tendency	 to	 condense	 complex	 issues	
into	 combative	 shorthand	 storylines	 e.g.	 by	 leaking	 letters	 showing	 disagreement	
between	ministers	over	the	fourth	carbon	budget	(Stratton,	2011).	Similarly,	a	complex	
set	of	policy	 instruments	had	been	developed	 to	 reflect	 the	energy	 trilemma’s	 goals	
but	 much	 communicative	 discourse	 ignored	 these	 details,	 focusing	 instead	 on	 net	
public	 expenditure	 and	 green	 levies,	 thereby	 pitting	 DECC	 against	 the	 Treasury,	
consumers	against	environmentalists	and	politicians	against	their	(constituents’)	 least	
favourite	energy	sources.	
3.4.4. Institutional	complexity	and	logical	inconsistency	
The	political	institutions	responsible	for	climate	policy	and	governance	also	interacted	
with	 these	 shifts	 in	 ideas	 and	 discourses.	 The	 UK	 parliamentary	 system	 has	 been	
described	 as	 a	 ‘simple’	 polity,	 meaning	 that	 the	 unified	 administration	 requires	 a	
relatively	small	amount	of	coordinative	interactions	to	reach	a	decision	before	putting	
most	 effort	 into	 communicating	 their	 justifications	 to	 the	 wider	 public	 and	
stakeholders	 (Schmidt,	 2010).	 Yet,	 several	 findings	 from	 this	 study	 suggest	 this	
description	 to	 be	 inaccurate.	 First,	 the	 devolved	 administrations	 of	Wales,	 Scotland	
and	 Northern	 Ireland,	 as	 well	 as	 sub-national	 city	 regions,	 have	 varying	 degrees	 of	
autonomy	over	their	climate	change	programs	and	policies,	often	outperforming	and	
contradicting	 those	espoused	 in	England.	Secondly,	 inter-departmental	 factions	were	
exacerbated	 by	 the	 need	 to	 integrate	 climate	 goals	 and	 by	 Conservative-Liberal	
coalition	 dynamics.	 Thus	 the	 coordinative	 activities	 and	 evidence	 gathering,	 or	
environmental	 policy	 boundary	 work	 (Guston,	 2001),	 of	 Junior	 Ministers,	 Select	
Committees,	 All	 Party	 Parliamentary	 Groups	 and	 Special	 Advisers	 increased	
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significantly.	 Lastly,	 there	 were	 complementary	 trends	 towards	 multi-actor	
governance,	 open	 policymaking	 and	 the	 mediatisation	 of	 politics	 (Hajer,	 2009).	
Together	 they	demanded	more	pluralistic	coordination	around	climate	change	 issues	
and	undermined	the	authority	of	didactic	state	driven	messages.	Taken	together,	such	
discord	calls	into	question	past	claims	about	the	institutionalisation	of	climate	change	
in	the	UK:	
‘We	have	some	climate	legislation	and	a	lot	of	climate	related	policy	zooming	
around	 that	 Westminster	 bubble.	 But	 I	 don’t	 think	 the	 UK	 has	 ever	 had	 a	
position	 on	 climate	 change.	 I	 don’t	 think	we	 have	 a	 polity	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 a	
public	 conversation	 that	 is	 a	 true	 reflection	 of	 our	 society.	 There	 is	 the	
Westminster	bubble,	which	has	rather	hijacked	the	public	conversation,	but	I	
wouldn’t	call	that	a	polity.’	(CS1)	
Furthering	 this	 line	 of	 critique,	 there	 were	 concerns	 about	 the	 inability	 of	 various	
political	and	governance	 institutions’	ability	 to	adequately	express,	 let	alone	respond	
to,	 the	 social	 complexities	 of	 climate	 change.	 The	 ideas	 of	 2005-2008	 about	 cross-
sector	 and	 cross-party	 consensus	 in	 pursuit	 of	 ambitious	 climate	 goals	 proved,	 over	
time,	to	be	 incompatible	with	several	entrenched	 institutional	 logics.	 In	policy	terms,	
the	logic	of	neoliberalism	continued	to	snub	regulatory	options	while	at	the	same	time	
the	logic	of	‘the	Treasury	View’	–	an	example	of	power	in	ideas	 institutionalised	since	
the	 1930s	 recession,	 asserting	 that	 government	 spending	 offers	 no	 net	 benefit	 to	
economic	activity	in	times	of	austerity	–	restricted	any	fiscal	options	regardless	of	how	
generously	climate	economists	discounted	the	future.	In	political	terms,	the	cognitive	
power	of	heuristic	–	as	opposed	to	holistic	–	thinking	in	government	quickly	returned	
climate	 change	 to	 its	position	as	 a	background	and	non-voter	 issue
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some	 polarizing	 disagreement.	 In	 this	 context	 consensus	 without	 competition	 is	
tantamount	to	depoliticisation,	as	one	climate	policymaker	recalled:	
‘If	you	are	not	seen	to	be	having	a	fight	about	something	then	it	is	not	seen	as	
being	 politically	 significant.	 We	 got	 some	 attention	 around	 the	 Spending	
Review	but	interest	in	the	run	of	the	mill	[climate	policy]	pieces	was	already	
waning	when	we	came	in	[in	2010].’	(PM5)	
3.5. Discussion:	the	power	of	ideas	and	their	impact	on	climate	politics	
More	 than	 just	 identifying	 and	 describing	 various	 ideas	 about	 climate	 change,	 the	
findings	 presented	 here	 have	 detailed	 their	 linkages,	 relative	 prominence	 and	
alterations	over	time.	The	generalised	norm	of	government	responsibility	for	acting	on	
climate	change	remained	but	was	diminished,	losing	the	positive	leadership	emphasis	
and	 failing	 to	 connect	 convincingly	 to	 political	 philosophies	 or	 to	 specific	 policies	
(figure	3.2).	As	the	2015	general	election	grew	nearer,	climate	economics	ideas	shifted	
from	investment	and	benefits	to	austerity	and	costs,	replacing	policy	prescriptions	for	
low-carbon	sector	prioritisation	with	wider	economic	co-benefits	(figure	3.3).		
The	power	of	 ideas,	 as	 theorised	by	Carstensen	and	Schmidt	 (2015)	was	also	 clearly	
evident	 throughout.	 Coordinative	 interactions	 among	 policy	 actors	 relied	 on	 the	
persuasive	 power	 through	 ideas	 of	 economics,	 with	 institutionalised	 government	
divisions	and	austerity	ultimately	overriding	climate	policy	commitments.	Two	types	of	
power	 over	 ideas	 were	 apparent	 in	 the	 communicative	 interactions	 of	 actors:	 the	
exclusion	 of	 climate	 change	 as	 a	 central	 political	 story	 and	 the	 inability	 of	 central	
government	to	control,	and	thus	impose,	coherent	climate	policy	messages.	Lastly,	the	
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institutionalised	power	 in	 ideas	 of	 economic	 rationality	was	 further	 strengthened	by	
the	 recession,	 leaving	 the	 Treasury	 and	neoliberal	 governance	 advocates	 in	 a	 strong	
position	to	veto	many	climate	policy	ideas.	
As	economic	recession	and	the	election	cycle	wore	on	politicians	appeared	to	revert	to	
the	meta-preference	of	‘re-election	at	all	costs’	that	Bauer	and	Knill	(2012)	warn	about	
in	their	work	on	policy	dismantling.	Combining	these	findings	with	the	observed	trends	
in	public	and	media	engagement	with	climate	change	in	the	UK	and	around	the	world	
(Boykoff	 et	 al.,	 2015)	 has	 confirmed	 Lockwood’s	 suspicion	 that	 despite	 occasional	
peaks	(e.g.	the	Big	Ask	campaign	in	2008)	there	is	insufficient	pressure	from	voters	to	
ensure	 politicians	will	 shoulder	 the	 responsibility	 for	 addressing	 climate	 change	 as	 a	
stand-alone	 public	 good.	 Given	 this,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 not	 surprising	 then	 that	
environmental	 NGOs	 expended	 great	 effort	 in	 coordinating	 a	 joint	 pledge	 from	 the	
three	 main	 party	 leaders	 (Green	 Alliance,	 2015)	 that	 simply	 restated	 previous	
commitments.	
Whilst	 this	 strategy	 of	 cross-party	 consensus	 building	 may	 be	 based	 on	 theoretical	
(Giddens,	2009;	Voß	et	al.,	2009)	and	experiential	(Carter,	2014)	foundations,	there	is	
reason	to	suggest	 that	 it	may	not	always	be	the	most	effective.	Several	 interviewees	
expressed	dismay	at	the	lack	of	ambition	and	its	inadvertent	reinforcement	of	the	idea	
of	climate	change	as	a	‘non-story’	even	during	an	election	campaign	period.	However,	
this	is	not	to	suggest	that	the	other	extreme	of	polarised	climate	politics	would	be	any	
more	 effective	 –	 witness	 the	 slow	 progress	 on	 climate	 change	 of	 successive	
administrations	 in	 the	 United	 States	 –	 but	 that	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	 contestation	 is	
necessary	 to	 limit	 the	 scope	 for	 dismantling	 or	 inaction.	 A	 more	 moderate	 and	
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pragmatic	strategy	of	exercising	power	over	policymakers	by	highlighting	slow	progress	
at	 a	 time	 of	 high	 accountability	 and	 visibility	 may	 be	 effective	 here.	 Despite	 the	
previous	success	of	this	strategy	in	2008,	few	audible	voices	referred	to	evidence	that	
policy	 changes	 under	 the	 Coalition	 Government	 were	 undermining	 longer-term	
emissions	reductions	(CCC,	2014).	
The	cognitive	idea	of	climate	change	economics	moved	in	the	opposite	direction	with	
regards	to	politicisation.	The	positioning	of	its	component	meanings	changed	very	little	
(see	 figure	 3.3)	 but	 the	 switching	 from	 investment	 to	 austerity	 as	 an	 underlying	
principle	and	 the	associated	 shift	of	 emphasis	 from	benefits	 to	 costs	 threatened	 the	
validity	of	 certain	policy	 ideas	e.g.	 green	energy	 subsidies	and	 the	 levying	powers	of	
DECC.	The	impact	of	these	tensions	on	climate	policymaking	was	significant;	reductions	
in	 the	 generosity	 of	 renewable	 energy	 subsidies	were	made	 in	 2011	 and	Parliament	
contradicted	CCC	advice	about	setting	a	decarbonisation	target	for	the	power	sector	in	
2013.	The	review	of	the	fourth	carbon	budget	evidence	base	in	2014	was	an	example	
of	 policymakers	 outwardly	 questioning	 the	wisdom	 of	 the	 CCC,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 its	
programmatic	 assumptions	 and	 policy	 solutions.	 A	 precedent	 has	 thus	 been	 set	 for	
Parliament	 to	 revisit	 its	 carbon	 budget	 commitments	 on	 economic	 competition	
grounds,	 potentially	 jeopardising	 future	 setting	 and	 achievement	 of	 interim	 targets.	
Overall,	 it	appears	 the	battle	 to	persuade	 through	 the	power	of	economic	 ideas	was	
won	by	those	presenting	a	view	of	climate	policy	as	too	costly	and	thus	incompatible	
with	deficit	reduction	and,	by	extension,	re-election.	
The	case	study	 findings	are	a	 reminder	of	 the	 ideational	 influence	of	economics	as	a	
rationale	 for	 governing	 (see:	 Flyvbjerg,	 2001).	 Its	 cognitive	 role	 was	 particularly	
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important	 throughout	 the	 policy	 process	 (e.g.	 for	 visioning	 a	 future	 low-carbon	
economy	and	guiding	decision	making	based	on	 the	principle	of	maximum	return	on	
investment)	and	the	institutional	positioning	of	economists	(e.g.	Treasury	control	over	
DECC’s	levying	activity	and	the	appointment	of	economically-oriented	leaders	at	DECC	
and	the	CCC).	This	‘political	influence	of	economics’	(Hirschman	and	Berman,	2014)	is	
not	 inherently	 counterproductive	 to	 climate	 change	 action	 –	 as	 the	 Stern	 Review	
proved	in	2008	–	but	it	does	limit	the	range	of	policy	solutions	that	can	be	considered.	
This	latter	point	raises	concerns	about	the	increasingly	technocratic	nature	of	climate	
and	 energy	 policy	 in	 the	 UK,	 especially	 regarding	 its	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	 political	
capacity	of	policymakers	(Kuzemko,	2015).	
3.6. Conclusion	
Starting	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 a	 prolonged	 economic	 recession	would	 challenge	
the	 foundations	of	 the	UK’s	ambitious	plans	 to	 tackle	climate	change,	 this	article	set	
out	to	explore	the	ideational,	discursive	and	institutional	dynamics	through	which	this	
might	be	observed.	Combining	DI	with	a	relational	definition	of	ideas	illustrated	how,	
through	 discursive	 interactions,	 the	 ideas	 underpinning	 institutionalized	 policy	
arrangements	can	be	re-configured.	The	impact	of	these	changes	on	the	policy	process	
can	be	described	as	power	 through,	over	and	 in	 ideas.	To	 summarise	 the	UK	case	 in	
these	 terms:	 austerity	 economics	 proved	most	 persuasive	 among	 policymakers,	 the	
non-story	status	of	climate	change	kept	it	away	from	the	(potentially	creative)	frictions	
of	politics,	and	institutional	constraints	ensured	any	attempt	to	increase	climate	policy	
ambitions	were	delegitimised.	Thus,	 it	has	been	shown	that	 ideas	continue	to	matter	
after	 the	 adoption	 of	 innovative	 policies	 and	 that	 the	 discursive	 interactions	 and	
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ideational	bricolage	through	which	they	evolve	can	be	analysed	to	reveal	exactly	when	
and	how	they	matter.	
Overall,	 the	 UK	 Government’s	 role	 in	 tackling	 climate	 change	 transformed	 from	
innovative	 leadership	 to	decentralised	 responsibility,	 questioning	 (and	also	 rejecting)	
new	 state	 driven	 targets	 for	 reducing	 emissions	 in	 favour	 of	 multi-sector	 driven	
alternatives.	The	economics	of	climate	change	continued	to	be	a	prominent	cognitive	
idea	 tying	 together	 norms,	 principles	 and	 specific	 solutions.	 However,	 its	 previous	
rationale	 for	 early	 action	was	 challenged	 by	 a	 shift	 in	 emphasis	 from	 investment	 to	
austerity	 i.e.	 from	 benefit	 to	 cost.	 Together	 these	 reformulated	 ideas	 were	
represented	through	increasingly	popular	discourses	of	macro-economic	prudence	and	
climate	 policy	 scepticism.	 In	 addition	 to	 amplifying	 divisions	 among	 political	 actors	
these	 changes	 reinforced	 simplified	 media	 narratives	 and	 stalled	 the	 progress	 of	
climate	policymaking	through	restrictions	on	both	thoughts	and	resources.	
Contrary	 to	 the	 image	of	UK	climate	politics	as	 safely	 institutionalised	by	cross-party	
agreement	 and	 flagship	 legislation,	 the	 2010	 to	 2015	 period	 was	 marked	 by	 an	
increasing	 dissensus.	 Some	 direct	 impacts	 on	 policy	 were	 apparent	 (e.g.	 in	 cuts	 to	
department	budgets,	to	renewable	energy	subsidies	and	to	domestic	energy	efficiency	
schemes)	although	these	were	obscured	under	the	general	banner	of	austerity	rather	
than	as	an	effect	of	the	UK	abandoning	its	position	as	a	climate	leader.	This	is	perhaps	
the	most	worrying	implication	of	the	findings,	especially	for	other	countries	seeking	to	
emulate	 the	UK’s	 climate	 policy	 framework	 and	 consensual	 political	 strategy.	 Strong	
disagreement	 among	 policymakers	 as	 well	 as	 a	 growing	 shortfall	 in	 the	 required	
policies	 to	meet	 long-term	 targets	 were	 partially	 hidden	 from	 critique.	 Thus,	 target	
		
133	
setting	and	rhetorical	commitments	may	provide	political	cover	for	inadequate	policy	
action	on	the	ground.	At	the	UNFCCC	COP21	in	Paris	in	2015	the	UK,	and	many	other	
countries,	presented	themselves	as	leading	the	fight	against	climate	change,	however	
the	 gap	 between	 targets	 and	 implementation	 at	 the	 national	 level	 has	 been	 quietly	
growing.	
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Abstract	
The	 issue	of	proportionality	 is	central	 to	climate	policy	debates	about	setting	 targets	
for	 the	 reduction	 of	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 and	 the	 development	 of	 low-carbon	
energy.	In	effect,	these	debates	centre	on	whether	the	perceived	social	costs	outweigh	
the	 benefits	 of	 policies	 and	 whether	 this	 may	 lead	 to	 over-investment	 or	 ‘policy	
bubbles’.	Political	attention,	agenda	setting	and	policy	 image	are	all	crucial	drivers	of	
ambitious	policy	formation,	as	seen	in	the	case	of	the	United	Kingdom's	(UK)	Climate	
Change	 Act	 (2008).	 However,	 as	 political	 salience	 waned	 and	 economic	 depression	
dragged	on,	 the	cost	of	 long-term	climate	 targets	have	been	reconsidered.	Based	on	
documentary	 analysis	 and	 33	 interviews	 with	 central	 political	 actors,	 this	 article	
presents	 a	 detailed	 account	 of	 how	 economic	 arguments	 have	 been	 used	 to	
reinterpret	and	challenge	policies,	using	the	heuristics	of	‘over-investment’	and	‘policy	
bubbles’.	 Ultimately,	 arguments	 about	 proportionality	 hinge	 on	 which	 costs	 and	
benefits	 are	 considered.	 In	 the	 UK,	 economic	 and	 technical	 framings	 are	 typically	
prioritised,	 but	 these	 do	 not	 explain	 contradictory	 and	 politically	 motivated	 policy	
decisions.	 We	 discuss	 these	 dynamics	 within	 the	 context	 of	 maturing	 renewable	
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energy	technologies,	high	energy	prices	and	the	UK's	cross-party	consensus	approach	
to	climate	politics.	
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	‘I	don’t	think	there	are	many	people,	even	in	that	policymaking	bubble,	
who	 have	 joined	 the	 dots.	 It	 is	 terribly	 convenient	 that	 in	 that	 bubble	
there	are	people	who	live	in	permanent	conditions	of	cognitive	overload’	
(senior	government	interviewee)	
4.1. Introduction	
Reducing	greenhouse	gas	emissions	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	climate	change	demands	
bold	actions	 from	nation	 states,	both	 collectively	 and	 individually.	 It	 also	demands	a	
high	degree	of	reflexivity,	managing	policies	in	response	to	rapidly	changing	social	and	
material	 conditions.	Many	 industrialised	 countries	 have	pledged	 ‘intended	nationally	
determined	 contributions’	 (INDC)	 and	many	have	 developed	 flagship	 climate	 change	
policies	to	guide	them	(Fankhauser,	Gennailo	&	Collins,	2015).	But	the	realisation	and	
political	feasibility	of	these	ambitions	is	far	from	assured,	especially	as	action	becomes	
more	 challenging	 over	 time	 (e.g.	 full	 decarbonisation	 of	 electricity	 supply),	 as	 public	
and	 political	 interest	 fluctuates,	 as	 energy	 prices	 rise,	 and	 as	 national	 economies	
struggle	in	the	aftermath	of	the	financial	crash	of	2008/9.	
We	 explore	 these	 various	 factors	 using	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (UK)	 as	 a	 case	 study,	
showing	that	despite	world-leading	legislation	a	gap	between	rhetoric	and	action	has	
emerged	 and	 is	 in	 danger	 of	 growing.	 By	 drawing	 on	 ideas	 of	 disproportionate	
policymaking	and	policy	bubbles	we	show	how	perceptions	of,	and	discourses	about,	
climate	change	and	low-carbon	energy	have	changed,	and	the	impact	this	has	had	on	
policy	 outputs.	 These	 concepts	 provide	 a	 particularly	 appropriate	 heuristic	 for	
exploring	the	ideas	and	rationales	behind	the	process	of	policy	recalibration.	They	are	
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especially	pertinent	to	climate	and	energy	policy,	given	the	predominance	of	economic	
framings	and	also	because	of	 their	attention	to	reflexivity	 in	complex	 long-run	policy	
issues.	Adding	to	existing	research	on	political	agenda	setting	and	policy	retrenchment,	
the	 case	 study	and	 concepts	 in	 this	 article	 illustrate	 the	power	of	 economic	 ideas	 in	
reframing	strategic	policies	and	justifying	the	rollback	of	policy.		
4.1.1. UK	climate	policy:	post-innovation	problems	
In	2008	the	United	Kingdom	passed	the	Climate	Change	Act	(CCA).	This	legislation	was	
heralded	as	a	significant	step	forward	for	national	level	climate	policy	(Carter	&	Jacobs,	
2014;	Hill,	2009;	 Lockwood,	2013;	 cf.	Pielke	 Jr,	2009).	 Following	 Jordan	and	Huitema	
(2014),	 it	 can	be	described	 as	 an	example	of	 policy	 innovation	because,	 for	 the	 first	
time,	 a	 national	 government	 had	 self-imposed	 legally	 binding	 targets	 for	 reducing	
greenhouse	gas	emissions.	In	order	to	oversee	progress	towards	the	flagship	target	of	
an	 80%	 reduction	 in	 emissions	 by	 2050	 (compared	 to	 1990	 baseline	 levels)	 a	 semi-
independent	 Committee	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (CCC)	 was	 established	 to	 propose	 and	
monitor	 interim	 five-yearly	 targets	 (‘carbon	 budgets’).	 Combined	 with	 the	 newly	
formed	 Department	 for	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change	 (DECC)	 the	 institutional	
architecture	supporting	the	CCA	was	thus	established.		
UK	 climate	 policy	 has	 since	 received	 a	 lot	 of	 attention	 in	 academia	 and	 beyond,	
sometimes	raising	doubts	and	drawing	criticism.	For	instance,	it	has	been	shown	that	
political	 competition	 and	 support	 for	 environmental	 issues	 from	 some	 parts	 of	 the	
incumbent	 Conservative	 Party	 quickly	 dissipated	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 economic	
downturn	 (Carter,	 2014).	 Uncertainty	 in	 climate	 change	 and	 low-carbon	 energy	
discourses	further	compounded	this	loss	of	momentum	(Lockwood,	2013;	Lorenzoni	&	
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Benson,	2014).	In	this	article	we	extend	this	line	of	critical	enquiry,	analysing	the	way	
these	issues	have	been	expressed	in	debates	about	emissions	target	setting	and	how	
they	have	materialised	in	the	form	of	policy	changes	in	the	low-carbon	energy	sector.	
4.2. Theory	
4.2.1. Uncertainty	during	times	of	rapid	change		
Theories	of	 the	policy	 process	often	 stress	 the	 importance	of	 timing,	 especially	with	
regards	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 new	 ideas	 and	 significant	 changes	 in	 direction	 for	 policy.	
Phrases	 such	 as	 ‘window	 of	 opportunity’	 and	 ‘punctuated	 equilibrium’	 are	 used	 to	
describe	 the	 conditions	 in	 which	 a	 certain	 problem,	 and	 solution,	 command	 the	
attention	 of	 publics	 and	 policymakers	 alike	 (Jones	&	 Baumgartner,	 2012;	 Sabatier	&	
Weible,	2007;	Pralle,	2009).	Contained	within	much	of	this	theory	are	warnings	about	
information	processing	errors	and	the	possibility	of	over-reaction	to	increased	activity	
in	previously	inert	policy	areas	(Baumgartner,	Jones,	&	Mortensen,	2007).	For	instance,	
policymakers’	 bounded	 rationality	 (i.e.	 focusing	 on	 a	 small	 number	 of	 highly	 salient	
issues)	 is	 known	 to	 play	 a	 role	 in	 sudden	 momentum	 overcoming	 entrenched	
resistance	 and	 forcing	 rapid	 policy	 change	 (Stirling,	 2014).	 When	 facing	 cognitive	
overload	 and	 intense	 political	 pressure,	 policymakers’	 may	 tend	 towards	
overconfidence	 (Maor,	 2012).	 Accordingly,	 more	 research	 into	 the	 post-adoption	
phases	of	policy	innovations	has	been	called	for	(Jordan	&	Huitema,	2014),	particularly	
to	 explore	 the	 consequences	 of	 over-	 or	 under-reactions	 (Howlett	 &	 Kemmerling,	
2017;	Maor,	 2012)	 and	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 subjectivity	 of	 rapid	 policy	 change	
(Jones	&	Baumgartner,	2012).	
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4.2.2. Discursive	framing	and	agenda	setting	
Whether	a	given	policy	is	perceived	and	described	as	(dis)proportionate	will	depend	on	
many	things,	including	the	position	of	the	person	doing	the	describing	and	the	point	of	
reference	they	use	to	make	their	claims,	e.g.	climate	risks,	other	nations’	policies	or	a	
particular	 set	 of	 costs/benefits.	 The	 use	 of	 speech	 acts	 (or	 discourse)	 to	 define	 the	
terms	 of	 reference	 or	 promote	 a	 particular	 perspective	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 an	
epistemological	intention	to:	
‘Transform	 information	 into	 a	meaningful	 whole	 by	 interpreting	 them	
through	 other	 available	 social,	 psychological,	 and	 cultural	 concepts,	
axioms,	and	principles.’	(Fischer,	2003:	p144)	
In	practice	this	can	be	a	powerful	and	persuasive	tool	for	those	involved	in	processes	
of	 deliberation	 and	 political	 agenda	 setting	 (Dryzek	 &	 Lo,	 2014;	 Hajer,	 1995;	 Snow,	
2004).	 As	 such,	 it	 is	 useful	 for	 analysing	 how	 government	 actors	 and	 other	
stakeholders	seek	to	emphasise	certain	characteristics	of	a	problem	in	order	to	justify	
their	preferred	solution	(Fischer,	2003;	Blue,	2016).	The	effects	of	framing	can	be	seen	
at	the	early	stages	of	defining	a	problem	as	well	as	throughout	the	lifecycle	of	policies,	
particularly	for	long-run	issues	such	as	climate	change	and	energy	transitions.	
Climate	 change	 has	 been	 described	 as	 the	 archetypal	 ‘wicked	 problem’,	 for	 which	
there	 can	 be	 no	 ‘silver	 bullet’	 policy	 solution	 (Urry,	 2016).	 Countering	 the	 tendency	
towards	despondency	that	such	 issues	sometimes	produce	requires	sensitivity	 to	the	
short	 and	 long	 term	 changes	 in	 public	 discourses,	 as	well	 as	 proactive	 strategies	 for	
keeping	 climate	 change	high	on	 the	political	 agenda	 (Capstick,	 Pidgeon	&	Henwood,	
2015;	 Pralle,	 2009).	 Building	 on	 agenda	 setting	 theories,	 Pralle	 (2009)	 stresses	 the	
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importance	of	framing	solutions	to	climate	change	in	terms	of:	avoiding	costly	impacts,	
producing	economic	benefits	and	stressing	its	linkages	with	energy	systems.	
4.2.3. Rationalising	over-reaction	
Substantial	policy	changes	are	often	politically	charged	and	scrutinised.	Therefore	the	
way	 they	 are	perceived	and	 legitimised	by	 various	 actors	 is	 crucial	 to	understanding	
their	political	dynamics	(Hajer,	2010;	Jones	&	Wolfe,	2015;	Sabatier	&	Weible,	2007).	
The	discursive	influence	and	emotional	valence	of	novel	policy	ideas	is	well	theorised	
in	 the	 literature	 (Cox	 &	 Béland,	 2013;	 Schmidt,	 2010)	 and	 may	 lead	 to	 bold	
commitments	 requiring	 significant	 levels	 of	 (potentially	 idealistic	 and	 unfeasible)	
government	 action	 (Maor,	 2015).	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 afore	 mentioned	 information	
processing	 errors,	Maor,	 Tosun	 &	 Jordan	 (2017)	 set	 out	 four	 political	 rationales	 for	
adopting	policies	that	could	later	come	to	be	seen	as	an	over-reaction:	
• To	 overturn	 a	 status	 quo	 and	 redefine	 the	 terms	 of	 debate	 in	 a	 given	 policy	
area	
• To	seek	first-mover	advantage	for	states	and	sub-national	bodies	
• To	respond	to	intense	public	demand	for	averting	a	perceived	risk	
• To	pursue	national	or	sub-national	goals	as	part	of	tackling	a	global	problem	
Accordingly,	 as	 conditions	 change	 and	 these	 rationales	 are	 no	 longer	 pertinent	 –	
because	 they	 have	 been	 met	 or	 otherwise	 negated	 –	 politicians	 and	 policymakers	
facing	 difficult	 circumstances	may	question	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 past	 decisions	 by	
invoking	new	or	different	framings	and	evidence.	
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By	 defining	 over-reaction	 as	 ‘producing	 an	 inefficient	 policy	 that	 generates	 greater	
social	costs	than	benefits’	(Maor,	2012:	p232),	it	is	possible	to	consider	both	objective	
and	 subjective	 evaluations.	Given	 the	 number	 of	 existing	 positivist	 arguments	 about	
the	 proportionality	 of	 climate	 change	 targets	 vis-à-vis	 climate	 science,	 this	 article	
focuses	on	the	perceptions	of	policymakers	and	other	stakeholders.	These	subjective	
accounts,	and	the	discourses	 they	mobilise,	are	analysed	alongside	observable	policy	
outputs	 to	 illustrate	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 climate	 and	 energy	 policies	 have	 been	 re-
interpreted	 and	 the	 way	 this	 is	 borne	 out	 in	 specific	 decisions	 e.g.	 to	 recalibrate	
policies.	
4.2.4. The	rise	of	policy	bubbles	
There	 are	 various	 feedback	 mechanisms	 through	 which	 innovative,	 long	 run,	 or	
contentious	policies	can	protect	their	longevity	such	as	creating	new	vested	interests,	
reallocating	resources	and	producing	new	information	streams	(Pierson,	1993).	These	
may	 be	 deliberately	 designed	 into	 policies	 or	 they	 may	 be	 unintentional	 (Jordan	 &	
Matt,	 2014).	 Either	 way,	 it	 is	 conceivable	 that	 these	 mechanisms	 could	 exacerbate	
actual,	 or	 perceived,	 costs,	 thereby	 creating	 prolonged	 over-investment	 or	 a	 ‘policy	
bubble’	 (Maor,	 2014;	 Jones,	 Thomas	 III,	 &	 Wolfe,	 2014).	 Accordingly,	 the	 reflexive	
capacity	of	policymakers	 to	 check	and	balance	 these	policies	 is	 crucial.	 This	 reflexive	
capacity	is	partially	determined	by	institutional	factors	(Howlett	&	Kemmerling,	2017;	
Kuzemko,	2015)	but	also	by	 individuals’	 strategic	actions	e.g.	discursive	 reframing	or	
deliberate	inaction	(Bauer,	Jordan,	Green-Pederson	&	Héritier,	2012;	Howlett,	2014).		
There	are	many	types	of	checks	and	balances	for	identifying	disproportionate	policies	
and	recalibrating	them,	including:	target	setting,	monitoring	and	evaluation,	evidence-
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based	 goals,	 and	 reflexive	 implementation	 (Hajer,	 2010;	 Howlett,	 &	 Lejano,	 2012;	
Hughes,	 2012;	 Voß,	 Smith	 &	 Grin,	 2009).	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 that	
policymaking	 is	 entirely	 rational	 and	 neatly	 professionalised.	 For	 example,	 target	
setting	 may	 be	 mobilised	 for	 political	 or	 ideological	 reasons	 in	 order	 to:	 impose	
responsibilities	 on	 successor	 administrations;	 establish	 or	 re-arrange	 policy	 areas;	
strengthen	 international	 negotiating	 positions;	 or	 give	 the	 impression	 of	 doing	
something	without	actually	increasing	implementation	(Bauer	et	al.,	2012;	Hajer,	2010;	
Howlett,	2014;	Rutter	&	Knighton,	2012).		
In	the	UK,	interim	targets	and	annual	reports	on	emissions	were	intended	to	maintain	
salience,	ambition	and	accountability	into	the	future	as	implementation	became	more	
difficult	and	costly	(Rutter	&	Knighton,	2012).	Yet	the	efficacy	of	these	mechanisms	has	
already	begun	to	be	questioned,	especially	with	regards	to	ensuring	policy	stability	and	
investment	 in	 low-carbon	 energy	 (Lockwood,	 2013).	 By	 applying	 the	 economic	
heuristic	 device	 of	 a	 ‘policy	 bubble’	 to	 the	 UK	 case	 we	 can	 see	 whether	 growing	
concerns	 about	 the	 costs	 of	 meeting	 emissions	 targets	 and	 over-investment	 in	
renewable	 energy	 are	 capable	 of	 over-riding	 the	 positive	 feedback	 mechanisms	 of	
climate	and	energy	policies.	
4.3. Methodology	
4.3.1. Research	Design	
Changes	 in	policy	outputs	 (i.e.	 strategies,	 instruments	and	 their	 settings)	provide	 the	
basis	for	the	study	whilst	the	discursive	activity	accompanying	them	(i.e.	their	framing	
by	 different	 actors)	 provides	 the	 qualitative	 depth.	 Underlying	 this	 approach	 is	 the	
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epistemological	assumption	 that	what	can	be	known	and	expressed	about	 the	world	
(e.g.	 about	 UK	 climate	 policy)	 is	 ultimately	 mediated	 by	 the	 interpreter’s	 particular	
history	and	context	(Yanow,	2000).	This	applies	to	both	the	expressed	views	of	actors	
in	 the	 texts	 and	 interviews	 we	 analyse,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 the	 researchers’	 own	
representations	of	these.	Thus,	we	do	not	claim	to	be	presenting	the	definitive	account	
of	 climate	 policy	 in	 the	UK	 but	 rather	 a	 particular	 exploration	 of	 policy	 outputs	 and	
how	various	actors	have	discursively	constructed	them.	The	analysis	focuses	on	climate	
change	mitigation	 in	 the	 form	of	 strategies	 and	 targets	 for	 reducing	 greenhouse	gas	
emissions.	 Given	 the	 interrelated	 nature	 of	 energy	 sources	 and	 emissions,	 both	
materially	and	discursively,	the	low-carbon	energy	policy	area	(specifically,	supply-side	
electricity)	was	scrutinised.	
4.3.2. Data	collection	
Publically	 available	documents	were	purposively	 collected	and	 subjected	 to	a	 critical	
discourse	analysis	in	order	to	identify	the	various	framings	of	policies	and	to	verify	the	
accounts	 of	 interviewees	 by	 looking	 for	 anomalies	 (Wetherell,	 2001).	 Key	 texts	
included:	policy	documents,	party	manifestos,	expert	 reports,	and	media	articles.	UK	
media	 coverage	 including	 the	 keywords	 ‘climate	 change’,	 ‘climate	 change	 +	 general	
election’	 and	 ‘renewable	 energy’	was	 collected	 using	 Google	 Alerts	 during	 the	 2015	
election	period.	Trends	and	analysis	of	frames	were	crosschecked	using	data	provided	
by	 the	 Media	 and	 Climate	 Change	 Observatory	 at	 the	 Center	 for	 Science	 and	
Technology	Policy	Research,	University	of	Colorado.	A	single	frame	was	used	to	code	
each	story,	and	these	were	 inspired	by	(and	partially	adapted)	from	existing	work	on	
climate	change	media	coverage	(Boykoff,	2008;	O’Neill	et	al.,	2015).		
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Semi-structured	 interviews	were	 carried	 out	 to	 complement	 this	with	 the	 otherwise	
undocumented	 beliefs,	 values	 and	 perceptions	 of	 key	 actors	 (Beamer,	 2002).	
Interviewees	 were	 purposively	 sampled	 to	 include	 a	 range	 of	 actors	 who	 regularly	
contributed	to	climate	policy	between	2006	and	2016,	 including	a	mix	of	 retired	and	
currently	 employed	 policymakers	 and	 therefore	 a	 mix	 of	 more	 and	 less	 critical	
perspectives	(see	table	4).	
Table	4:	Summary	of	interviewees	
Organisations	and	roles	 Number	
Government	 MPs,	policymakers,	advisers	and	civil	servants	 17	
Non-governmental	
organisation	(NGO)	
Policy	 analysts,	 knowledge	 brokers,	 consultants	
and	campaigners	
7	
Media	 Mass	and	specialist	journalists	 3	
Energy	sector	 Consultants,	 investors	 and	 heads	 of	 research	 &	
development	
3	
Academia	 Professors	of	climate	change	and	energy	 3	
	 	 Total:	33	
	
Following	 a	 grounded	 theory	 approach,	 these	 two	 layers	 of	 evidence	were	 collected	
and	 analysed	 iteratively,	 with	 emerging	 themes	 informing	 future	 collection	 and	
analysis	(Charmaz,	2014).	Inevitably,	not	all	policy	changes	are	described	in	full	and	the	
individuals’	 perspectives	 included	 are	 thus	 representative	 rather	 than	 exhaustive	
(Yanow,	 2000).	 This	 partiality	 is	 justified	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 reflects	 the	 overall	
nature	of	the	climate	policy	area,	in	terms	of	who	has	the	power	to	shape	policy	and	
the	 communication	 channels	 through	which	 they	 engage	with	 stakeholders	 and	 the	
general	public.		
4.4. Case	study:	changing	perspectives	and	policies	
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4.4.1. National	climate	politics	and	emissions	target	setting	
4.4.1.1. The	‘dangerous	climate	change’	imperative	
Leading	 up	 to	 the	 passing	 of	 the	 CCA,	 discourse	 from	 the	 two	main	 political	 parties	
took	 the	 long	 view,	 framing	 climate	 change	 as	 an	 inter-generational	 issue	 that	
demanded	immediate	action.	The	Labour	Prime	Minister’s	speech	in	2004	referred	to	
climate	change	as:	
	‘[A]	 challenge	 so	 far-reaching	 in	 its	 impact	 and	 irreversible	 in	 its	
destructive	power,	that	it	alters	radically	human	existence’	(Blair,	2004).		
David	Cameron,	leader	of	the	opposition	Conservative	Party,	also	made	it	a	prominent	
part	of	his	platform,	saying	 ‘the	price	of	 inaction	gets	higher	every	day’	and	 ‘tackling	
climate	 change	 is	 our	 social	 responsibility	 to	 the	 next	 generation’	 (BBC,	 2006).	
According	 to	a	prominent	campaigner,	 this	sense	of	urgency	and	cross-party	support	
‘opened	a	whole	 load	of	 possibilities	 that	weren’t	 there	before’	 (Rutter	 et	 al.,	 2012:	
p114).	Seizing	the	opportunity,	campaigners	coordinated	political	support	for	the	80%	
emissions	 reduction	 target,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 no	 other	 country	 in	 the	world	 had	
such	an	ambitious	target	or	legal	framework	(Friends	of	the	Earth,	2008).		
Pressure	 also	 came	 from	 the	 civic	 and	 private	 sectors.	 A	 public	 consultation	 on	 the	
draft	Climate	Change	Bill	produced	more	than	17000	responses	from	individuals	that	
were	 ‘overwhelmingly	 supportive’	 (HM	 Government,	 2007:	 p10)	 and	 the	
Confederation	 of	 British	 Industry	 (CBI),	 stated	 that	 ‘this	 bill	 is	 a	 big	 step	 forward	 in	
combining	 the	 two	 things	 we	 really	 need:	 long-term	 clarity	 on	 policy	 direction	 and	
flexibility	in	its	delivery’	(HM	Government	2007	p10).	In	addition	to	the	business	case,	
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climate	modelling	by	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC)	provided	
influential	scientific	evidence,	as	the	Deputy	Director	of	the	CBI,	told	a	policy	reunion:	
	‘What	really	did	it,	in	2004	and	early	2005,	was	the	science.	I	think	your	
average	chief	exec	of	a	major	company	had	a	feeling	in	their	gut	[that]	
the	UN	scientists	were	right’	(Rutter	et	al.,	2012	p114)	
The	 legislation	 was	 scrutinised	 by	 three	 separate	 parliamentary	 committees	 and	
although	 a	minority	 of	 sceptical	 voices	were	heard	 (see	Parliament,	 2007),	 it	 passed	
into	 law	 in	 2008.	 In	 this	 context,	 only	 those	 willing	 to	 be	 cast	 as	 outsiders	 could	
outwardly	 oppose	 the	 CCA	 (5	 out	 of	 650	 MPs	 abstained	 or	 voted	 against	 it).	 For	
example,	 a	 statement	 from	 climate-sceptic	Member	 of	 Parliament	 (MP)	 Peter	 Lilley	
laments	the	persuasiveness	of	the	economic	argument	in	these	terms:	
‘Given	the	public	mood	[at	the	time],	the	Stern	Review	was	adopted	as	
Gospel	 truth;	 by	 politicians	 -	 because	 it	 endorsed	 an	 apparently	 vote-
winning	message;	by	the	media	-	because	the	global	warming	story	sold	
newspapers;	 and	 by	 environmentalists	 -	 because	 it	 validated	 their	
agenda.’	(Lilley,	2012:	p8)	
It	is	much	harder	to	imagine	this	argument	for	early	investment	resonating	in	quite	the	
same	way	had	it	been	made	after	the	global	economic	crash	of	2008/9.	Certainly	from	
a	government	Treasury	perspective	austerity	should	have	put	 the	economy	ahead	of	
climate	on	the	political	agenda	(Ares,	2011).	Although	not	a	central	theme	of	election	
campaigns	 in	 2010,	 climate	 change	 was	 referred	 to	 in	 party	 manifestos	 more	
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frequently	than	in	2005	or	2015	(figure	4.1),	attesting	to	the	short-lived	nature	of	the	
competitive	consensus.	
	
Figure	4.1:	Number	of	references	made	to	climate	change	in	main	political	party	
manifestos.	
However,	 even	 within	 this	 apparent	 consensus	 there	 were	 significantly	 different	
interpretations	 of	 the	 associated	 costs	 and	 most	 desirable	 policy	 pathways.	 Even	
among	 departmental	ministers	 only	 a	 few	 individuals	were	 keen	 to	make	 emissions	
targets	a	priority,	whilst	the	rest	made	up	a	passive	majority	described	by	one	senior	
government	colleague	as:	
‘A	quite	shallow	consensus	among	a	small	group	of	people	who	wanted	
to	be	on	the	right	side	of	history.’	
Another	interviewee	who	worked	with	MPs	on	promoting	the	climate	change	agenda	
across	 government	 encountered	 the	 same	discord,	 characterising	 the	 atmosphere	 in	
Parliament	as	‘one	part	hostility	to	nine	parts	indifference’.	
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Another	 telling	 quote	 from	 a	 civil	 service	 policymaker	 describes	 the	 subsequent	
ideological	 incongruence	 faced	 by	 Conservative	 leaders.	 Pledging	 strong	 action	 on	
climate	change	helped	to	soften	the	party’s	image	and	strengthened	David	Cameron’s	
platform	 (Carter,	 2014),	 but	 it	 also	 left	 them	 facing	 potentially	 unpopular	 policy	
options:	
‘I	think	No.10	[the	Prime	Minister’s	office]	were,	and	still	are,	committed	
to	 tackling	 climate	 change	 in	principle	but	are	unprepared	 to	 take	 the	
difficult	decisions.	At	 the	high	 level	 they	are	committed	but	as	soon	as	
you	 get	 a	 level	 down	 and	 face	 policy	 decisions	 involving	 public	
expenditure,	money	on	bills	or	regulation	which	some	people	might	not	
like…	then	they	don’t	like	the	consequences.’	
4.4.1.2. Target	setting	amidst	economic	turmoil	
The	five-yearly	interim	targets	were	an	innovative	and	important	element	of	the	CCA’s	
longevity.	 In	 principle	 the	 carbon	 budgets	 were	 intended	 to	 provide	 a	 measurable	
pathway	to	the	2050	target,	thereby	helping	to	neutralise	the	antagonisms	of	political	
attention	cycles	 that	 so	often	hinder	 long-term	policy	objectives	 (Anderson,	Bows,	&	
Mander,	2008;	Giddens,	2009;	Hill,	2009;	Voß,	Smith,	&	Grin,	2009).	The	evidence	base	
for	 these	 targets	 follows	 the	 IPCC’s	 modelling	 of	 global	 temperature	 rises,	 which	
underpins	the	United	Nation’s	(UN)	international	climate	change	negotiations	to	which	
the	 UK	 is	 a	 party.	 However,	 this	 needs	 to	 be	 placed	 within	 the	 national	 social	 and	
political	context.	As	the	CCC’s	budget	proposals	must	also	consider,	 in	each	sector	of	
the	economy,	‘what	can	be	achieved	to	reduce	emissions	at	least	cost,	taking	account	
of	available	technologies	and	government	policy’	(CCC,	2016).	
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The	 first	 three	 carbon	 budgets	 covering	 five-yearly	 periods	 between	 2008	 and	 2022	
(23%,	29%	and	35%	respectively)	were	legislated	simultaneously	with	the	CCA	in	2008.	
The	report	does	not	use	the	term	‘proportionate’	but	synonyms	such	as	‘moderation,	
‘appropriate’,	‘feasible’	and	‘manageable’	are	present	throughout	e.g.		
‘The	 costs	 of	 meeting	 the	 80%	 target	 are	 affordable	 and	 should	 be	
accepted	 given	 the	 consequences	 and	 higher	 costs	 of	 not	 acting’	 (CCC	
2008:	p5)		
‘Realistically	achievable	emissions	reductions	are	sufficient	 to	meet	the	
required	objective.’	(CCC	2008:	p17).		
An	 interim	assessment	 report	noted	 that	emissions	 reductions	were	 likely	 to	exceed	
the	 targets,	partially	as	a	 result	of	 the	economic	downturn	 (HM	Government,	2010).	
However,	 it	 was	 stated	 confidently	 that	 ‘the	 aim	 should	 be	 to	 outperform	 the	 first	
budget,	 and	 not	 to	 use	 this	 outperformance	 to	 reduce	 effort	 in	 the	 second	 budget’	
(Ares,	2011:	p2).	This	warning	against	the	possibility	of	interpreting	over-performance	
as	justification	for	policy	rollback	proved	to	be	astute.	
By	 contrast,	 the	 fourth	 carbon	had	a	much	 tougher	 time	being	 legislated	 in	 2011	as	
concerns	over	economic	competitiveness	with	 the	 rest	of	Europe	began	 to	outweigh	
the	scientific	case.	Statements	from	senior	politicians	clearly	sought	to	shift	attention	
to	 short-term	 costs	 (Guardian,	 2013),	 suggesting	 that	 the	 CCA	 had	 produced	 an	
untenable	legacy	in	the	current	political	economic	circumstances:		
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‘It	was	fine	to	be	talking	about	spending	money	on	climate	change	in	the	
good	times	but	when	energy	bills	are	going	up	it	doesn’t	seem	like	good	
politics.’	(Senior	Conservative	MP	quoted	in	Wright,	2012)	
Despite	these	attempts	to	reframe	long-term	climate	targets	as	costly	over-reactions,	
the	 fourth	 budget	 was	 set	 in	 2011,	 albeit	 with	 the	 caveat	 of	 a	 review	 of	 its	
proportionality	 in	2014	 (HM	Government,	2011).	Again,	despite	sustained	arguments	
from	 some	 ministers	 and	 lobbying	 from	 energy	 intensive	 industry,	 the	 target	 was	
retained	(CCC,	2013).	This	open	dissent	was	presented	as	economic	prudence	on	the	
part	of	the	Chancellor	of	the	Exchequer,	but	several	government	interviewees	close	to	
the	 internal	 discussions	 revealed	 it	 was	 largely	 a	 political	 strategy	 to	 differentiate	
himself	 from	 ‘green	 Tories’	 and	 to	 stoke	 a	 potential	 rift	 among	 their	 coalition	
colleagues	in	the	Liberal	Democrat	party.	Some	media	coverage	of	the	disagreements	
portrayed	it	as	a	fundamental	rethink	of	the	UK’s	leadership	position,	but	according	to	
a	government	interviewee	responsible	for	assessing	the	evidence	base	this	was	not	the	
case:	
‘Obviously	there	is	a	push	from	a	small	part	of	the	Conservatives	to	use	
that	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 get	 rid	 of	 the	 4th	 budget	 or	 the	 [Climate	
Change]	Act	but	that	was	always	more	of	a	media	story	than	a	reality.	
Maybe	it	seems	easy	to	take	that	tone	afterwards	but	I	was	there	during	
it	and	it	just	wasn’t	a	big	deal.’	
This	 example	 clearly	 demonstrates	 how	 reviews	 of	 proportionality	may	 be	 used	 not	
only	to	keep	targets	aligned	to	evidence	(i.e.	acting	as	early	warning	signs	for	potential	
policy	bubbles),	but	also	employed	for	political	reasons.	
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4.4.1.3. The	other	side	of	the	cross-party	coin	
Our	account	and	others	have	highlighted	the	apparent	waning	of	a	once	competitive	
consensus	(Carter,	2014),	but	with	a	landmark	UN	climate	change	conference	in	Paris	
following	soon	after	the	2015	UK	general	election	there	was	potential	for	a	resurgence	
onto	 the	 political	 agenda.	 However,	 the	 incoming	minister	 of	 DECC	 set	 the	 tone	 by	
speaking	 of	 ‘inheriting	 a	 department	where	 policy	 costs	 on	 [household	 energy]	 bills	
had	 spiralled’,	 explicitly	 reframing	 the	 UK’s	 global	 contribution	 as	 ‘providing	 a	
compelling	 example	 of	 how	 to	 cut	 carbon	 while	 controlling	 costs’	 (Rudd,	 2015).	
Although	one	of	our	non-governmental	interviewees	who	attended	the	UN	conference	
spoke	 positively	 of	 the	 role	 senior	 DECC	 officials	 and	 the	 minister	 played,	 others	
(media	and	other	areas	of	government)	felt	this	agenda	only	resonated	with	a	minority	
of	policymakers	and	interest	groups.	They	consistently	bemoaned	the	lack	of	public	or	
political	salience	of	climate	change,	particularly	where	policy	details	were	complex	and	
uninspiring,	for	example:	
‘In	 communications	 terms	 it	 [climate	 change]	was	probably	one	of	 the	
most	difficult	things.	It’s	not	tangible,	it’s	not	easy	to	grasp.	I	have	to	sell	
stories;	 there	 isn’t	 a	 bloody	 story!’	 (Government	 communications	
official)	
Ultimately,	 climate	 change	 and	 the	 environment	were	 crowded	 out	 of	 the	 electoral	
campaigns	 in	 2015	 as	 attention	 focused	 on	 the	 economy	 and	 immigration	 and	 the	
Liberal	Democrats	–	who	continued	to	prioritise	the	climate	change	agenda	(figure	4.1)	
–	were	unequivocally	 side-lined	 (Simms,	2015;	media	 interviewees).	 In	 the	 run-up	 to	
the	 2015	 national	 election,	 a	 group	 of	 environmental	 NGOs	 brokered	 a	 joint	 pledge	
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from	 the	 leaders	of	 the	 three	main	political	parties	 to	 reaffirm	 their	 commitment	 to	
the	climate	agenda	(Green	Alliance,	2015).	Although	this	was	 intended	to	strengthen	
the	 image	 of	 climate	 policy	 and	 to	 avoid	 politicisation,	 some	 of	 our	 interviewees	
expressed	misgivings,	e.g.:	
‘I	do	think	in	a	sense	it	took	the	heat	off	–	they	could	all	just	sign	it	and	
they	weren’t	asked	to	 follow	 it	up	 in	a	particularly	strong	way.	So	 in	a	
sense	 it	 felt	 like	 the	 pledge	 existed	 in	 its	 own	 little	 reality	 somewhere	
separate	and	had	absolutely	no	useful	impingement	or	relationship	with	
the	rest	of	the	election	campaign.	So	I	think	ultimately	it	let	them	off	the	
hook	actually’	(Opposition	Member	of	Parliament)	
Ultimately,	the	pledge	contributed	to	a	lack	of	public	deliberation.	Within	the	election	
period	media	coverage	we	analysed,	articles	specifically	linking	UK	politics	and	climate	
change	were	relatively	sparse	(30	out	of	240),	despite	wider	interest	in	the	UN	climate	
conference	(‘world	politics’	frame	in	figure	4.2).	There	were	a	similar	number	of	stories	
focusing	on	the	‘settled/contested	science’	as	on	the	link	between	climate	change	and	
‘UK	politics’	or	election	‘campaigns’.	Thus,	we	see	evidence	of	two	possible	effects	of	
cross-party	 politics	 (inducing	 and	 neutralising	 competition	 in	 2008	 and	 2015	
respectively).	 Interestingly,	 in	 both	 cases,	 a	 flagship	 national	 level	 commitment	 was	
adopted	 and	 rhetorically	 lauded,	 obscuring	 more	 detailed	 disagreements	 among	
policymakers	about	the	potential	costs	of	implementation.	
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Figure	4.2:	Frame	analysis	of	UK	national	media	coverage	of	climate	change	
29.03.2015-07.05.2015	(election	campaign	period)	
4.4.2. Low-carbon	 energy:	 from	 clean	 energy	 transformation	 to	 least	 cost	
transition	
Broadly	corresponding	to	the	UK’s	Carbon	Plan	(DECC,	2011a),	the	low-carbon	energy	
policies	 concentrated	 on	 in	 this	 article	 relate	 to	 supply-side	 issues	 only,	 focusing	
primarily	on	renewable	sources	but	also	addressing	the	role	of	nuclear	and	shale	gas.	
The	only	binding	 target	 in	 this	 policy	 area	was	 courtesy	of	 the	 European	Renewable	
Energy	 Directive	 (EC,	 2009)	 that	 required	 the	UK	 to	 supply	 15%	 of	 its	 energy	 needs	
(disaggregated	into	electricity,	heat,	and	transport)	from	renewable	sources	by	2020.		
Regarding	electricity,	concerted	 lobbying	from	NGOs	and	numerous	MPs	built	on	the	
carbon	budgets	and	 the	 ‘UK	 leadership’	discourse	 to	argue	 for	a	 full	decarbonisation	
target	 (BBC,	2013;	Friends	of	 the	Earth,	2012).	Contrary	 to	advice	 from	 the	CCC,	 the	
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Government	 rejected	 the	 target	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 ‘would	 not	 be	 in	 the	 best	
interests	 of	 consumers’	 who	 would	 pay	 for	 the	 policies	 through	 inflated	 bills	 (LSE,	
2013).	Many	in	the	private	sector	saw	this	as	a	clear	signal	that	renewables	would	no	
longer	be	prioritised	ahead	of	shale	gas	or	nuclear	(private	sector	interviews;	Murray,	
2013).	 A	 leaked	 letter	 from	 the	 Chancellor	 confirmed	 the	 Treasury’s	 desire	 to	move	
away	from	focussing	on	renewables	to	promote	a	pro-gas	narrative	due	to	the	public	
appeal	 of	 perceived	 energy	 security	 and	 cheaper	 bills	 resulting	 from	 indigenous	
supplies	(Guardian,	2012).	
This	 shift	came	at	a	 time	when	rising	energy	prices	 for	households	were	becoming	a	
salient	 issue,	prompting	energy	companies	and	Conservative	politicians	 to	blame	the	
cost	of	renewable	energy	subsidies	that	are	levied	via	consumer	bills.	The	then	Prime	
Minister	David	Cameron	allegedly	demanded	 that	policymakers	 ‘get	 rid	of	 the	green	
crap’	 (a	 comment	 referred	 to	 by	 government,	 NGO	 and	 media	 interviewees).	
Moreover,	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Energy	 and	 Climate	 Change,	 Amber	 Rudd,	
reportedly	 wrote	 to	 the	 energy	 companies	 asking	 them	 to	 lower	 their	 bills	 (NGO	
interviewee).	 Although	 the	 cost	 of	 living	 crisis	 was	 (and	 still	 is)	 very	 real	 for	 many,	
blaming	renewables	for	exacerbating	this	through	high	energy	prices	was	misleading,	
as	one	energy	expert	explained:	
‘If	 you	 take	 a	 look	 at	 the	 data	 for	 consumer	 expendable	 incomes,	 it’s	
been	 the	 sharpest	 squeeze	 for	 ages.	 That’s	 why	 the	 bills	 stuff	 was	 so	
toxic	 and	 challenging.	 Even	 though	when	 you	 look	 at	 the	 breakdown,	
[renewable]	energy	policy	is	still	such	a	minor	component	of	the	bill.’	
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The	chairman	of	the	CCC	also	pointed	this	out	in	a	recent	interview	(Hickman,	2015).	
Here,	again,	the	power	of	discourse	and	simplified	media	coverage	in	constructing	the	
perceived	costs	of	these	policies	is	apparent.	
More	 generally,	 economic	 framing	 in	 the	 decarbonisation	 debates	 concentrated	
attention	on	 the	cost-effectiveness	of	 target	 setting	 in	principle.	Whilst	not	explicitly	
attacking	 their	 levels	 this,	 implicitly	 raised	 concerns	 about	 the	 appropriateness	 of	
setting	carbon	budgets.	One	senior	policymaker	explained	that	the	word	 ‘target’	had	
become	‘politically	toxic’.	A	political	rationale	for	this	became	clear	in	late	2015	when	a	
leaked	letter	from	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Energy	and	Climate	Change	revealed	the	
Government’s	own	analysis	predicted	 they	would	miss	 the	2020	European	 target	 for	
renewable	 energy.	 This	 resulted	 in	 accusations	 from	 environmental	 NGOs	 of	
misleading	 rhetoric	and	 increased	media	coverage	of	how	recent	policy	changes	had	
hit	the	renewables	sector	(Tickell,	2015;	Benton,	Francis	&	Mount,	2016).	
4.4.2.1. Policy	goals	and	strategies	
In	pursuit	of	the	above	emissions	and	energy	source	targets,	the	2009	UK	Renewable	
Energy	Strategy	(DECC,	2009)	presented	an	optimistic	view,	justifying	costs	by	referring	
to	the	Stern	Review’s	(Stern,	2007)	well-rehearsed	argument	of	‘early	action	costs	less	
in	the	 long	run’	and	also	by	highlighting	multiple	benefits	such	as	community	energy	
resilience	and	fuel	poverty	reduction	(DECC,	2009:	183-187).	In	2011	this	strategy	was	
replaced	 by	 The	 UK	 Renewable	 Energy	 Roadmap	 (DECC,	 2011b:	 6),	 which	 focuses	
instead	on	the	technologies	‘that	have	the	greatest	potential	to	help	the	UK	meet	the	
2020	 target	 in	 a	 cost	 effective	 and	 sustainable	 way’.	 Eliding	 many	 social	 costs	 and	
benefits	 the	 new	 Roadmap	 emphasises	 aggregate	 value	 for	 money,	 repeatedly	
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stressing	 the	 superior	 cost-efficiency	 virtues	 of	 market	 competition	 as	 a	 means	 of	
delivering	policies	(DECC,	2011b:	pp10-11).	
This	 neoliberal	 logic	 also	 underpins	 much	 of	 the	 Government’s	 2013	 Energy	 Act.	
Discursively	combining	 three	main	objectives	 (emissions	 reductions,	affordability	and	
security)	 into	 a	 ‘trilemma’,	 the	 long-term	 move	 towards	 low-carbon	 electricity	 was	
caveated	with	 short-term	 concerns	 about	 cost	 and	 supply.	 In	 particular,	 part	 of	 the	
Energy	Act	introduced	an	electricity	market	reform	(EMR)	targeting	low-carbon	supply,	
based	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 increased	 competition	 would	 solve	 the	 trilemma	 most	
efficiently.	As	the	Government’s	report	on	implementing	the	EMR	illustrates:	
‘Our	 long-term	vision	 for	 the	electricity	market	 is	 for	a	decreasing	 role	
for	the	Government	over	time,	and	to	transition	to	a	market	where	low-
carbon	technologies	can	compete	fairly	on	price.’	(DECC,	2014:	p13)	
4.4.2.2. Policy	instruments	
Although	 the	 overall	 number	 of	 low-carbon	 energy	 policy	 instruments	 increased	
between	 2006	 and	 2016,	 successive	 governments	 tried	 to	 contain	 their	 costs	 and	
complexity.	 In	 terms	 of	 instruments,	 the	 pre-existing	 Renewables	 Obligation	 (RO),	
which	mandated	energy	providers	to	source	an	 increasing	percentage	of	their	supply	
from	 renewable	 sources,	 was	 joined	 by	 two	 new	 instruments	 for	 subsidising	 small-
scale	 and	 non-electric	 forms	 of	 renewable	 energy:	 feed-in	 tariffs	 (FiT)	 and	 the	
Renewable	Heat	 Incentive	 (RHI)	 respectively.	Part	of	 the	rationale	behind	the	Energy	
Act	 in	2013	was	to	simplify	this	policy	 landscape,	so	the	RO	(which	had	already	gone	
through	many	 recalibrations)	was	 replaced	by	 an	 auctioning	 system	 called	Contracts	
for	Difference	(CfD).	Under	the	RO,	which	closes	in	2017,	government	determined	the	
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relative	value	of	different	sources	of	renewable	energy	through	a	banded	certificates	
scheme.	The	CfD	are	specifically	designed	to	create	competition	between	low-carbon	
sources	 of	 electricity,	 awarding	 subsidies	 to	 the	 lowest	 bidders	 in	 an	 auction	 and	
eventually	 fading	 out	 technology	 specific	 auctions	 to	 create	 a	 ‘free	 market’.	 Two	
government	 officials	 responsible	 for	 designing	 and	 implementing	 the	 new	 policy	
offered	further	justifications	for	this	change:		
‘The	 renewable	 energy	 industry	 is	 ready	 to	 be	weaned	off	 guaranteed	
subsidies	and	can	stand	to	lose	a	few	projects.’		
‘There	are	so	many	projects	 in	the	pipeline	that	developers	will	bid	 low	
just	to	get	them	off	their	books.’		
Either	 way,	 the	 prevailing	 view	 within	 government	 was	 that	 the	 previous	 policy	
trajectory	 would	 result	 in	 consumers	 paying	 more	 than	 they	 needed	 to	 through	
subsidy	 levies	 on	 household	 bills,	 especially	 as	 the	 renewables	 sector	 became	more	
established.	In	other	words	it	was	seen	as	a	growing	policy	bubble	that	needed	to	be	
checked.	
This	 issue	became	highly	politicised	by	regular	price	 increases	and	energy	companies	
being	accused	of	profiteering	by	then	Opposition	leader	Ed	Miliband,	who	promised	a	
20	 month	 price	 freeze	 on	 domestic	 energy	 and	 stricter	 regulations.	 The	 impact	 of	
renewables	 subsidies	 on	 bills	 was	 amplified	 by	 traditionally	 climate-sceptic	 media	
outlets	using	headlines	such	as:	 ‘Green	taxes	will	hike	up	energy	bills	by	almost	£300	
by	 2020’	 (Ingham,	 2013)	 and	 ‘Family	 energy	 bills	 to	 be	 £70	 higher	 than	 ministers	
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claimed	…	despite	millions	lavished	of	green	energy	schemes’	(McTague	and	Spencer,	
2014).	
4.4.2.3. Instrument	settings	and	scope	
Reducing	cost	over	the	long-term	has	been	built	 into	the	design	of	renewable	energy	
subsidies,	 ostensibly	 to	 reflect	 changes	 in	 production	 costs	 and	 profitability	 as	
technology	 improves,	 i.e.	 to	halt	over-investment	or	policy	bubbles.	However,	 as	we	
have	seen,	this	type	of	reflexive	policy	alteration	can	also	be	used	for	political	reasons.	
In	2009	a	banding	system	was	introduced	into	the	RO	to	incentivise	the	development	
of	emerging	(e.g.	tidal)	rather	than	more	established	(e.g.	on-shore	wind)	technologies.	
Similar	 steps	 were	 taken	 to	 reduce	 the	 generosity	 of	 the	 new	 FiT	 instrument,	 e.g.	
introducing	a	gradual	depreciation	timeline	for	overly	successful	solar	PV	(DECC,	2012;	
Parkes,	 2012),	 as	 well	 as	 some	 immediate	 tariff	 reductions	 and	 a	 cap	 on	 overall	
spending	 (DECC,	2015a).	 The	 case	of	 solar	PV	 is	particularly	 illustrative	of	 the	 risk	of	
over-investment.	Due	to	rapid	deployment	and	improvements	in	technology	efficiency,	
more	electricity	was	being	produced	(and	purchased	through	the	FiT)	than	anticipated.	
Combined	with	 a	 low	wholesale	 electricity	 price	 this	meant	 that	 subsidy	 rates	were	
disproportionately	high,	benefiting	the	solar	PV	industry	and	small-scale	panel	owners,	
but	inflating	the	cost	to	consumers	over	the	long-term	(DECC,	2015a).		
Whilst	 the	 discourse	 of	 curbing	 costs	 was	 easily	 made	 during	 a	 time	 of	 high	 retail	
energy	 prices	 and	 stagnant	 wages,	 it	 also:	 foreclosed	 public	 discussion	 of	 the	 net	
benefits	these	investments	bring	about;	misconstrued	the	way	subsidies	are	linked	to	
wholesale	 electricity	 prices;	 and	 masked	 a	 set	 of	 political	 motivations	 for	 cutting	
policies	(according	to	central	government,	private	sector	and	academic	interviewees).	
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Whenever	over-investment	is	suspected	and	policies	are	changed,	there	will	always	be	
winners	and	losers	with	differing	perspectives	of	what	constitutes	an	appropriate	level	
of	cost.	The	political	nature	of	these	changes	complicates	things	for	policy	experts.	As	
one	government	official	responsible	for	consulting	with	stakeholders	put	it:	
‘The	 problem	 is	 trying	 to	 differentiate	what	 is	 just	moaning	 by	 people	
who	 are	 losing	 some	 of	 their	 rents,	 compared	 to	 genuine	 complaints	
from	people	who	are	concerned	about	us	not	reaching	our	targets.’	
Changes	 in	 the	 calibration	 of	 policy	 instruments	 also	 altered	 their	 targeting	 of	
technologies,	 some	 of	 which	 directly	 contradict	 Government	 claims	 about	 cost	 and	
their	 ideological	position	of	not	 ‘picking	winners’.	The	 first	of	 these	 is	a	bespoke	CfD	
awarded	to	a	new	nuclear	project	without	any	competition,	on	the	grounds	that	 it	 is	
low-carbon	 (if	 not	 renewable)	 and	 necessary	 for	 security	 of	 supply	 (DECC,	 2012b).	
Putting	arguments	about	the	political	desirability	of	nuclear	contra	renewables	to	one	
side	 (for	 a	 full	 account	 see:	 Sovacool	 and	Watts,	 2009;	 Stirling,	 2014),	 the	 cost	 per	
megawatt	hour	(£92.50)	of	the	nuclear	CfD	was	more	than	the	average	onshore	wind	
(£82)	 and	 solar	 PV	 (£68)	 around	 the	 same	 time	 and	 was	 locked-in	 for	 an	
unprecedented	35-year	lifespan	(DECC,	2015b).		
At	the	same	time,	an	even	more	overtly	political	decision	was	taken	by	the	 incoming	
Conservative	government	 in	2015	 to	halt	 the	 construction	of	 any	new	onshore	wind	
farms,	 despite	 it	 being	 one	 of	 the	most	 cost-efficient	 sources	 of	 renewable	 energy.	
From	a	low-carbon	investment	perspective,	the	Treasury’s	decision	in	2015	to	apply	a	
carbon	 tax	 to	 renewable	 energy	 suppliers’	 electricity	 consumption	 also	 seems	
somewhat	 counter-intuitive.	This	decision	was	predicted	 to	 shift	 at	 least	£450million	
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from	renewable	industry	pockets	to	Government	coffers	annually,	and	was	likened	to	
‘making	 apple	 juice	 pay	 an	 alcohol	 tax’	 (Cameron,	 2015)	 illustrating,	 as	 one	
environmental	NGO	interviewee	put	it:		
‘...just	 how	much	 value	 the	 Treasury	and	George	Osborne	 [Chancellor]	
put	on	carbon,	which	is	effectively	zero.’	
4.5. Discussion	
Direct	attempts	by	politicians	to	re-interpret	the	CCA,	or	its	existing	carbon	budgets,	as	
an	over-reaction	were	uncommon.	This	is	potentially	surprising	given	that	the	various	
political	 rationales	 for	 pursuing	 highly	 ambitious	 policy	 commitments	 –	 such	 as	
redefining	the	terms	of	debate;	seeking	first-mover	advantage;	responding	to	intense	
public-demand;	and	achieving	national	or	sub-national	goals	by	responding	to	a	global	
problem	 (Maor	 et	 al.,	 2017)	 –	 had	 all	 been	 negated	 to	 a	 greater	 or	 lesser	 extent.	
However,	our	analysis	showed	that	new	policies,	such	as	the	fourth	carbon	budget	and	
an	electricity	decarbonisation	 target,	were	attacked	precisely	on	 (their	 lack	of)	 these	
grounds.	More	 generally,	 the	 amount	 of	 political	 attention	 given	 to	 climate	 change	
decreased	within	 government	 (evidenced	 in	 interviews	 and	manifestos),	 and	 also	 in	
national	press	coverage	(Capstick	et	al.,	2015).	
At	 first	glance,	 the	UK’s	 low-carbon	energy	policy	area	appears	 to	have	expanded	 to	
accommodate	 the	complexity	and	evolution	of	 the	sector.	New	strategies	have	been	
published,	 along	 with	 new	 policy	 instruments,	 to	 support	 renewable	 energy	
development.	 However,	 on	 closer	 inspection,	 significant	 steps	 have	 been	 taken	 to	
scale	back	the	generosity	of	subsidies.	Policymakers	and	media	reports	have	described	
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them	as	a	poor	deal	for	consumers,	or	in	other	words	as	a	growing	policy	bubble	that	
needed	to	be	checked.	These	changes	appear	to	have	been	driven	by	a	short-term	cost	
cutting	agenda	–	linked	to	the	political	salience	of	high	consumer	bills	at	a	time	of	low	
real-terms	wages	 –	 rather	 than	 by	 reforming	 their	 long-term	 efficacy	 (Parkes,	 2012;	
Wood	 &	 Dow,	 2011;	 Woodman	 &	 Mitchell,	 2011).	 Tellingly,	 the	 discursive	 framing	
moved	away	from	an	ambitious	renewables-led	transformation	towards	a	‘needs	must’	
mix	 of	 options	 including	 nuclear	 and	 shale	 gas	 (Corner	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 Such	pragmatic	
sounding	 arguments	 for	 a	 flexible	 portfolio	 of	 cost-effective	 options	 sound	
economically	rational,	but	they	also	mask	the	political	nature	of	‘picking	winners’	e.g.	
Conservatives	appealing	to	their	core	constituencies	and	business	allies	by	blocking	on-
shore	wind	development	and	investing	in	new	nuclear	(Stirling,	2014).	
Returning	 to	 concerns	 about	 weak	 institutionalisation	 and	 the	 battle	 between	
vested/new	 interests	 (Pierson,	 1993;	 Lockwood,	 2013),	 our	 findings	 confirm	 the	
suspicion	 that	 the	 UK’s	 current	 climate	 policy	 feedback	 mechanisms	 may	 be	
insufficient.	For	example,	 the	positive	effects	of	using	energy	and	economic	framings	
(outlined	by	Pralle	2009)	were	turned	on	their	head.	 Interim	emissions	targets	and	a	
political	 consensus	on	 the	need	 to	 respond	 to	warnings	 from	climate	 scientists	 (two	
other	 recommended	 strategies)	 also	 struggled	 to	 prevent	 the	 salience	 of	 climate	
change	from	waning.	Further	research	is	needed	to	explore	why	climate	policymakers	
in	general,	and	the	renewables	sector	in	particular,	may	struggle	to	resist	rollback.	For	
instance:	why	was	so	little	made	of	the	political	nature	of	policy	recalibration	(Howlett	
&	Kemmerling,	2017);	and	to	what	extent	 is	 the	 influence	of	economic	 ideas	such	as	
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‘over-investment’	 and	 ‘policy	 bubbles’	 exaggerated	 by	 austerity	 and	 ideological	
commitments	to	market-based	governance	(Maor,	2014;	Schmidt,	2010)?	
Furthermore,	 our	 findings	 revealed	 a	 degree	 of	 hesitancy	 among	 senior	 decision-
makers	 to	 prioritise	 climate	 change	 (noted	 elsewhere	 by	 Rickards,	 Wiseman	 &	
Kashima,	 2014;	 Howlett,	 2014),	 and	 also	 highlighted	 the	 inconsistency	 of	 policy	
decisions	regarding	low-carbon	energy	(e.g.	bespoke	deals	for	nuclear	and	shale	gas	at	
a	 time	when	 incentives	 for	 renewables	were	being	 cut).	 Although	 the	 climate	policy	
community	 lamented	these	details,	wider	media	and	political	discourses	presented	a	
broad-brush	picture	of	sustained	climate	leadership	at	the	international	level	coupled	
with	 economic	 prudence	 in	 the	 national	 energy	 sector.	 Thus,	 cross-party	 consensus	
strategies	and	climate	 leadership	 framings	may	be	vital	 for	early	policy	development	
and	providing	strategic	direction,	but	as	time	goes	on	they	need	to	be	accompanied	by	
close	 scrutiny	 of	 on-the-ground	 actions.	 Recent	 developments	 in	 the	 UK	 suggest	 a	
continuation	of	this	tension,	as	the	fifth	carbon	budget	has	been	passed,	but	DECC	has	
been	disbanded	and	subsumed	into	a	new	department	with	a	much	greater	emphasis	
on	energy	and	industrial	strategy.	
4.6. Conclusion	
Beginning	from	a	position	of	high	salience,	government	innovation,	and	self-identified	
leadership	 in	 2006,	UK	 climate	 and	 low-carbon	 energy	 policy	 in	 2016	 appears	 to	 be	
faltering.	Prolonged	economic	depression	and	a	shift	 in	political	power	both	played	a	
part.	 During	 this	 period	 the	 costs	 associated	 with	 climate	 and	 low-carbon	 energy	
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policies	 were	 magnified,	 leading	 to	 doubts	 about	 whether	 scientifically	 justifiable	
targets	are	economically	and	politically	viable.		
In	 particular,	 the	 low-carbon	 energy	 policy	 area	 has	 changed	 to	 reflect	 this,	 with	
policymakers	turning	to	non-renewable	sources	and	repeatedly	cutting	subsidy	 levels	
for	 certain	 technologies.	 The	 official	 justification	 was	 to	 avoid	 over-investment	 in	
renewables,	and	whilst	there	is	some	economic	merit	to	this	argument	it	only	tells	part	
of	the	story,	especially	 if	considered	in	the	context	of	other	policy	decisions	e.g.	new	
nuclear	 costs,	 the	 on-shore	 wind	 ban	 and	 an	 oxymoronic	 carbon	 tax	 for	 renewable	
energy.	Although	national	level	targets	appear	to	be	being	met,	and	set,	into	the	future	
(despite	the	increasingly	difficult	nature	of	the	policies	and	social	changes	they	imply)	
there	is	a	danger	that	this	will	lead	to	a	widening	gap	between	rhetoric	and	action.	
Beyond	 the	 UK	 case,	 our	 findings	 challenge	 many	 of	 the	 assumptions	 about	 an	
incremental,	 technical	and	managerial	approach	 to	 tackling	 long-term	problems	such	
as	 climate	 change	 through	 national	 policymaking.	 Recognising	 the	 possibility	 of	
(deliberate	or	unintentional)	over-reactions	 to	salient	agendas	encourages	us	 to	 look	
at	policy	feedback	mechanisms	in	a	more	critical	light.	When	politicians	talk	about	the	
dangers	of	‘over-investment’	–	or	political	scientists	of	‘policy	bubbles’	–	it	implies	that	
policymaking	 is	a	purely	rational,	and	reflexive,	evidence-based	process.	However,	as	
our	analysis	has	shown,	this	is	not	strictly	true.	It	matters	a	great	deal	who	is	framing	a	
policy,	and	against	what	reference	point,	for	whether	it	is	perceived	and	presented	as	
proportionate.	 Therefore,	 these	 concepts	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 useful	 heuristics	 for	
discussing	 politically	 motivated	 attempts	 to	 reinterpret	 policy,	 as	 much	 as	 for	
examining	the	official	economic	 justifications	 for	decisions.	Ultimately	this	article	has	
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offered	an	important	reminder,	and	case	study	illustration,	of	the	way	flagship	policies	
can	 begin	 to	 rapidly	 transform	 sectors	 of	 society,	 but	 how	 they	 can	 also	 be	 pegged	
back	by	a	shift	in	priorities	from	efficacy	to	(economic)	efficiency.	
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Abstract	
Many	factors	can	conspire	to	 limit	 the	scope	for	national	policy	development.	 In	this	
chapter,	 we	 consider	 whether	 blockages	 in	 national	 policy	 processes	 –	 resulting	 for	
example	 from	austerity	or	 small	 state	political	philosophies	–	might	be	overcome	by	
the	development	of	more	polycentric	governance	arrangements.	Drawing	on	evidence	
from	three	stakeholder	workshops	and	fifteen	interviews,	we	address	this	question	by	
exploring	 the	 United	 Kingdom’s	 recent	 retrenchment	 in	 the	 area	 of	 climate	 change	
policy,	and	the	ways	 in	which	 its	policy	community	have	responded.	We	identify	two	
broad	strategies	based	on	polycentric	principles:	‘working	with	gatekeepers’	to	unlock	
political	 capital	 and	 ‘collaborate	 to	 innovate’	 to	 develop	 policy	 outputs.	 We	 then	
empirically	 examine	 the	 advantages	 that	 these	 actions	 bring,	 analysing	 coordination	
across	 overlapping	 sites	 of	 authority,	 such	 as	 those	 associated	 with	 international	
regimes,	 devolved	 administrations	 and	 civic	 and	 private	 initiatives	 that	 operate	 in	
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conjunction	 with,	 and	 sometimes	 independently	 of,	 the	 state.	 Despite	 constraining	
political	and	economic	factors,	which	are	by	no	means	unique	to	the	UK,	we	find	that	a	
polycentric	 climate	 policy	 network	 can	 create	 opportunities	 for	 overcoming	 central	
government	blockages.	However,	we	also	argue	that	the	ambiguous	role	of	the	state	in	
empowering,	 but	 also	 in	 constraining,	 such	 a	 network	 will	 determine	 whether	 a	
polycentric	 approach	 to	 climate	 policy	 and	 governance	 is	 genuinely	 additional	 and	
innovative,	or	whether	 it	 is	merely	a	temporary	sticking	plaster	for	the	retreat	of	the	
state	and	policy	retrenchment	during	austere	times.	
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5.1. Introduction	
In	 theory,	 nation	 states	 can	 be	 attuned	 to	 accommodate	 the	 demands	 of	 long-term	
inter-woven	social	and	material	challenges	such	as	anthropogenic	climate	change	e.g.	
by	building	non-partisan	coalitions,	ensuring	 independent	monitoring	and	 fostering	a	
reflexive	 policy	 process	 (Giddens,	 2009;	 Grin	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Latour,	 2009;	 Voß	 et	 al.,	
2009).	For	example,	Barry	and	Eckersley	(2005)	provide	empirical	evidence	of	effective	
state-based	 environmental	 stewardship	 involving	 strong	 collaboration	 beyond	
territorial	 boundaries,	 decision-making	 based	 on	 environmental	 objectives,	 and	
integrated	 environmental	 impact	 assessments.	 In	 the	 right	 circumstances,	
entrepreneurial	 individuals	 can	 work	 to	 promote	 innovative	 policies	 and	 help	
institutionalise	 state	 leadership	 (Kingdon,	 1984;	 Lovell,	 2009;	 Mazzucato,	 2015).	
Accordingly,	 there	 have	 been	 high	 hopes	 for,	 and	 some	 empirical	 evidence	 of,	 such	
leadership	in	the	area	of	climate	change;	especially	because	governments	have	several	
rationales	for	taking	action	e.g.	to	protect	vulnerable	communities	and	infrastructure,	
promote	inter-generational	justice	and	drive	economic	competitiveness	(Boasson	and	
Wettestad,	 2014;	Giddens,	 2009;	 Lorenzoni	 and	 Benson,	 2014;	 Jordan	 and	Huitema,	
2014).	
However,	policy	progress	can	also	be	slow	and	inconsistent	in	democratic	governments	
for	many	reasons,	including	the	veto	power	of	senior	decision-makers	and	risk	aversion	
of	 politicians,	 whose	 jobs	 depend	 on	 re-election.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 when	 high	
levels	of	uncertainty	and	delayed	or	diffused	benefits	are	involved,	which	is	clearly	the	
case	with	regards	to	climate	change	(Howlett,	2014;	Rickards	et	al.,	2014;	Russel	and	
Benson,	 2014).	 Further	 exacerbating	 this	 inertia	 is	 the	 constant	 battle	 for	 political	
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saliency	at	a	time	when	many	different	 issues	are	competing	for	a	 limited	amount	of	
public	and	political	attention.	Most	theories	of	public	policy	treat	this	political	agenda	
setting	 as	 a	 zero-sum	 game	 because	 of	 policymakers’	 bounded	 rationality	 and	
governments’	limited	capacity,	and	this	often	results	in	contradictory	or	insecure	policy	
trajectories	 (Sabatier,	 2007).	 For	 instance,	 longitudinal	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	
reactionary	rollback	due	to	a	political	swing	and	gradual	retrenchment	due	to	resource	
constraints	are	constant	threats	(Patashnik,	2014;	Pierson,	2004).	
The	recurring	theme	of	de-centralisation	 is	another	 factor	affecting	states’	governing	
capacities	 and	 the	 feasibility	 of	 certain	 policies	 (Treisman,	 2007).	 It	 is	 especially	
relevant	 for	 environmental	 policy	 where	 locally	 sensitive,	 or	 ‘bottom-up’,	 and	
‘polycentric’	 forms	of	governance	are	often	claimed	 to	be	most	effective	 (Andersson	
and	Ostrom,	2008;	Ostrom,	2010).	Here,	scholars	highlight	the	efficacy	and	cost-saving	
virtues	of	delivering	environmental	policy	 through	civic,	private	or	public	partnership	
forms	 and	 across	multiple	 levels	 and	 scales	 (Bäckstrand,	 2010;	 Bulkeley	 and	Newell,	
2010;	 Bulkeley	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Lemos	 and	 Agrawal,	 2006;	 Newell	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 It	 is	
suggested	that	these	additional	opportunities	for	experimentation,	learning,	and	trust	
building	should	be	particularly	appealing	to	governments	when	they	face	political	and	
economic	 barriers	 to	 unilateral	 action	 (Cole,	 2015),	 a	 claim	 that	 this	 article	 seeks	 to	
test.	
At	 the	 international	 level,	 the	 polycentric	 approach	 (sometimes	 described	 as	 a	
‘fragmentation’)	 is	 increasingly	 evident	 in	 political	 institutions	 and	 governance	
arrangements	 (Abbott,	 2012;	 Zelli,	 2011).	 For	 example,	 the	 European	 Union’s	 (EU)	
principle	 of	 ‘subsidiarity’	 –	 that	 ‘rules	 out	 Union	 intervention	when	 an	 issue	 can	 be	
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dealt	with	 effectively	 by	Member	 States	 at	 central,	 regional	 or	 local	 level’	 (Chateau,	
2016:	 2)	 –	 is	 intended	 to	 encourage	 self-governance	 and	 autonomy.	 It	 also	
characterises	 the	 2015	 UNFCCC	 Paris	 Agreement,	 which	 replaced	 earlier	 top-down	
targets	 with	 a	 bottom-up	 agreement	 based	 on	 ‘intended	 nationally	 determined	
contributions’.	
At	the	national	level,	the	rise	of	non-state	and	hybrid	forms	of	governance	has	involved	
community	 projects,	 private	 sector	 voluntary	 agreements	 and	 a	 variety	 of	 market-
based	mechanisms.	They	have	forced	governments	to	think	beyond	traditional	state-
centric	policies	(Jordan,	2008;	Lemos	and	Agrawal,	2006).	The	hierarchy	and	authority	
of	 national	 governments	 is	 thus	 directly	 challenged	 by	 new	 initiatives	 spanning	
multiple	scales	and	territories	(Bäckstrand,	2008;	Bulkeley,	2005;	Termeer	et	al.,	2010).	
Whether	this	empowers	non-state	actors	or	hollows	out	the	state’s	responsibilities	is	a	
long	running	debate	within	the	governance	literature.	
Following	these	reflections,	we	start	from	a	view	that	national	government	leadership	
on	complex	 long-term	issues	such	as	climate	change	 is	 likely	to	encounter	difficulties	
due	to	the	vagaries	of	political	and	economic	trends.	Therefore,	we	set	out	to	explore	
whether	 government	 engagement	 with	 other	 actors	 and	 levels	 could	 strengthen	 a	
policy	area	and	help	overcome	some	of	the	blockages	in	central	state	institutions.	To	
explore	this	argument,	we	first	 introduce	the	common	conceptualisation	of	the	state	
as	an	autonomous	unitary	actor	and	the	structuralist	understandings	of	 its	capacities	
that	 this	 gives	 rise	 to.	 Then	 we	 describe	 a	more	 relational	 understanding	 based	 on	
polycentric	governance	before	empirically	exploring	its	key	tenets	in	the	UK	case	study.	
The	 findings	advance	our	understanding	of	1)	what	policy	communities	can	do	when	
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faced	with	 blockages	 in	 national	 policy	 processes	 and	 2)	 to	what	 extent	 non-central	
government	sites	of	authority	can	provide	effective	remedies	to	these	blockages.	
5.2. Theory	
5.2.1. Climate	change	and	the	constraints	of	state-based	governing	
Throughout	the	wide-ranging	and	long	tradition	of	writings	on	the	nation	state,	there	
is	 a	 common	 tendency	 to	 conflate	 the	 state	 apparatus	 with	 broader,	 non-
governmental,	 social	 structures	 and	processes	 (for	 an	overview	 see:	Chernilo,	 2008).	
Although	 this	 ontological	 expedience	 has	 produced	 some	 important	 analyses,	 e.g.	
political	economy	critiques	of	capitalist	states	(Jessop,	1990)	and	various	comparative	
typologies,	 it	has	also	steered	 research	 towards	structuralist	 theories	of	 statecraft	at	
the	expense	of	more	agency-oriented	readings.	Since	Giddens	(1984)	proposed	a	‘third	
way’	 to	 view	 structure	 and	 agency	 as	 a	 dualism,	 and	 the	 forces	 of	 globalisation	
diversified	the	governance	landscape,	more	relational	and	deterritorialised	theories	of	
the	state	have	gained	ground	(Brenner	et	al.,	2008;	Holton,	2011;	Jessop,	2016;	Latour,	
2009;	cf.	Davies,	2011).		
Yet,	despite	a	widespread	retreat	of	the	state	and	policy	retrenchment	in	many	areas	–	
hastened	by	a	preference	for	market-based	mechanisms	driven	by	neoliberal	ideology	
(Harvey,	2005;	Cashore,	2002;	Okereke,	2007)	–	national	government	policies	remain	
an	 important	 source	 of	 innovation	 and	 a	 promising	 area	 of	 research,	 especially	
regarding	 climate	 change	 (Boasson,	 2014;	 Jänicke,	 2005;	 Fankhauser	 et	 al.,	 2015;	
Jordan	and	Huitema,	2014;	Townshend	et	al.,	2013).	 In	2014,	a	 total	of	804	national	
climate	 laws	 and	 policies	 were	 in	 existence	 in	 the	 highest	 emitting	 industrialised	
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countries	 (Nachmany	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Many	 of	 these	 countries	 have	 decreased	 their	
emissions	 from	 the	 1990	 baseline	 (UNFCC,	 2015),	 although	 some	 of	 this	 may	 have	
happened	because	of	the	offshoring	of	production	to	 industrialising	countries	(Peters	
and	 Hertwich,	 2008).	 Inevitably	 there	 are	 leaders	 and	 pioneers,	 as	well	 as	 laggards,	
among	 these	 countries	whose	 high	 outward	 ambitions	 depend	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 on	
their	inward	policy	performance	and	consistency	(Liefferink	and	Wurzel,	2017).	
The	ability	of	the	leading	European	countries	to	advance	domestic	climate	policies	and	
deploy	 low-carbon	 investment	 has	 certainly	 been	 stymied	 by	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	
2008	 and	 the	 slow	 recovery	 of	 national	 economies	 (Geels,	 2013;	 Skovgaard,	 2014).	
Such	 moments	 of	 crisis	 and	 disruption	 can	 lead	 to	 significant	 policy	 change	 by	
prompting	 critical	 reflection	 on	 the	 status	 quo	 and	 heightening	 the	 demand	 for	 a	
proactive	 response	 i.e.	 creating	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 for	 entrepreneurial	
individuals	 working	 within	 government	 (Bauer	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Kingdon,	 1984).	 Broadly	
speaking,	 early	 opportunities	 for	 re-orienting	 socio-economic	 systems	 towards	
sustainability	as	a	response	to	the	crisis	were	recognised	by	many	in	the	climate	policy	
community	 but	 ultimately	 were	 not	 achieved	 because	 of	 resistance	 from	 vested	
interests	and	entrenched	economic	biases	blocking	such	innovation	(Geels,	2013).	
Marxist	 and	 political	 economic	 critiques	 of	 capitalist	 states	 and	 societies	 have	 long	
pointed	to	the	fundamental	constraints	of	governing	within,	or	through,	the	structures	
of	 liberal-capitalist	democracies	(Jessop,	1990).	These	analyses	pay	close	attention	to	
power	imbalances,	but	in	doing	so	they	often	posit	the	state	as	a	unitary	actor	vis-à-vis	
non-state	actors.	This	distinction	is	useful	as	a	purely	descriptive	tool	–	and	indeed	will	
be	 used	 as	 such	 in	 this	 article	 –	 but	 it	 is	 less	 helpful	 as	 an	 analytical	 tool	 for	
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understanding	 the	 dynamic	 power	 relations	 and	 social	 processes	 that	 take	 place	
beyond	the	confines	of	central	government	institutions.	These	interactions	still	shape,	
and	are	shaped	by,	public	policy	and	governance.	In	practice	‘the	state’	is	not	a	distinct	
actor	 but	 rather	 an	 assemblage	 of	 multiple	 arenas	 for	 governing	 collective	 action	
(DeLanda,	2006;	Paavola,	2011).	Arguably,	what	matters	for	theory	and	for	practice	is	
the	number	and	type	of	arenas	that	are	engaged	in	a	given	policy	area	i.e.	its	degree	of	
polycentricity.		
Starting	from	an	empirical	observation	that	monocentric	forms	of	climate	governance	
(such	as	unilateral	state	action)	are	fraught	with	structural	biases	and	impediments	to	
effective	 policy	 development,	 proponents	 of	 polycentricity	 have	 highlighted	 the	
benefits	 of	 pursuing	 an	 alternative,	 more	 pluralistic,	 approach	 (Cole,	 2011;	 Harris,	
2013;	 Jordan	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Ostrom,	 2010;	 2012).	 In	 essence,	 they	 claim	 that	 the	
potential	 costs	 of	 having	 multiple,	 often	 overlapping,	 domains	 of	 governance	 are	
outweighed	by	the	potential	benefits	of	experimentation,	 learning,	trust	building	and	
context	sensitivity	(Cole,	2015).		
Experimentation	 and	 learning	 have	 been	 argued	 to	 be	 able	 to	 improve	 policy;	
especially	 in	 areas	 of	 high	 uncertainty	 and	 complexity	 such	 as	 climate	 change	 (Pahl-
Wostl,	2009;	Ostrom,	2010).	This	flexibility,	or	adaptive	capacity,	within	a	governance	
arrangement	 is	 vital	 for	 responding	 to	 rapid	 or	 unexpected	 changes	 in	 the	 natural	
environment	 (Pahl-Wostl,	 2009)	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	
environment	 (Voß	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Perhaps	 most	 relevant	 for	 our	 focus	 on	 policy	
blockages	 and	 climate	 transitions	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 trial-and-error	 development	 of	
policies	by	multiple	governance	actors	can	lead	to	innovation	and	improved	outcomes,	
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especially	if	it	is	accompanied	by	close	monitoring	and	information	sharing	(Cole,	2015;	
De	 Búrca	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Put	 simply,	 a	 polycentric	 policy	 arena	 allows	 for	
experimentation	with	 new	 ideas,	whose	 successes	 can	 be	 used	 to	 develop	 action	 in	
other	contexts.		
Another	 anticipated	positive	 effect	 of	 increased	 connectivity	 and	 learning	 is	 to	 build	
the	 levels	 of	 trust	 and	 co-operation	 needed	 to	 overcome	 politically	 entrenched	
blockages.	 Resisting	 criticisms	 of	 fragmentation	 and	 atomisation,	 a	 central	 tenet	 of	
polycentric	 governance	 is	 that	 the	multiple	 sites	 of	 authority	 remain	 connected	 and	
inter-dependent.	 Talk	 does	 not	 always	 lead	 to	 action,	 so	 systems	 of	 reciprocity,	
reputation	 and	 mutual	 benefit	 are	 needed	 to	 produce	 greater	 levels	 of	 actual	 co-
operation;	 something	 which	 has	 been	 regularly	 proven	 in	 collective	 action	 research	
(McGinnis,	2011;	Ostrom	and	Walker,	2003).	Importantly,	this	principle	applies	not	just	
to	 official	 party	 politics	 and	 bureaucracies,	 but	 to	 the	 plethora	 of	 ways	 governance	
actors	communicate	about,	and	through,	their	policies,	actions	and	beliefs	beyond	the	
state	(Hajer,	2009).	Put	simply,	a	polycentric	policy	arena	encourages	greater	levels	of	
communication	and	trust,	capable	of	overcoming	stand-offs	between	different	actors.	
Building	 on	 this	 body	 of	 theory	 and	 many	 years	 of	 practical	 applications	 and	
workshops,	 McGinnis	 (2015:	 p5)	 offers	 a	 three-part	 definition	 of	 polycentric	
governance	consisting	of:	
‘(1)	Multiple	centers	of	decision-making	authority	with	overlapping	jurisdictions	
(2)	which	 interact	 through	a	process	of	mutual	 adjustment	during	which	 they	
frequently	 establish	 new	 formal	 collaborations	 or	 informal	 commitments,	 and	
(3)	their	interactions	generate	a	regularized	pattern	of	overarching	social	order	
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which	 captures	 efficiencies	 of	 scale	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 aggregation,	 including	
providing	a	secure	foundation	for	democratic	self-governance.’	
The	 extent	 to	which	 these	 structures,	 processes	 and	outcomes	 are	 present	will	 vary	
from	 case	 to	 case.	 In	 fact,	 it	 should	be	noted	here	 that	 the	 involvement	of	multiple	
(often	non-state)	actors	in	policy	processes	is	by	no	means	a	novel	phenomenon.	The	
point	 is	rather	that	 its	prevalence	 is	growing	and	that	 its	normative	claims	to	greater	
efficacy	need	to	be	examined.	To	this	end,	McGinnis	postulates	a	number	of	systemic	
issues	 responsible	 for	 policy	 blockages	 and	 the	 way	 they	 might	 be	 ameliorated	 by	
polycentricity	to	produce	desirable	outcomes	in	a	given	context	(see	table	5.1).	
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Table	 5.1:	 Systemic	 barriers	 to	 polycentric	 governance	 and	 the	 strategies	 for,	 and	
benefits	of,	overcoming	them	(based	on	McGinnis,	2016:	28)	
Systemic Tendencies  
or Biases  
Sources and Reasons  Remedies and Potential 
Benefits  
A. Structural Inequities  Different groups face 
different costs for collective 
action, and high costs can be 
imposed by especially 
successful groups  
Continued access to other 
channels for mobilization 
outside existing forms of 
domination  
B. Incremental Bias  Multiple veto points restrict 
range of feasible mutually 
beneficial adjustments  
Can appeal to authorities at 
other levels to break an 
impasse at any single level  
C. High Complexity  High participation costs can 
give current experts a big 
advantage on others  
Since no governance system 
can be complete, new forms 
of connections may provide 
alternative paths to 
participation  
D. Deep Structural 
Fissures  
Each policy domain may be 
dominated by network of 
incumbents insulated from 
outside pressure  
Interconnectedness between 
policy domains will change 
with new technologies and 
systemic shocks  
E. Coordination 
Failures  
Dilemmas of collective action 
are especially difficult at high 
levels of aggregation  
Gaps or failures in 
coordination exposed at one 
level can inspire efforts of 
other actors at lower levels, 
or leadership from above  
F. Lack of Normative 
Clarity  
No single goal will be 
consistently pursued by all 
actors at all levels  
Drawing attention to multiple 
goals encourages open 
deliberation and can build 
legitimacy and cooperation 
	
We	will	 test	 these	potential	 remedies	to	systemic	policy	blockages	 in	our	case	study,	
responding	 to	 a	 call	 from	 Jordan	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 for	more	 research	 into	why	 and	 how	
polycentric	governance	is	emerging	and	the	role	of	states	therein.	For	instance,	in	the	
field	of	climate	and	energy,	Sovacool	(2011)	has	shown	that	government	policymaking	
and	institutions	play	a	key	part	in	the	emergence	and	functioning	of	these	polycentric	
processes.	Our	 study	builds	on	 this	work,	examining	 the	efforts	of	a	broadly	defined	
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policy	community	to	overcome	recent	blockages	to	the	development	of	climate	policy	
in	the	UK.	
5.3. The	promise	and	limitations	of	UK	climate	policy	
Prior	to	2008,	the	UK	Government’s	climate	change	policies	were	faltering	and	being	
pursued	 with	 minimal	 coordination	 across	 government	 departments	 and	 sectors	
(Carter	 and	 Jacobs,	 2014).	 However,	 this	 was	 not	 for	 want	 of	 initiatives.	 Local	
government,	civic	and	private	sector	climate	governance	initiatives	were	plentiful	and	
have	 continued	 to	 proliferate,	 sometimes	 in	 concert	 and	 sometimes	 in	 tension	with	
central	 government	 (Bulkeley	 and	 Kern,	 2006;	 Giddens,	 2009).	 To	 illustrate,	 the	
Nottingham	 Declaration	 in	 2000	 saw	 local	 governments	 and	 cities	 make	 climate	
change	 integral	 to	 their	 decision-making	 and	 strategies	 (now	 with	 392	 signatories	
accounting	 for	 90%	 or	 British	 councils).	 Low-carbon	 communities	 and	 grassroots	
projects	 also	 have	 a	 relatively	 long,	 if	 somewhat	 uncertain,	 history	 in	 the	 UK	 (see:	
Walker,	2011),	and	the	country’s	economy	has	achieved	an	average	annual	reduction	
in	carbon	 intensity	of	3.5%	between	2000-2015	(the	highest	 in	Europe)	 (PWC,	2016).	
However,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 this	 activity	 has	 been	 acknowledged,	 supported	 or	
hindered	by	central	government	has	fluctuated	over	time.	
Bringing	together	key	actors	and	discourses	from	these	numerous	sectors,	a	period	of	
civil	 society	 campaigning,	 private	 sector	 endorsements	 and	 political	 competition	
between	2006	and	2008	led	to	the	passing	of	the	Climate	Change	Act	(CCA)	(Lorenzoni	
and	Benson,	2014).	This	 innovative	policy	enshrined	 in	 legislation	a	 target	of	an	80%	
emission	 reduction	 from	 1990	 level	 by	 2050.	 It	 also	 established	 five-yearly	 ‘carbon	
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budgets’	 that	would	be	proposed	 and	monitored	by	 a	 semi-independent	Committee	
on	Climate	Change	(CCC).	A	newly	created	Department	for	Energy	and	Climate	Change	
(DECC)	ensured	that	there	would	be	ministers	and	policy	teams	dedicated	to	achieving	
a	 low	 carbon	 transition	 in	 social	 and	 energy	 systems.	 The	 Department	 for	
Environment,	 Food	 and	 Rural	 Affairs	 (DEFRA)	 remained	 responsible	 for	 climate	 risk	
assessments	and	adaptation,	being	given	new	powers	to	demand	reports	on	progress	
from	certain	sectors.	
This	high	 level	of	government	activity	and	political	salience	continued	for	some	time,	
despite	 the	 onset	 of	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 UNFCCC	
negotiations	at	Copenhagen	in	2009.	The	first	three	carbon	budgets	were	passed	into	
law,	DECC	produced	a	comprehensive	strategy	for	transforming	the	energy	sector	(HM	
Government,	2009)	and	DEFRA	began	compiling	a	comprehensive	Climate	Change	Risk	
Assessment	 (DEFRA,	 2012).	 At	 this	 time,	 incumbent	 politicians	 and	 those	 seeking	
election	portrayed	themselves,	and	the	UK,	as	leading	the	fight	against	climate	change.	
The	 Conservative-Liberal	 Coalition	 elected	 in	 2010	 promised	 to	 be	 ‘the	 greenest	
government	ever’	(Cameron,	2010).	However,	early	doubts	were	raised	about	the	cost	
effectiveness	 of	 these	 policies	 and	 the	 limited	 influence	 of	 the	 climate	 policy	
community	 (Lockwood,	 2013;	 Pielke	 Jr,	 2009).	 The	 waning	 influence,	 interest	 and	
commitment	(see	also	Carter,	2014)	are	reminders	that	flagship	strategic	policies	 like	
the	 CCA	 are	 not	 enough	 alone,	 they	 need	 to	 be	 followed	 up	 with	 consistent	 policy	
development	and	implementation	in	multiple	sectors	 in	order	to	deliver	the	required	
emissions	reductions.	
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Some	 of	 these	 concerns	 materialised	 during	 the	 2010-2015	 Conservative-Liberal	
Coalition	and	intensified	at	the	start	of	the	2015-	Conservative	majority	Government.	
Previously	prominent	arguments	from	the	CCC,	DECC	and	DEFRA	were	drowned	out	by	
the	politics	and	discourse	of	austerity,	whilst	disagreements	between	departments	and	
ministers	made	 it	 difficult	 to	 build	 trust	 or	 to	 send	 consistent	 policy	 signals.	 Senior	
politicians	 sought	 to	 reign	 in	 the	UK’s	 leadership	position	and	make	any	new	targets	
conditional	on	parity	with	other	European	countries	(Gillard,	2016).	Under	the	banner	
of	austerity,	DECC	and	DEFRA	suffered	significant	budget	cuts,	which	also	limited	their	
capacity	to	develop	policy.	
5.4. Methodological	considerations	
The	 growing	 tension	 between	 ambitious	 policy	 targets	 and	 constrained	 political	 and	
economic	 circumstances	 informed	 our	 case	 study	 selection.	 Many	 European	
economies	have	been	slow	to	recover	from	the	financial	crisis	of	2008,	which	has	had	
both	political	and	policy	effects.	Interestingly	in	this	context,	some	governments	–	such	
as	 the	UK	 –	 have	 continued	 to	 position	 themselves	 as	 leaders	 in	 investing	 in	 a	 low-
carbon	 economy	 and	 intervening	 to	 transform	 the	 energy	 system	 whilst	
simultaneously	 prioritising	 austerity	 policies	 and	 deregulation.	 By	 selecting	 a	 case	
study	where	 this	 tension	 is	 particularly	 pronounced	we	 are	 able	 to	 present	 findings	
that	advance	knowledge	through	 ‘the	power	of	example’	and	can	 inform	analyses	of	
other	countries	and	policy	areas	facing	similar	challenges	(Flyvbjerg,	2008).	
We	 consider	 that	 the	 UK	 climate	 policy	 community	 –	 policymakers	 and	 non-
governmental	 actors	 and	 stakeholders	 with	 a	 vested	 interest	 in	 achieving	 climate	
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policy	goals	–	have	been	actively	 searching	 for	 innovative	 solutions	 to	overcome	 the	
challenges	encountered	in	the	key	departments	in	central	government.	The	UK	climate	
policy	area	can	be	described	and	analysed	as,	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent,	polycentric:	
inasmuch	 as	 the	 central	 government	 is	 not	 a	 ‘monolithic	 actor’	 and	 the	 state	
constitutes	a	‘set	of	arenas	and	instruments	for	collective	action’	(Paavola,	2011:	418).	
This	 climate	 policy	 community	 involves	 a	mixture	 of	 state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 and	
venues,	resisting	the	temptation	towards	methodological	nationalism	(Chernilo,	2008)	
to	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 the	 way	 their	 inter-relations	 produce	 public	 policy	 and	
climate	governance	initiatives.	
The	formulation	and	implementation	of	climate	policy	depends	on	the	input	of	various	
civic,	 private	 and	 expert	 actors	 to	 e.g.	 community	 energy	 schemes,	 supply	 chain	
resilience	and	low-carbon	technology	(Bulkeley	and	Kern,	2006).	For	example,	the	UK’s	
membership	of	 the	EU	 (prior	 to	 the	 referendum	to	 leave	 in	 June	2016),	 its	devolved	
authorities	(Northern	Ireland,	Scotland	and	Wales)	and	its	 localism	agenda	that	seeks	
to	 empower	 cities,	 regions	 and	 communities	 mean	 there	 are	 several	 venues	 for	
decentralised	 innovation.	Many	 of	 these	 venues	 for	 climate	 policy	 have	 been	 active	
prior	to	the	timeframe	that	is	the	focus	of	this	article.	As	such,	it	is	not	our	intention	to	
prove	 a	 quantifiable	 step-change	 towards	 polycentric	 policy	 over	 time,	 but	 to	
determine	the	extent	to	which	 it	provides	a	solution	to	the	challenges	and	blockages	
currently	being	encountered	by	policymakers	in	central	government.	
Our	analysis	is	primarily	based	on	discussions	at	three	participatory	workshops	(n=28,	
27,	 15	 participants	 respectively).	 The	 participants	 included	 government	 actors	 from	
senior,	 strategic	 and	 operational	 levels,	 climate	 change	 and	 energy	 policy	 experts,	
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consultants,	 communications	 specialists	 and	academics.	 The	workshops	were	 carried	
out	 under	 the	 Chatham	House	 Rule	 (Chatham	House,	 2016)	 to	 allow	 participants	 to	
contribute	freely	rather	than	as	representatives	of	their	organisations.	Participants	co-
produced	a	set	of	reflections	on	the	barriers	to,	and	opportunities	 for,	climate	policy	
innovations	 but	 all	 interpretation	 and	 analysis	 of	 these	discussions	 presented	 in	 this	
article	 are	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 authors.	 Semi-structured	 interviews	 were	 also	
carried	 out	 with	 15	 key	 members	 of	 climate	 policy	 community	 to	 explore	 their	
strategies	 and	 rationales	 for	 advancing	 climate	 policy.	 Finally,	 documentary	material	
such	as	policy	documents,	and	government	and	non-government	reports	was	used	to	
triangulate	these	accounts.	
5.5. Analysis	
In	this	section,	we	briefly	present	the	outcomes	of	the	workshops	and	interviews	that	
related	 to	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 structural	 factors	 affecting	 UK	 climate	
policymakers’,	as	well	as	 their	proposed	strategic	 responses.	This	section	 is	 relatively	
brief,	as	many	of	these	issues	have	been	raised	elsewhere	in	the	literature	(Carter	and	
Jacobs,	 2014;	 Gillard,	 2016;	 Lockwood,	 2013).	 Our	 evidence	 reconfirms	 their	
importance	and	presents,	for	the	first	time,	some	insights	into	how	policymakers	and	
stakeholders	respond	during	such	turbulent	times.		
We	 then	 scrutinise	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 polycentricity	 presents	 opportunities	 for	
policymakers	 to	 overcome	 policy	 blockages,	 whilst	 also	 considering	 its	 limitations.	
Crucially	we	see	all	governance	actors	as	sites	of	authority	 in	their	own	right;	that	 is,	
not	 as	 pawns	 in	 governmental	 strategies	 but	 as	 co-producers	 and	 (varyingly)	
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autonomous	drivers	of	climate	policy	and	actions.	Their	level	of	authority	and	agency	
may	 be	 in	 part	 determined	 by	 their	 interactions	with	 the	 state,	 but	 it	 is	 also	 drawn	
from	 elsewhere	 and	 enacted	 through	 non-state	 channels.	 Therefore	 our	 analysis	 is	
based	 on	 a	 relational	 view	 of	 agency	 and	 power;	 seeing	 polycentricity	 as	 expressed	
through	socio-political	interactions	between	multiple	public	(state	based),	private	and	
civic	actor	networks.	
First,	we	demonstrate	how	international	linkages	can	pull	in	both	directions,	advancing	
ambition	and	undermining	 it.	Second,	devolved	authorities	such	as	nations	and	cities	
can	outpace	central	government	but	their	capacity	to	do	so	is	shaped	by	the	limits	of	
their	self-rule	and	how	effectively	they	can	work	with	transnational	networks	and	the	
private	 sector.	 Lastly	 we	 show	 the	 importance	 of	 adopting	 a	 collaborative	 (not	
prescriptive)	 approach	 to	working	with	 industry	 and	 civil	 society.	 These	 findings	 are	
summarised	in	table	5.2.	
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Table	5.2:	Examples	of	barriers	to,	and	opportunities	for,	the	realisation	of	polycentric	
ideals	in	UK	climate	policy.	
Systemic Tendencies  
or Biases  
Sources and Reasons  Remedies and Potential 
Benefits  
A. Structural Inequities  Homogenous groups with a 
small focus such as 
campaigns against wind farms 
or heavy industry against 
carbon taxes were more 
successful at influencing 
specific policies than 
heterogeneous groups such as 
‘environmentalists’ who may 
have differing views on the 
details of how to achieve 
broad goals. 
Environment and climate 
coalitions were able to reach 
beyond site-specific 
interests to mobilise support 
from various interest groups 
and influence from multiple 
institutions. 
B. Incremental Bias  Powerful and numerous veto 
points within central 
government such as the 
Treasury and Cabinet 
Ministers made radical climate 
policy decisions unlikely. 
Devolved authorities and 
cities set more ambitious 
targets and pioneer 
innovative policies in sectors 
they have control over. 
C. High Complexity  Local governance initiatives 
such as community energy or 
low carbon businesses 
struggled to compete with 
more established and 
dominant firms.  
City Deals, Local Enterprise 
Partnerships and trans-
national networks all opened 
up avenues for accessing 
policy support and new 
markets. 
D. Deep Structural 
Fissures  
Climate policymakers found it 
difficult to connect with some 
other policy sectors and 
departments e.g. education 
and DCLG.   
Communications specialists 
and think tanks helped 
connect climate change to 
other issue areas and 
centre-right ideologies. 
E. Coordination 
Failures  
Lack of coordination between 
Coalition parties, Cabinet 
Ministers and central 
government departments 
produced mixed messages 
and uncertainty. 
Private sector actors and 
cities seized the initiative 
with certain policy ideas; 
international and trans-
national actors pushed for 
more ambitious targets. 
F. Lack of Normative 
Clarity  
The rationale and methods for 
pursuing of a low-carbon 
lifestyle differs between 
community groups and 
government actors. 
 
Voices from the private and 
civic sector were sought by 
policymakers to help 
develop a shared narrative 
about the low-carbon 
transition. 
	
		
193	
	
5.5.1. Structural	challenges	and	strategic	responses	
In	the	six	years	following	the	financial	crash	of	2008,	macro-economic	trends	such	as	
slow	 growth	 of	 Gross	 Domestic	 Product	 (GDP)	 and	 high	 levels	 of	 government	 debt	
(Office	 for	 Budget	 Responsibility,	 2011;	 2012)	 reinforced	 the	 view	 among	 some	
politicians	and	some	sectors	of	the	public	that	new	(and	many	existing)	climate	policies	
could	 not	 be	 afforded.	 Though	 these	 views	 were	 not	 completely	 hegemonic,	 their	
power	 was	 remarkable;	 policymakers	 often	 deemed	 arguments	 about	 long-term	 or	
non-fiscal	 benefits	 of	 a	 low-carbon	 economy	 untenable	 a	 priori.	 One	 strategic	 level	
interviewee	captured	this	succinctly	by	defining	their	overarching	mandate	as	working	
out	‘how	to	do	more	with	less’.	
Significant	budget	cuts	were	imposed	on	government	departments	(notably	DECC	and	
DEFRA)	and	on	local	governments	(HM	Treasury,	2015),	which	had	a	negative	 impact	
on	 climate	 policymaking.	 Such	 fiscal	 restraints	 exacerbated	 a	 silo	 mentality:	
departments	 focused	 their	 resources	on	 core	work	 and	marginal	 adjustments	 rather	
than	on	crosscutting	issues	like	climate	change.	DECC’s	plans	were	also	constrained	by	
a	cap	on	spending	(HM	Treasury,	2011),	resulting	in	cuts	to	renewable	energy	subsidies	
and	policy	decisions	being	forced	upon	them	by	the	Treasury.	Eventually,	in	2016,	they	
were	subsumed	into	the	Department	for	Business	Innovations	and	Skills	(BEIS).	
Perhaps	 unsurprisingly,	 we	 found	 that	 policymakers	 were	 seeking	 to	 increase	 their	
engagement	with	 a	wider	 set	 of	 actors	 and	 institutions	 beyond	 central	 government.	
Actions	 fell	 into	 two	 broad	 strategies,	 explicitly	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	
overcoming	 policy	 blockages	 would	 require	 a	 polycentric	 approach.	 The	 strategy	 of	
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‘working	with	gatekeepers	and	champions’	was	intended	to	unlock	political	capital	by	
developing	dialogues	and	commitments	across	policy	areas	and	by	reframing	climate	
change	so	that	 it	appealed	to	centre-right	political	preferences,	climate	sceptics,	and	
disengaged	senior	strategists	alike.	The	strategy	of	 ‘collaborate	 to	 innovate’	 included	
more	consultations	prior	to	decisions,	drawing	on	ex	post	analysis	and	expert	evidence,	
localised	 climate	 messages	 to	 discuss	 context-sensitive	 policies,	 and	 utilising	 joint-
funding	 and	more	 applied	 research	 and	development	 schemes	 in	 the	private	 sector.	
Many	elements	of	these	strategies	have	been	a	part	of	the	UK	climate	policy	area	for	
some	time,	but	there	was	an	explicit	acknowledgment	that	 increasing	these	activities	
was	necessary	for	overcoming	current	and	future	constraints,	especially	as	targets	and	
policy	decisions	were	becoming	more	challenging.	
5.5.2. Engaging	with	multiple	sites	of	authority	
5.5.2.1. The	international	climate	regime	and	the	European	Union	
Many	interviewees	had	a	positive	view	of	international	climate	politics,	despite	sharing	
reservations	 about	 the	 difficulties	 of	 negotiating	 agreements	 and	producing	 tangible	
policy	 outputs	 in	 such	 a	 high	 level	 arena.	 As	 shown	 above,	 the	 UK’s	 position	 as	 an	
international	 leader	 has	 been	 an	 important	 part	 of	 its	 climate	 change	 story.	 This	
position	 was	 based	 on	 the	 perceived	 success	 of	 domestic	 legislation,	 which	
underpinned	 subsequent	 diplomacy	 and	 policy	 diffusion	 efforts.	 The	 Minister	 for	
Energy	 and	Climate	Change	 (then	Amber	Rudd)	 and	DECC’s	Director	of	 International	
Climate	 Change	 (then	 Peter	 Betts)	 demonstrated	 this	 leverage	 in	 Paris	 in	 2015	 by	
steering	the	final	agreement	towards	a	model	that	resembles	the	UK’s	framework	of	a	
long-term	target	broken	down	into	five-yearly	monitoring	periods.	
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Such	 mutually	 reinforcing	 overlaps	 between	 national	 and	 international	 governance	
create	 pressure	 on	 national	 policy,	 but	 their	 effects	 are	 neither	 immediate	 nor	
guaranteed.	For	instance,	the	2015	Paris	Agreement	on	a	more	stringent	target	limiting	
global	warming	 to	 1.5	 degrees	Celsius	 prompted	UK	policymakers	 to	 promise	 a	 new	
domestic	 ‘net	 zero’	 emissions	 target.	 Yet	 the	 CCC	 chose	 not	 to	 revise	 the	 target,	
despite	 concerted	pressure	 from	environmental	 campaigners,	 on	 the	grounds	 that	 it	
would	 suffice	as	an	absolute	minimum	for	 the	UK’s	 contribution	 to	 the	global	 target	
and	that	domestic	policy	was	already	falling	short	of	this	(CCC,	2016a).	This	illustrates	
the	 limitation	 of	 the	 CCC’s	 purely	 advisory	 mandate	 and	 represents	 a	 missed	
opportunity	for	building	reciprocity	between	policymakers	at	the	two	levels.	
Similarly,	 efforts	 to	 feed	 commitments	 and	 ideas	 from	 the	 international	 level	 into	
adjacent	policy	areas	such	as	 raising	public	awareness	and	climate	change	education	
have	been	very	limited,	representing	another	missed	opportunity	for	establishing	new	
connections	 across	 sectors	 and	 demographics.	 Despite	 these	 shortcomings	 and	 the	
failure	 of	 potential	 polycentric	 benefits	 to	 be	 secured,	 most	 policymakers	 and	 non-
government	organisations	remained	optimistic	about	the	political	value	of	maintaining	
a	 leadership	 position	 internationally	 and	 the	 institutional	 pressure	 it	 exerts	 on	
domestic	actors.	
For	those	seeking	global	agreements	on	climate	change,	the	UK’s	relationship	with	the	
EU	 has	 moved	 in	 an	 even	 less	 positive	 direction.	 Negotiating	 at	 the	 UNFCCC	 as	 a	
member	 of	 the	 EU,	 the	 UK	 has	 traditionally	 been	 seen	 as	 a	 leader	 within	 the	 bloc,	
often	 pushing	 for	 stronger	 targets	 and	 monitoring	 frameworks.	 This	 situation	 was	
unsettled	 in	2016	by	a	 referendum	on	 the	UK’s	membership	of	 the	EU	resulting	 in	a	
		
196	
vote	 to	 leave.	 After	 a	 series	 of	 successful	 negotiations	 in	 2014	 to	 align	 climate	 and	
renewable	energy	targets,	this	work	was	‘largely	seen	as	done’	by	some	policymakers	
and	so	co-ordination	efforts	were	relaxed.		
By	voting	to	leave	the	EU	the	UK	closed	a	significant	source	of	policies	(e.g.	renewable	
energy	targets)	and	financing	(worth	€3.5bn	during	the	period	2014-2020)	for	climate	
and	 energy	 schemes	 (Froggatt	 et	 al.,	 2016).	 Most	 pertinently	 from	 the	 polycentric	
perspective,	the	impending	loss	of	the	influence	of	EU	regulations	and	legal	structures	
represents	a	significant	decrease	 in	the	number	of	mechanisms	for	monitoring	–	and	
thereby	 encouraging	 –	 cooperation	 on	 climate	 goals.	 Furthermore,	 the	 referendum	
result	 represents	 the	 loss	 of	 a	 vital	 multi-level	 governance	 connection	 for	 the	 UK’s	
devolved	 authorities	 and	 cities	 that	 previously	 benefitted	 greatly	 from	 EU	 policies,	
finance	and	networks.	
5.5.2.2. Ambition,	 constraints	 and	 bottom-up	 innovation	 in	 devolved	 authorities	
and	cities	
The	 UK’s	 devolved	 nations	 offer	 clear	 examples	 of	 non-central	 government	 actors	
looking	 for	 ways	 to	 develop	 a	 faltering	 policy	 area	 and	 encourage	 experimentation.	
The	 Scottish	Government’s	 equivalent	 of	 the	CCA	 incorporated	emissions	 reductions	
beyond	 its	per	 capita	 share	 for	achieving	 the	UK	 target,	and	at	a	much	quicker	pace	
(Scottish	 Parliament,	 2009;	 CCC,	 2016b).	 In	 Wales	 a	 3%	 annual	 emission	 reduction	
target	enables	a	more	comprehensive	and	explicit	application	to	different	sectors	than	
the	UK’s	aggregate	targets	(Welsh	Assembly	Government,	2010a).	Scotland	and	Wales	
have	 also	 legislated	 on	 targets	 and	 strategies	 for	meeting	 all	 of	 their	 electricity	 and	
energy	needs	with	renewable	and	low-carbon	sources	by	2020	and	2050	respectively	
(Scottish	 Government,	 2011;	Welsh	 Assembly	 Government,	 2010b);	whereas	 the	UK	
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Parliament	 rejected	 such	 an	 approach	 by	 narrowly	 voting	 against	 an	 explicit	 power	
sector	decarbonisation	target.	
This	higher	ambition	in	devolved	authorities	does	filter	into	specific	policy	decisions	at	
other	 levels,	 sometimes	 standing	 in	 direct	 contrast	 to	 central	 government.	 For	
instance,	 onshore	 wind	 continued	 to	 be	 a	 priority	 in	 Scotland	 whereas	 the	 UK	
Government	gave	it’s	Minister	the	power	to	veto	planning	applications	in	England	and	
Wales.	 The	 Welsh	 Government	 has	 less	 control	 over	 large	 energy	 infrastructure	
decisions	but	has	developed	plans	for	a	world-first	tidal	 lagoon	project	in	Swansea.	It	
also	has	a	more	generous	and	consistent	record	of	supporting	micro-generation	energy	
projects.	
Such	ambitious	and	experimental	sub-national	policies	may	act	as	pilots	of	innovation,	
to	be	 learnt	from	and	even	adopted	 later	by	national	government.	This	was	the	case	
when	 Scotland	 and	 Wales	 introduced	 a	 plastic	 bag	 levy	 that	 was	 later	 adopted	 in	
England	after	its	positive	impacts	were	monitored	and	evaluated	(Welsh	Government,	
2016;	 Zero	 Waste	 Scotland,	 2015).	 Another	 example	 emerged	 from	 our	 workshop	
discussions,	 as	 policymakers	 sought	 to	 draw	 lessons	 from	 the	 perceived	 success	 of	
Greener	Scotland’s	environment	and	climate	change	communication	strategy.	This	was	
primarily	driven	by	individuals	who	were	part	of	wider	policymaking	networks	because	
no	 formal	 channels	 for	 facilitating	 such	 learning	within	 the	 climate	 policy	 area	were	
identified.	 Confirming	 the	 ‘more	 connections,	 more	 innovation’	 hypothesis	 of	
polycentric	governance,	this	suggests	that	 learning	 lessons	from	experimentation	 is	a	
valuable	 addition,	 but	 that	 it	 may	 be	 quicker	 and	 more	 effective	 when	 formally	
supported	rather	than	simply	as	a	by-product	of	pioneers	leading	by	example.	
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Sub-national	actors	may	also	seek	to	circumvent	their	national	governments.	Scotland	
has	 25%	 of	 Europe’s	 offshore	 wind	 and	 tidal	 potential	 and	 has	 attracted	 tens	 of	
millions	of	Euros	 from	the	EU	 for	 renewable	energy	projects	 (European	Commission,	
2014).	Wales	also	drew	a	financial	net	benefit	from	the	EU	in	2014	(Ifan	et	al.,	2016),	
much	 of	 which	 has	 been	 spent	 on	 innovative	 tidal	 energy	 projects	 and	 adaptation	
initiatives	in	coastal	communities.	Scotland	and	Wales	are	also	active	in	transnational	
networks	of	devolved	authorities	that	engage	in	climate	governance	initiatives	such	as	
the	Climate	Group’s	 States	 and	Regions	Alliance.	Recourse	 to	 these	other	 levels	 and	
channels	can	help	to	sidestep	the	entrenched	power	relations	and	impasses	of	central	
government	policymaking,	offering	new	sources	of	information,	funding	and	policies.	
In	 England,	 legislation	was	 introduced	 to	 accelerate	 the	 devolution	 of	 power,	 giving	
‘new	 freedoms	and	 flexibilities	 to	 local	 government’	 and	 ‘new	 rights	 and	powers	 for	
communities	 and	 individuals’	 (DCLG,	 2011:	 3).	 This	 included	 provisions	 giving	 local	
government	and	city	councils	specific	powers	such	as	control	over	the	prioritisation	of	
economic	sectors	and	public	spending.	Interestingly,	these	26	‘City	Deals’	were	guided	
by	 principles	 akin	 to	 those	 of	 polycentricity:	 creating	 another	 site	 of	 authority,	
encouraging	collaboration	between	public	and	private	actors,	and	seeking	efficiencies	
of	scale	(HM	Government,	2011:	20).	The	use	of	such	localism	discourse	suggests	the	
potential	 virtues	 of	 a	 polycentric	 approach	 are	 being	 recognised	 and	 legitimised	 in	
formal	 policy	 outputs,	 although	 it	 does	 not	 reveal	 the	 underlying	 rationale	 for	 their	
adoption	or	the	details	of	their	enactment.	
Several	 interviewees	 described	 the	 City	 Deals	 as	 a	 good	 idea	 in	 principle	 but	
underperforming	 in	 practice.	 This	 was	 largely	 attributed	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 were	
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overseen	by	two	departments	who	were	overtly	uninterested	 in	climate	change,	and	
partly	because	they	came	at	a	time	when	local	government	budgets	were	being	heavily	
cut.	 City	 level	 interviewees	 corroborated	 this,	 reporting	 difficulties	 in	 finding	 central	
government	 support	 for	 climate	 change	 related	 initiatives,	 even	 when	 the	 business	
case	was	strong	and	the	social	benefits	were	clear	(e.g.	energy	efficiency	investment	to	
reduce	emissions	and	fuel	poverty).	Devolving	responsibilities	can	thus	be	described	as	
a	move	 towards	 self-governance	and	autonomy	but,	 in	 the	 context	of	a	51%	budget	
cut	 to	 the	Department	 for	 Communities	 and	 Local	 Government	 between	 2010-2015	
(HM	Treasury,	2015),	it	can	also	be	described	as	an	example	of	hollowing	out	the	state.	
Several	city	level	actors	also	underlined	that	working	with	central	policymakers	is	not	
the	only	option.	 They	highlighted	 the	 importance	of	 transnational	 networks	 like	C40	
and	the		Compact	of	Mayors	 in	promoting	the	influence	of	cities,	sharing	knowledge,	
and	collaborating	on	mitigation	and	adaptation	governance.	Within	 the	UK,	 the	Core	
Cities	 group	 is	 one	 such	 example,	 being	 a	 successful	 collaboration	 between	 the	 10	
biggest	city	economies	outside	of	London.	For	example,	in	conjunction	with	the	capital	
city	 and	 private	 sector	 energy	 companies	 they	 developed	 an	 innovative	 scheme	 to	
reduce	 emissions	 from	 public	 buildings	 without	 needing	 additional	 up-front	 public	
finance;	 a	 clear	 example	 of	 experimental	 governance	 succeeding	 in	 a	 policy	 area	
blighted	by	underfunding	and	inertia.	
5.5.2.3. A	 problem	 shared	 is	 a	 problem	 halved:	 working	with	 private	 enterprise	
and	civil	society	to	build	a	low-carbon	coalition	
In	workshop	discussions	and	 interviews,	policymakers	expressed	a	desire	 to	 create	a	
sense	 of	 ‘shared	 ownership’	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 climate	 change.	 It	 was	 felt	 that	 this	
resonated	 with	 the	 broader	 neoliberal	 approach	 to	 small-state	 governance	 –	
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exemplified	by	the	Coalition	Government’s	‘Big	Society’	agenda	(Cabinet	Office,	2010)	
–	and	 that	 it	had	already	proven	successful	 in	building	co-operation	 in	 the	 run	up	 to	
the	passing	of	the	CCA	and	the	UNFCCC	conference	in	Paris	(Jacobs,	2016).	Yet,	it	was	
acknowledged	 that	 ‘no	 single	 goal	 would	 be	 prioritised	 by	 everyone’,	 but	 that	 this	
potential	lack	of	clarity	was	not	something	for	government	to	try	to	control.	Rather,	it	
was	 hoped	 that	 by	 bringing	 a	 range	 of	 leading	 voices	 together	 a	 shared	 narrative	
would	 emerge.	 The	 expectation	 was	 that	 this	 would	 increase	 the	 legitimacy	 and	
acceptability	 of	 future	 climate	 policies	 and	 governance	 arrangements,	 and	 also	 put	
pressure	on	central	government	to	send	consistent	messages	of	support	–	even	during	
periods	of	austerity	and	low	political	prioritisation	of	climate	change.		
Importantly	 this	 was	 not	 seen	 solely	 as	 an	 issue	 of	 public	 relations,	 but	 one	 of	
democratic	 participation.	 Many	 policymakers	 cited	 the	 Government’s	 Open	
Policymaking	 initiative	as	a	benchmark,	which	had	provided	 the	 tools	 for	 including	a	
broad	 range	 of	 expertise	 and	 feedback	 during	 all	 stages	 of	 the	 policy	 process.	 If	
successful,	 this	 sort	 of	 governance	 arrangement	 can	 provide	 a	 forum	 for	 increased	
communication	 and	 learning	 between	 stakeholders	 without	 requiring	 significant	
additional	expenditure	or	legislation	at	a	time	when	government	is	disinclined	towards	
either.	
Policymaking	 collaborations	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 private	 sector	 have	 been	
increasingly	popular	in	the	UK	and	other	countries	with	liberalised	markets.	Mobilising	
private	 capital	 to	 produce	 social	 and	 environmental	 benefits	 can	 be	 effective	 during	
times	 of	 limited	 public	 finances.	 For	 example,	 the	 Carbon	 Trust’s	 five-year	 Offshore	
Wind	Accelerator	project	 combined	public	 finance	with	 considerable	 investment	and	
		
201	
expertise	of	nine	offshore	wind	 companies	 to	 reduce	 costs,	 furthering	 the	economic	
competitiveness	of	this	particular	renewable	energy.	
Companies	seeking	first-mover	advantages	have	also	acted	independently	of	the	state,	
drawing	on	the	latest	climate	science	and	policy	trajectories	to	develop	internal	carbon	
pricing	to	guide	their	investment	strategies	and	pledging	to	become	powered	entirely	
by	renewable	energy.	 Interviewees	 felt	 that	 there	were	many	such	success	stories	 in	
the	UK	and	even	a	critical	mass	of	actors	committed	to	tackling	climate	change	despite	
governments	and	markets	seeming	less	assured.	As	an	example	of	this	sentiment,	they	
cited	the	World	Economic	Forum’s	open	 letter	to	government	 leaders	 in	2015	urging	
stronger	 climate	 action.	 This	 stemmed	 from	 the	 recognition	 that	more	 needs	 to	 be	
done	 to	 prepare	 and	 promote	 low-carbon	 business	 messages	 in	 conjunction	 with	
governments	to	overcome	apparent	contradictions	in	interest	and	preferences.	Private	
sector	 voluntary	 agreements	 are	 often	 used	 to	 pre-emptively	 stave	 off	 government	
regulation,	but	they	also	indicate	a	willingness	to	go	beyond	lagging	policies	and	thus	
are	an	opportunity	to	innovate	when	public	finances	and	political	capital	are	limited.	
The	state	also	plays	an	 important	but	ambiguous	 role	 in	shaping	civil	 society	climate	
actions	 such	 as	 community	 energy	 and	 behaviour	 change	 schemes.	 These	 schemes	
often	 focus	 on	 energy	 efficiency	measures,	 renewable	 energy	 development	 and	 low	
consumption	 lifestyles.	 Public	 policy	 and	 top-down	 intervention	 may	 enhance	 their	
success	(e.g.	by	establishing	feed-in-tariffs	for	renewable	energy,	setting	up	knowledge	
sharing	 networks	 and	 providing	 frameworks	 for	measuring	 impact)	 but	 they	 are	 not	
always	 dependable	 revenue	 streams	 and	 their	 governance	 rules	 may	 even	 be	
counterproductive	 to	 the	 aims	 and	 functioning	 of	 community	 projects	 (for	 UK	
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examples	see:	Aiken,	2016;	Markantoni,	2016;	Walker,	2011).	The	many	examples	of	
failed	 or	 faltering	 community	 level	 low-carbon	 energy	 schemes	 serve	 as	 a	 reminder	
that	favourable	conditions	for	polycentric	experimentation	need	to	be	maintained,	and	
that	governments	have	a	continued	role	to	play	in	this.	
More	 broadly,	 the	 high	 costs	 of	 competing	 in	 a	 liberalised	 market	 and	 of	 meeting	
regulatory	requirements	may	limit	the	ability	of	these	civic	initiatives	to	scale	up	their	
impact,	but	several	of	our	interviewees	and	workshop	participants	saw	their	increasing	
prevalence	as	a	positive	sign.	Their	popularity,	cost-efficiency,	co-benefits	and	localised	
governance	 structures	were	 all	 lauded,	 but	 ultimately	 policymakers	 need	 to	 provide	
more	reliable	support	and	to	see	them	as	co-producers	of	an	 inclusive	and	pluralistic	
low-carbon	transition,	not	merely	expendable	experiments.	
5.6. Discussion:	polycentricity	and	the	ambiguous	role	of	government	
As	 austerity	 took	 hold	 across	 Europe	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 2008	 financial	 crisis,	
governments	 seeking	 to	 reduce	 regulation	 and	 public	 spending	 were	 able	 to	 justify	
implementing	severe	cuts.	As	a	result,	 in	the	UK,	the	climate	policy	community	faced	
significant	blockages	to	policy	development	(confirming	the	theoretical	and	empirical	
hypotheses	of	Bauer	et	al.,	2012;	Lockwood,	2013;	Gillard,	2016).	Despite	independent	
progress	 reports	 stressing	 the	 need	 to	 maintain	 ambition	 and	 to	 increase	 policy	
development	 to	 meet	 future	 targets	 (CCC,	 2014;	 2016a),	 climate	 change	 was	
effectively	 de-prioritised	 by	 central	 government.	 Our	 findings	 should	 resonate	 with	
other	countries	and	policy	areas	marked	by	state	retreat	or	policy	retrenchment,	and	
they	will	certainly	be	of	 interest	within	the	UK	where	 limited	policymaking	resources	
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continue	to	be	cut	(e.g.	DECC	being	subsumed	into	BEIS)	or	are	being	focused	on	other	
priorities	(e.g.	negotiating	an	exit	from	the	EU).	
What	 can	 policymakers	 do	 when	 faced	 with	 such	 a	 predicament	 and	 what	 is	 their	
rationale	 for	 acting?	 The	 UK	 climate	 policy	 community	 responded	 to	 the	 above	
challenges	by	pursuing	two	broad	strategies:	1)	appealing	to	influential	individuals	and	
2)	 seeking	 out	 new	 collaborations.	 The	 assumption	 that	 leadership	 could	 not	 come	
from	 government	 alone	 underpinned	 these	 strategies.	 Another	 key	 assumption	was	
that	 policy	 innovations	 would	 require	 linking	 top-down	 influence	 with	 bottom-up	
creativity.	Interviewees	reported	numerous	sites	where	these	strategies	play	out,	such	
as	 international	 institutions,	 transnational	networks,	devolved	authorities,	 cities,	 and	
private	 enterprise	 and	 community	 groups.	 It	 is	 in	 the	 interactions	 between	 these	
multiple	sites	of	authority	that	issues	of	relational	power	and	policy	development	can	
be	seen.	
The	 case	 study	 provides	 examples	 of	 a	 positive	 contribution	 of	 a	 broad	 network	 of	
actors	to	climate	policy,	which	at	least	partially	fulfilled	the	definition	and	promises	of	
polycentric	governance	as	 laid	out	by	McGinnis	 (2015),	Cole	 (2015)	and	 Jordan	et	al.	
(2015).	 The	 network	 helped	 produce	 new	 formal	 governance	 arrangements	 and	
informal	 commitments	 for	 tackling	climate	change	across	multiple	 levels,	 institutions	
and	 sectors	 (e.g.	 nationally	 determined	 contributions,	 renewable	 energy	 targets,	
voluntary	 actions	 among	 businesses,	 and	 pledges	 between	 cities	 and	 communities).	
They	 also	 produced	 efficiencies	 of	 scale	 and	 self-governance	 e.g.	 through	 public-
private	financing,	City	Deals,	and	community	energy.		
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These	successes	may	be	in	part	due	to	the	specifics	of	the	UK	case,	but	broad	lessons	
can	 still	 be	drawn	 from	 these	and	explored	 in	other	 contexts	of	policy	blockage.	 For	
instance,	the	relatively	 long	history	of	non-state	climate	action	in	the	UK	showed	the	
importance	of	being	able	to	draw	on	past	experience	and	existing	relationships	when	
developing	 innovations.	 Further,	 the	 widely	 perceived	 success	 of	 the	 CCA	 enabled	
policymakers	 to	 re-direct	 limited	 resources	 towards	 complementary	 forms	 of	
governance,	 showing	 the	 importance	 of	maintaining	 political	 and	 public	 support	 for	
national	 level	 strategies	 (Cao	 and	 Ward,	 2017).	 Extending	 these	 arguments,	 we	
contend	that	a	polycentric	approach	will	be	most	effective	when	it	is	additional	to,	not	
a	 replacement	 for,	 strong	 central	 government	 leadership.	Without	 this	 overt	 shared	
commitment	and	reciprocity	there	is	a	danger	that	progress	will	be	halted	in	times	of	
crisis	or	that	contrary	policy	decisions	may	appear	to	have	no	political	cost.	
Does	all	of	this	polycentric	activity	achieve	tangible	results	beyond	the	existing	state-
based	policies	such	as	the	CCA	and	its	carbon	budgets?	Although	such	policy	outcomes	
are	difficult	 to	calculate	at	 the	aggregate	 level	of	emissions	 reductions	 (Hertin	et	al.,	
2009),	it	 is	possible	to	argue	for	three	significant	advantages	for	policy	processes	and	
outputs.	 First,	 by	 coordinating	 with	 other	 (sometimes	 more	 receptive)	 actors	 and	
sectors	 the	 wider	 climate	 policy	 community	 was	 able	 to	 put	 pressure	 on	 central	
government,	or	even	 to	circumvent	 it	entirely.	 Second,	 these	channels	also	provided	
extra	opportunities	 for	experimentation,	 learning	and	diffusion	 (Loorbach,	2010;	Voß	
et	 al.,	 2009),	 e.g.	 when	 devolved	 authorities	 outpaced	 the	 national	 level	 and	
businesses	trialled	higher	carbon	prices.	Third,	the	increased	connections	between	the	
state	and	other	actors	offered	the	necessary	scope	to	begin	to	build	a	shared	narrative	
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for	 fostering	 trust	 and	 social	 buy-in	 necessary	 to	 implement	 ambitious	 and	 broadly	
supported	 climate	 policies	 (Stirling,	 2011).	 Each	 of	 these	 examples	 illustrates	 the	
potential	 value	 of	 relational	 forms	 of	 power	 and	 influence	 within,	 and	 beyond,	 the	
structures	of	the	nation	state.	
Although	 our	 case	 study	 aligned	 with	 McGinnis’	 (2015)	 tripartite	 definition	 of	 a	
polycentric	 system	 of	 governance,	 the	 exact	 contours	 of	 the	 UK	 climate	 policy	 area	
were	left	deliberately	open.	Future	analyses	could	examine	more	tightly	defined	policy	
areas	 or	 sub-systems	 of	 climate	 policy	 (e.g.	 the	 renewable	 energy	 sector	 or	 local	
adaptation)	to	provide	more	comparative	evidence	and	clarify	certain	theoretical	and	
applied	 issues	e.g.	 the	ambiguous	role	of	government	and	claims	of	scalar	efficiency.	
On	 the	 latter	 point,	 proving	 such	 an	 ‘economic	dividend’	would	 certainly	 strengthen	
the	case	for	pursuing	greater	polycentricity	in	other	fiscally	constrained	countries	and	
policy	areas	(Pike	et	al.,	2012).		
The	 ability	 of	 other	 countries	 and	policy	 communities	 to	 replicate	 the	 same	positive	
effects	 seen	 in	 the	UK	 case	 is	 not	 necessarily	 assured.	 This	will	 likely	 be	 affected	by	
many	 context	 specific	 variables	 e.g.	 the	 level	 of	 decentralisation,	 pre-existing	 actor	
networks,	institutionalised	power	relations,	styles	of	policymaking,	legislative	context,	
and	activeness	of	civic	and	private	sectors.	However,	 it	certainly	seems	plausible	that	
increasing	polycentricity	is	a	desirable,	and	effective,	strategy	for	overcoming	national	
level	blockages	e.g.	 recently	 in	the	USA,	Congress	has	blocked	climate	policies	but	at	
the	state	level	there	are	prominent	leaders	(California)	and	collaborations	(Compact	of	
Mayors).	
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Our	 findings	 showed	 that	 policymakers	 actively	 tried	 to	 enhance	 their	 engagement	
with	 other	 sites	 of	 authority.	 At	 the	 time,	 this	 fit	 well	 with	 the	 government’s	 ‘Big	
Society’	 rhetoric,	 deregulation	 agenda,	 and	 public	 spending	 cuts;	 raising	 concerns	
about	the	potential	‘Janus-face’	of	neoliberal	governance	as	a	response	to	constrained	
public	 finances	 (Davies,	 2011;	 Swyngedouw,	 2005).	 In	 other	words,	 the	 turn	 to	non-
state	 actors	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 a	 de	 facto	 solution	 to	 central	 state	 inaction	
(Paavola	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Our	 case	 study	 chimes	 with	 other	 critical	 research	 that	 has	
raised	 this	 issue.	 For	 instance,	devolution	of	 resources	 to	 sub-national	 actors	 can	be	
insufficient	to	match	their	new	responsibilities,	and	the	new	relationship	to	the	state	
that	it	produces	can	be	deliberately	managed	to	favour	other	(more	central)	priorities	
or	 to	 spread	 the	 blame	 for	 policy	 failures	 /	 inaction	 (Muinzer,	 2016;	 Royles	 and	
McEwen,	2015).	Similarly,	civil	society	initiatives	and	local	enterprise	partnerships	are	
at	risk	of	being	instrumentalised	by	the	state,	i.e.	turned	into	the	subjects,	rather	than	
curators,	of	social	change	(Aiken,	2016;	Davies,	2011;	Lever,	2005).	
5.7. Conclusion	
Long-term	 policy	 development	 and	 state-based	 governance	 may	 be	 hampered	 by	
multiple	 factors	 such	 as	 economic	 and	 political	 cycles,	 as	 well	 as	 by	 the	 tendency	
towards	 silo	 thinking	 and	 entrenched	 power	 relations	 of	 central	 government	
structures.	 This	 is	 especially	 true	 for	 policy	 areas	 marked	 by	 uncertainty,	 vested	
interests,	 and	 complex	 economic	 or	 scientific	 forecasting	 that	 is	 open	 to	 multiple	
interpretations.		
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As	we	have	shown	 in	 the	case	of	UK	climate	policy,	 state	 leadership	 through	 targets	
and	 policy	 frameworks	 is	 vital	 to	 raise	 ambition	 and	monitor	 progress.	 However,	 it	
requires	 consistent	 policy	 development	 to	 maintain	 the	 trajectory	 and	 to	 deliver	
tangible	 interim	achievements	(i.e.	annual	emissions	reductions).	However,	economic	
downturns	and	changes	in	political	priorities	can	cause	domestic	progress	to	slow	and	
an	implementation	gap	to	emerge.	Such	blockages	may	also	limit	the	scope	for	policy	
innovation	 and	 leadership	 from	 other	 actors,	 raising	 important	 questions	 about	
governmental	constraints	on	the	agency	of	non-state	actors	or	governance	networks.		
At	such	times	policymakers	may	turn	to	other	sites	of	authority	that	offer	alternative	
channels	of	influence	and	innovation,	as	well	as	the	potential	for	achieving	efficiencies	
of	 scale.	 Countries	 with	 more	 devolved	 power	 structures,	 and	 politically	 engaged	
private	 and	 civic	 sectors,	 are	 well	 placed	 to	 cultivate	 such	 polycentric	 networks.	
However,	 our	 final	 contention	 is	 that	 the	 underlying	 rationale	 for	 governments’	
interactions	 with	 these	 other	 sites	 of	 authority	 –	 and	 the	 relational	 power	 through	
which	this	 is	enacted	–	 is	a	key	determinant	of	their	success.	Where	other	actors	are	
seen	as	passive	recipients	of	policy	decisions	they	will	be	given	less	scope	(materially	
and	 idealistically)	 for	 bottom-up	 innovation:	 governments	 will	 effectively	 shift	
responsibility	 and	 blame	 rather	 than	 share	 ownership	 and	 accountability.	 Where	
governments	 invite	 other	 actors	 into	 the	 policymaking	 process	 at	 all	 stages	 and	
encourage	 the	 autonomy	 of	multiple	 sites	 of	 authority	 there	will	 be	more	 room	 for	
experimentation,	 economies	of	 scale	 and,	 ultimately,	 the	progression	of	 an	 inclusive	
low-carbon	transition.	
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6.	Discussion	
6.1. Overview	
In	order	 to	avoid	the	potentially	disastrous	 impacts	of	anthropogenic	climate	change	
most	 nations	 around	 the	 world	 have	 committed	 to	 reducing	 their	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions	 in	a	 timely	and	effective	manner.	Such	a	 transition	 to	a	 low-carbon	 future	
entails	significant	material,	organisational	and	cultural	changes	across	multiple	sectors	
of	society	e.g.	private,	public	and	civic.	National	governments	have	an	important	role	
to	 play	 in	 articulating	 and	 incentivising	 these	 changes	 by	 setting	 clear	 targets	 and	
developing	 the	 necessary	 policies	 and	 governance	 arrangements	 to	 achieve	 them	
(Giddens,	2009).	Many	countries	have	begun	to	do	just	that,	with	93%	of	the	world’s	
greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 now	 being	 accounted	 for	 by	 national	 frameworks	 and	
targets	 (Nachmany	 et	 al.,	 2015),	 and	 the	 annual	 emissions	 inventories	 of	 many	
industrialised	countries	showing	a	downward	trajectory	in	recent	years	(UNFCC,	2015).	
However,	 keeping	 such	 progress	 on	 track	 towards	 full	 decarbonisation	 will	 get	
increasingly	 difficult.	 After	 the	 most	 technologically	 feasible	 and	 economically	
attractive	 actions	 have	 been	 taken,	 the	 amount	 of	 political	 and	 financial	 capital	
required	for	developing	and	implementing	policies	will	begin	to	mount.	Furthermore,	
the	significant	socio-cultural	implications	of	moving	to	a	low-carbon	society	–	such	as	
eating	less	meat	and	using	public	transport	–	remain	under-appreciated	in	policy,	and	
have	 thus	 far	 proven	 resistant	 to	 light-touch	 and	 paternalistic	 behaviour	 change	
initiatives	(Shove,	2010;	Wellesley	et	al.,	2015).	Against	this	backdrop,	several	Western	
European	governments	 face	 the	added	challenges	of	a	slow	economic	recovery	after	
		
215	
the	 2008	 financial	 crash	 and	 a	 pervasive	 commitment	 to	 neoliberal	 ideas	 about	
minimising	state	intervention.	
By	 taking	 the	 UK	 as	 a	 case	 study	 this	 thesis	 set	 out	 to	 analyse	 the	 impact	 of	 these	
challenges	 on	 climate	 change	 politics,	 policy	 and	 governance.	 Arguably	 the	 UK,	 like	
many	 other	 countries,	 is	 at	 a	 critical	 juncture	with	 regards	 to	 climate	 change.	 After	
setting	 an	 ambitious	 long-term	 emissions	 reduction	 target	 in	 2008,	 the	 first	 two	
interim	 targets	 (23%	 by	 2013	 and	 29%	 by	 2018)	 have	 since	 been	 met	 (CCC,	 2014;	
2016).	However,	 concerns	 have	 been	 raised	 about	 the	weight	 of	 causal	 influence	 of	
government	policies	in	reaching	these	achievements	(compared	to	the	impacts	of	the	
economic	recession),	particularly	regarding	their	ability	to	achieve	sufficient	reductions	
in	 the	 most	 difficult	 areas	 (such	 as	 heat	 and	 transport)	 (CCC,	 2010;	 CCC,	 2016).	
Furthermore	the	two	most	recent	progress	reports	from	the	CCC	(2016;	2017)	point	to	
a	 growing	 ‘policy	 gap’	 between	 existing	 instruments	 and	 the	 levels	 of	 emissions	
reductions	 required	 to	 meet	 upcoming	 targets.	 Evidence	 from	 this	 thesis	 adds	 a	
qualitative	understanding	to	recent	accounts	of	how	investment	in	low-carbon	sectors	
of	 the	economy	and	the	development	of	environmental	policies	has	been	stymied	 in	
the	UK	and	across	Europe	by	the	financial	crisis	(Burns	and	Tobin,	2016;	Geels,	2013).	
As	 a	 result,	 governments	 face	 two	 simultaneous	 dilemmas:	 first,	 keeping	 climate	
change	as	 a	political	 priority	 at	 a	 time	of	 successive	 geopolitical	 crises	 (e.g.	 financial	
instability,	 mass	 migration	 and	 the	 UK	 leaving	 the	 EU),	 and	 second,	 developing	
innovative	policies	at	a	time	of	constrained	resources	and	state	retrenchment.	
This	 thesis	 explored	 these	widely	 relevant	 issues	 underlying	 such	 climate	 politics	 by	
asking	 four	 specific	 questions	 in	 the	 UK	 context.	 First,	 to	 what	 extent	 do	 current	
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approaches	 to	 describing	 and	 prescribing	 low-carbon	 transitions	 adequately	 address	
their	social	and	political	dimensions	 (chapter	2)?	Second,	how	have	the	 fundamental	
ideas	 of	 climate	 change	politics	 and	 economics	 changed	 in	 response	 to	 political	 and	
economics	 pressures	 (chapter	 3)?	 Third,	 what	 impact	 have	 these	 changes	 had	 on	
climate	 and	 energy	 policy	 outputs	 (chapter	 4)?	 And	 fourth,	 where	 are	 the	 current	
policy	and	governance	innovations	coming	from	and	what	is	government’s	role	therein	
(chapter	5)?	
In	chapter	2,	the	shortcomings	of	adopting	a	systems-based	ontology	when	theorising	
or	 governing	 large-scale	 social	 transitions	 were	 enumerated.	 It	 argued	 that	 this	
reinforces	a	tendency	towards	incremental	change	rather	than	fundamental	systemic	
reform	and	produces	of	an	elitist	rather	than	pluralist	approach	to	social	transitions.	In	
response,	it	was	shown	how	the	seeds	of	change,	and	the	winds	that	carry	them,	could	
be	more	fruitfully	explored	by	drawing	on	social	theory	concepts	of	assemblage,	inter-
subjectivity	 and	 political	 agency.	 This	 included	 adopting	 a	 relational	 ontology	 that	
emphasises	the	contingency	of	existing	social	relations,	as	well	as	bringing	attention	to	
the	 strategic	 way	 actors	 can	 create,	 and	 capitalise	 on,	 windows	 of	 opportunity	 for	
transformational	change.	
In	chapter	3,	the	malleability	of	climate	change	politics	and	economics	was	tracked	via	
the	discursive	interactions	of	key	individuals	and	coalitions.	Three	forms	of	ideational	
power	 were	 visible	 in	 the	 way	 that	 these	 interactions	 altered	 the	 meaning	 and	
influence	of	 climate	change	governance	and	economics	discourses.	Ultimately,	 these	
changes	 demonstrated	 the	 persistence	 of	 certain	 institutionalised	 power	 relations	
within	UK	government	e.g.	senior	leadership	and	the	Treasury	vis-à-vis	environmental	
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policymakers	 (DECC	 /	 DEFRA)	 and	 stakeholders.	 Loss	 of	 political	 salience	 and	 the	
tendency	towards	divisive	narratives	in	media	reporting	on	climate	change	also	added	
to	the	difficulty.	These	factors	were	all	partially	driven	by	an	intense	focus	on	austerity,	
which	 negated	 calls	 for	 increased	 government	 spending	 or	 intervention	 and	
undermined	the	idea	of	green	economic	growth.	
Chapter	4	examined	the	way	these	discourses	and	power	relations	resulted	in	specific	
policy	outputs.	It	noted	how	the	predominant	use	of	an	economic	framing	for	climate	
change	 and	 low-carbon	 energy	 determined	what	 discourse	 could,	 and	 could	 not,	 be	
used	to	legitimise	decisions.	Most	prominent	was	the	use	of	a	‘policy	bubble’	heuristic	
to	present	 ideas	about	potential	over-investment	 in	climate	and	energy	policies.	The	
utility	of	target	setting	was	explicitly	called	into	question	–	suggesting	it	to	be	unwise	
due	 to	 unpredictability	 and	 possible	 overshoot	 –	 thus	 making	 setting	 new	 carbon	
budgets	and	renewable	energy	targets	politically	contentious.	More	concretely,	policy	
support	for	renewable	energy	was	dismantled	on	the	back	of	these	arguments	and	the	
politicisation	 of	 high	 energy	 costs	 during	 a	 time	 of	 austerity.	 Despite	 the	 stated	
economic	 rationality	 for	 these	 policy	 changes,	 they	 were	 directly	 contradicted	 by	
concurrent	decisions	to	 invest	 in	new	nuclear	energy	and	to	place	stricter	conditions	
on	the	development	of	relatively	low-cost	on-shore	wind	farms.	
Lastly,	in	chapter	5,	the	strategies	used	by	climate	policymakers	to	overcome	structural	
constraints	 were	 examined.	Macro	 level	 factors	 such	 as	 austerity	 and	 neoliberalism	
combined	with	institutional	and	situational	factors,	such	as	departmental	budget	cuts	
and	 national	 elections,	 created	 a	 challenging	 context	 for	 climate	 policymakers.	
Recourse	 to	 non-central	 government	 sites	 of	 authority	 offered	 opportunities	 for	
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developing	 policy	 and	 governance	 innovations,	 partially	 fulfilled	 the	 promises	 of	 the	
polycentric	 governance	 literature.	However,	 their	 ability	 to	 drive	 policy	 forward	was	
often	 limited	 by	 the	 underlying	 rationale	 of	 government	 engagement	 with	 such	
arrangements	 and	 the	 persistence	 of	 uneven	 power	 dynamics.	 Echoing	 previous	
research	on	the	(limited)	potential	of	non-state	governance,	this	chapter	offered	some	
guarded	optimism	about	the	greater	levels	of	authority,	ambition	and	activity	in	non-
central	government	sites	of	climate	governance	networks.	
Building	on	these	findings	the	rest	of	this	discussion	chapter	identifies,	and	elaborates	
on,	 some	 crosscutting	 themes	 that	 run	 throughout	 the	 thesis.	 In	 each	 case	 it	 states	
how	the	contributions	have	advanced	social	scientific	understanding	of	climate	change	
politics,	 policy	 and	 governance.	 Section	 6.2.	 addresses	 the	 inherent	 limitations	 of	
state-led	 transitions,	 particularly	 their	 tendency	 towards	 incrementalism	 and	 the	
difficulties	 of	 mainstreaming	 climate	 goals	 into	 the	 functioning	 of	 government.	 The	
theoretical	 implications	call	 for	a	critical	consideration	of	 the	role	of	 flagship	policies	
and	 institutions	 in	securing	 long-term	action,	particularly	emphasising	 the	need	 for	a	
better	understanding	of	actors’	 strategies	 for	 strengthening	or	 subverting	 them	over	
time	i.e.	through	discursive	practices.	Empirically,	the	findings	warn	against	the	use	of	
overly	 technical	 discourses	 and	 overly	 centralised	 climate	 policymaking,	 noting	 the	
need	 for	 significant	 changes	 to	 longstanding	 uneven	 power	 relations	 among	
governance	actors	in	the	UK.	
Section	 6.3.	 addresses	 the	way	 different	 interpretations	 of	 the	 future	 are	mobilised	
and	brought	into	contact	by	the	politics	of	climate	change,	exploring	the	way	different	
manifestations	of	agency	and	power	are	made	visible	in	the	practices	of	climate	policy	
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and	governance.	 In	 theoretical	 terms	this	highlights	 the	 importance	of	 the	disruptive	
potential	 of	overlapping	 social	 issues	 and	how	 they	 frame	 climate	 change	action	 i.e.	
affording	 more/less	 authority	 to	 different	 actors	 and	 initiatives.	 In	 practice,	 the	
increasing	ambiguity	of	the	UK	government’s	position,	and	 level	of	 influence,	creates	
uncertainty	that	needs	to	be	addressed.	Interestingly	it	also	creates	opportunities	for	
non-state	actors	to	steer	the	agenda.	Lastly,	section	6.4.	includes	some	methodological	
reflections	on	the	thesis	and	offers	recommendations	for	furthering	its	line	of	enquiry,	
before	the	final	conclusions	are	summarised	in	section	6.5.	
6.2. Two	 steps	 forwards,	 one	 step	 back:	why	 government	 can’t	 go	 it	
alone	
If	 we	 accept	 the	 assertion	 that	 a	 successful	 and	 timely	 low-carbon	 transition	 will	
require	nothing	short	of	a	transformation	of	social	and	material	life	(IPCC,	2014;	Kates	
et	 al.,	 2012;	O’Brien	 and	 Sygna,	 2013),	 then	 it	would	 seem	 inappropriate	 to	 assume	
that	 any	 single	 actor	 –	 even	 one	 as	 apparently	 authoritative	 and	 pervasive	 as	 the	
nation	state	–	could	be	solely	responsible	for	leading	such	a	change.	In	fact,	the	idea	of	
a	 single	 blueprint	 or	 roadmap	 for	 any	 actor(s)	 to	 navigate	 runs	 counter	 to	 the	
unpredictable	nature	of	transformational	change,	which	ultimately	defies	attempts	to	
operationally	define	it	(Lonsdale	et	al.,	2015).	
As	 chapter	 2	 illustrated,	much	 theorising	 and	prescribing	of	 sustainability	 transitions	
assumes	 that	 the	 complexity	 and	 contestability	 of	 large-scale	 social	 change	 can	 be	
intentionally	 ‘managed’.	 Reinforcing	 deep-seated	 modernist	 assumptions	 about	 the	
arrow	 of	 time	 and	 technological	 progress,	 the	 literature	 shows	 a	 tendency	 towards	
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historiography	when	looking	back	(e.g.	at	the	development	of	telecommunications	or	
modes	 of	 transport)	 and	 towards	 technological	 or	 ecological	 determinism	 when	
looking	forwards	(e.g.	at	the	promise	of	geo-engineering	or	the	limitations	imposed	by	
environmental	 planetary	 boundaries)	 (Bailey	 and	 Wilson,	 2009;	 Parsons	 and	 Nalau,	
2016).	 Throughout	 this	 thesis	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 more	 needs	 to	 be	 done	 to	
understand	and	engage	with	the	difficult	terrain	of	co-evolving	ideas,	power	relations	
and	 subjectivities	 that	 accompany	 such	 material	 changes.	 Its	 conclusions	 raise	
significant	 doubts	 about	 whether	 national	 governments	 can	 provide	 the	 most	
appropriate	conceptual	or	institutional	tools	for	such	an	undertaking.	
Even	when	low-carbon	norms	emerge	and	are	perceived	as	commanding	widespread	
political	and	public	appeal	(e.g.	sustainable	development,	clean	energy	transitions	and	
climate	 resilience),	 national	 political	 institutions	 often	 provide	 limited	 deliberative	
space	for	debating	the	multiple	interpretations	of	these	terms	and	their	consequences.	
Rather,	 they	 tend	 to	 jump	straight	 to	 the	 task	of	bringing	about	 their	 realisation	 i.e.	
putting	 the	 techno-scientific	 cart	 before	 the	 socio-political	 horse	 (Bevir,	 2010;	
Hiedanpää	and	Bromley,	2016).	Even	 if	 the	 ‘dominant’	 interpretation	of	 these	norms	
was	 accepted	 at	 face	 value,	wherever	 they	 imply	 fundamental	 change	 to	 the	 status	
quo	 then	 governments	 will	 face	 resistance	 from	 a	 range	 of	 actors	 with	 vested	
interests,	as	well	as	from	social	inertia	and	political	and	economic	pressures.	
Chapters	3	and	4	illustrated	the	negative	effects	of	all	of	these	factors	on	the	political	
meaning	 and	 policy	 outputs	 of	 climate	 change	 and	 renewable	 energy	 in	 the	 UK.	 In	
addition	 to	confirming	many	political	 scientists’	doubts	about	 radical	policymaking	 in	
general	 (Patashnik,	 2014;	 Pierson,	 2004),	 and	 in	 the	 UK	 in	 particular	 (Carter,	 2014;	
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Lockwood,	 2013),	 these	 chapters	 revealed	 the	 potential	 for	 consensus	 politics	 and	
flagship	policymaking	to	cover	up	for	a	lack	of	political	resonance	and	patchy	progress	
on	implementation.	There	is	a	precedent	for	governments	to	engage	in	such	symbolic	
politics	during	austere	times	or	when	long-term	political	issues	are	struggling	to	retain	
their	salience	(Bauer	and	Knill,	2012;	Middlemiss,	2016).	This	is	particularly	worrying	in	
the	 case	 of	 climate	 change	 because	 as	 the	 ‘policy	 gap’	 grows	 (CCC,	 2017),	 the	
greenhouse	 gas	 effect	 of	 carbon	 dioxide	 emissions	 intensifies	 and	 the	 requirements	
placed	on	future	decision	makers	to	act	becomes	ever	greater.		
This	tendency	towards	depolitcisation	was	further	compounded	by	an	overreliance	on	
economic	discourses	for	rationalising	climate	policies,	thereby	making	their	legitimacy	
dependent	on	a	perceived	cost-benefit	ratio	that	fluctuates	depending	on	the	priorities	
of	the	analyst	e.g.	by	applying	different	discount	rates	to	future	economic	value	(Spash	
and	Gattringer,	2016).	Not	only	does	such	economisation	make	 (climate	and	energy)	
politics	 seem	 opaque	 and	 technocratic	 (Kuzemko,	 2016;	 Willis,	 2017),	 it	 also	 puts	
policies	 at	 risk	 of	 being	 undermined	 by	 the	 side	 effects	 of	 financialisation	 and	 the	
pressures	 of	macroeconomic	 trends	 (Papandreou,	 2015;	Walker	 and	 Cooper,	 2011).	
This	phenomenon	is	certainly	not	unique	to	the	UK	or	to	climate	policy.	Economics	has	
become	the	bedrock	of	political	decision-making	 in	many	countries	and	sectors	 (Fine	
and	 Milonakis,	 2009;	 Sandel,	 2013),	 often	 making	 finance	 departments	 the	 most	
powerful	state	institutions,	as	was	the	case	with	the	UK	Treasury	to	the	detriment	of	
traditionally	non-financial	policy	areas	such	as	the	environment	(Bromley,	2006;	Russel	
and	Benson,	2014).		
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In	many	instances	this	economic	and	neoliberal	approach	to	governing	limits	the	role	
of	 the	 state	 to	 that	 of	 market	 facilitator/corrector,	 encouraging	 governments	 to	
deregulate	and	to	conceptualise	public	and	environmental	issues,	such	as	energy	and	
climate	change,	as	requiring	market	–	as	opposed	to	civic	or	moral	–	solutions.	As	the	
moral	 philosopher	 Michael	 Sandel	 (2013)	 has	 argued,	 this	 ‘market	 mimicking	
governance’	 may	 be	 fundamentally	 inappropriate	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 environment,	
effectively	 suppressing	non-economic	 framings	and	 solutions	 to	deeply	personal	 and	
ethical	issues.		
Although	 chiefly	 concerned	 with	 international	 politics	 and	 global	 governance	
arrangements,	 fundamental	 critiques	 of	 neoliberal	 forms	 of	 such	 market	
fundamentalism	point	out	that	nation	state	policies	are	shaped	–	indeed	bounded	–	by	
the	 structures	 of	 capitalism	 through	 which	 they	 operate,	 potentially	 limiting	 their	
ability	to	transform	society	towards	a	low-carbon	and	equitable	future	through	purely	
economic	means	 (Brand	 and	Wissen,	 2013;	Duit,	 2014;	Newell	 and	 Paterson,	 1998).	
This	was	clearly	visible	in	the	UK	case	study,	where	ideas	of	green-growth	and	a	low-
carbon	 economy	were	 rhetorically	 influential,	 but	 their	 specific	 policies	 (such	 as	 the	
Green	 Investment	 Bank,	 carbon	 taxes	 and	 renewable	 energy	 subsidies)	 fell	woefully	
short	 of	 expectations	 and	 effectively	 side-lined	 alternative	 rationales	 and	 policy	
instruments	(for	further	examples	of	this	in	the	UK	see:	Pearce,	2006).	
Chapter	5	investigated	some	of	these	structural	factors,	describing	the	negative	impact	
they	 had	 on	 policymakers’	 ability	 to	 pursue	 their	 goals	 through	 the	mechanisms	 of	
central	 government.	 The	 findings	 chimed	 with	 long-running	 observations	 about	 the	
way	 central	 political	 institutions	 in	 the	 UK	 retain	 veto	 powers	 and	 influence	 over	
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smaller	 departments	 even	 during	 periods	 of	 decentralisation	 and	 the	 much	 touted	
‘governance	turn’	(Davidson	and	Elstub,	2014;	Richards	and	Smith,	2002).		
It	also	resonated	with	previous	studies	of	climate	change	political	strategies,	noting	the	
constructive	 influence	 of:	 pushing	 for	 international	 agreements;	 highlighting	
independent	 progress	 reports;	 developing	 consensual	 policy	 options;	 and	mobilising	
multiple	 non-climate	 framings	 (Compston	 and	 Bailey,	 2008;	 Pralle,	 2009).	 Although	
many	 in	 the	climate	policy	community	 in	 the	UK	were	still	pursuing	 these	strategies,	
they	 also	 raised	 doubts	 about	 their	 long-term	 efficacy,	 especially	 as	 more	 difficult	
policy	decisions	began	to	loom	on	the	horizon.	Linking	this	back	to	the	wider	issue	of	
depoliticisation	 described	 above,	 the	 findings	 illustrate	 how	 climate	 change	 can	
become	 a	 consensual	 and	 populist	 issue	 within	 mainstream	 politics	 (e.g.	 flagship	
targets	 and	 leadership	 posturing),	 with	 very	 little	 government	 engagement	 in	
environmental	politics	or	democratic	deliberation	of	how	to	transform	a	socio-political	
status	quo	(Swyngedouw,	2010).		
Efforts	 to	 integrate	or	mainstream	climate	 goals	 into	 the	 functioning	of	 government	
have	struggled	in	the	UK	case.	This	was	largely	due	to	a	period	of	fiscal	constraint	and	
low	political	salience	for	climate	change,	meaning	most	departments	were	prioritising	
their	 core	 tasks	 and	 senior	 decision	 makers	 were	 not	 prioritising	 it.	 The	 limited	
mainstreaming	mechanisms	that	were	in	place,	such	as	mandatory	emissions	reporting	
on	 policy	 impact	 assessments,	 were	 eventually	 scrapped	 as	 part	 of	 the	 small	 state	
agenda.	Like	sustainable	development	and	ecological	modernisation	before	it,	climate	
change	mitigation	in	the	UK	highlighted	the	need	for,	but	lack	of,	effective	integrated	
policy	 responses	 to	 complex	 environmental	 problems,	 leaving	 policy	 integration	
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scholars	 with	 a	 feeling	 of	 déjà	 vu	 (Adelle	 and	 Russel,	 2013;	 Jordan	 and	 Lenschow,	
2010).	A	pertinent	example	of	 the	 lack	of	progress	 in	 this	 area	 is	 the	way	dedicated	
environment	and	climate	change	departments	(DEFRA	and	DECC	respectively)	suffered	
repeated	cuts	to	resources	and	were	unable	to	coordinate	effectively	with	each	other	
or	with	other	departments.	Whether	the	subsuming	of	DECC	into	the	new	department	
for	Business	 Energy	 and	 Industrial	 Strategy	 (BEIS)	will	 advance	or	hinder	 the	 climate	
mainstreaming	agenda	remains	to	be	seen.	
These	findings	raise	fundamental	questions	about	the	‘institutional	fit’	or	‘institutional	
coherence’	 of	 central	 governments	 for	 the	 task	 of	 governing	 climate	 transitions	 in	
industrialised	 capitalist	 societies	 (Bromley,	 2006;	 Duit	 et	 al.,	 2016;	 Paavola	 et	 al.,	
2009).	 Despite	 promising	 examples	 of	 environmental	 and	 climate	 leadership	 from	
some	states	(Duit	et	al.,	2016;	Liefferink	and	Wurzel,	2016;	Wurzel	and	Connelly,	2010;	
Eckersley,	2004;	 Jänicke,	2005)	–	 including	the	UK’s	own	Climate	Change	Act	–	 these	
breakthroughs	remain	susceptible	to	rollback.	This	thesis	found	very	little	evidence	to	
suggest	 that	 the	 UK,	 and	 potentially	 other	 centralised	 liberal	 democracies,	 can	
coordinate	 their	various	 factions	and	processes	 to	 fully	 integrate	climate	goals,	or	 to	
resist	state	retrenchment,	policy	dismantling	and	the	power	of	vested	interests.	These	
findings	 undermine	 the	 idea	 of	 an	 ‘ensuring	 state’	 that	 is	 able	 to	 provide	 an	
authoritative	guarantee	of	action	on	climate	change	(Giddens,	2009)	and	add	empirical	
weight	 to	 rising	 concerns	 about	 a	 potential	 ‘glass	 ceiling’	 of	 state-based	 climate	
governance	in	modern	democracies	(Bäckstrand	and	Kronsell,	2015).	
Taken	 together,	 these	 findings	 contribute	 significantly	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	
limitations	 to	 state-driven	 climate	 transitions.	 For	 political	 scientists	 concerned	with	
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the	 functioning	 of	 democratic	 political	 systems	 at	 a	 time	 of	 political	 disengagement	
and	populism,	we	can	see	the	danger	of	a	growing	disconnect	between	the	high-level	
rhetoric	of	climate	leadership	and	personal	engagement	at	the	individual	level	among	
politicians	and	the	public	alike.	
Ultimately	 this	 is	 a	 failure	 of	 political	 philosophy	 to	 connect	 the	 complicated	
materiality	 of	 the	 global	 climate	 to	 everyday	 social	 realities.	 Adding	 to	 an	 existing	
broad	level	political	economy	critique	of	the	unsustainability	of	capitalist	systems,	the	
case	study	showed	how	limiting	a	commitment	to	market-based	governance	could	be	
in	 specific	 policy	 areas.	 Lastly,	 previously	 identified	 strategies	 for	 advancing	 climate	
policy	 through	 consensus	 building	 and	mainstreaming	 have	 been	 stress	 tested,	 and	
found	wanting.	 The	 climate	 policy	 community	 and	 researchers	will	 need	 to	 develop	
additional	 strategies	 to	 navigate	 these	 turbulent	 political-economic	 times	 and	 to	
overcome	entrenched	institutional	barriers	within	government.	
6.2.1. Implications	for	theory	and	practice	
6.2.1.1. Political	science	and	policy	studies	
• The	existence	of	flagship	climate	policies	aids,	but	does	not	guarantee,	long-
term	 action.	 Previously	 identified	 barriers	 such	 as	 climate	 science	 scepticism	
and	 zero-sum	 international	 negotiations	 have	 waned,	 and	 the	 political	
battleground	has	 shifted	 from	 the	 scale	 of	 emissions	 reductions	 to	 how	 they	
are	 to	 be	 distributed	 within	 countries	 and	 sectors.	 For	 political	 science	 and	
policy	 studies,	 the	 normative	 task	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 growing	
‘policy	 gap’	 between	 targets	 and	 emissions	 accounted	 for	 (CCC,	 2017)	 e.g.	
political	 and	 institutional	 impediments,	 policy	 design	 faults,	 or	 public	
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acceptability.	As	the	costs	and	benefits	of	climate	policies	become	increasingly	
politicised,	there	needs	to	be	more	analyses	of	the	political	economy	of	climate	
change	 that	 take	 account	 of	 how	 these	 costs	 and	 benefits	 are	 discursively	
constructed.	Clearly,	as	this	thesis	has	reiterated,	no	stage	of	the	policy	process	
is	entirely	 (economically)	 rational	–	or	 free	 from	politics	and	power	–	despite	
continued	attempts	to	make	policymaking	appear	as	such.	
• Institutions	 remain	 powerful	 explanatory	 factors,	 but	 actors’	 strategic	
engagement	 with	 these	 structures	 needs	 to	 be	 better	 understood.	 Many	
previously	effective	 strategies	were	 still	present	and	being	pursued	 in	 the	UK	
case,	 but	 with	 mixed	 results.	 New	 international	 agreements	 and	 national	
targets	 were	 being	 set	 but	 consensual	 politics	 failed	 to	 overcome	
institutionalised	 divisions	 within	 government.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 legal-
institutional-governance	frameworks	of	climate	policies	need	to	be	understood	
de	 jour,	 i.e.	 through	 the	 way	 they	 are	 brought	 to	 life	 by	 actors’	 strategic	
interplay.	 Institutionalist	 frameworks	 and	 theories	 of	 the	 state	 could	 help	
explain	 how	 these	 strategies	 are	 bounded	 by	 established	 structures.	 More	
agency-oriented	 theories	 (e.g.	 social	 fields,	 and	 policy	 implementation	 and	
governance	studies)	would	provide	insights	into	the	efficacy	of	strategic	actions	
such	as	preparing	 the	ground	 for	 radical	 policies	 and	amplifying/undermining	
their	feedback	effects.	In	practice,	the	strategic	and	reflexive	engagement	with	
institutions	 is	 an	 ambivalent	 part	 of	 politics,	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 advance	
climate	policies	as	well	as	undermine	them.	The	example	given	in	this	thesis	of	
relocating	 responsibility	 for	 climate	 change	 from	one	 department	 to	 another	
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illustrates	this	nicely;	showing	how	it	initially	catalysed	action	in	2008	and	then	
potentially	paralysed	it	in	2016.	
6.2.1.2. International	and	national	contexts	
• Political	 discourses	 need	 to	 avoid	 overly	 technical	 and	 economic	 framings.	
More	 should	 be	 done	 to	 connect	 with	 the	 debates	 and	 value	 pluralism	 of	
contested	norms	such	as	transformation	and	resilience.	Similarly	efforts	should	
be	 made	 to	 increase	 the	 socio-political	 salience	 of	 climate	 change	 by	
highlighting	its	many	crossovers	with	contemporaneous	social	issues.	This	does	
not	 mean	 simply	 ‘reframing’	 climate	 change	 as	 something	 else,	 but	 rather	
opening	up	the	terms	of	the	debate	to	include	more	voices	in	order	to	explicitly	
address	 the	 tensions	 between	 certain	 interests	 and	 issues.	 Arguably	 this	
already	 takes	place	at	 the	 international	 level	 to	 some	extent.	At	 the	national	
level,	countries	with	powerful	veto-wielding	finance	ministries	and	single-party	
executives	would	do	well	to	avoid	narrow	or	overly	technical	framings.	
• National	 governments	 should	 seek	 to	 diversify	 their	 policymaking	 and	
governance	 networks.	 Engaging	 with	 other	 sites	 of	 authority	 can	 mobilise	
additional	 resources	 and	 influence	 during	 constrained	 times	 and	 offers	
opportunities	for	policy	 learning.	 It	also	encourages	voluntary	action	from	the	
private	and	civic	sectors.	However,	this	comes	with	caveats.	Primarily,	echoing	
earlier	 criticisms	 of	 the	 governance	 turn,	 this	 strategy	 requires	 a	 sharing	 of	
power	and	resources,	not	 just	 responsibilities.	Further,	 it	may	add	complexity	
and	 create	 more	 opportunities	 for	 checks	 and	 balances	 from	 new	 actors	 or	
rules,	which	can	secure	policy	feedback	but	also	slow	down	the	pace	of	change.	
Countries	with	federal	systems	and	a	history	of	decentralised	governance	may	
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be	 in	 a	 stronger	 position	 to	 make	 the	 most	 of	 these	 opportunities,	 at	 least	
within	the	context	of	government	institutions.	
6.2.1.3. UK	climate	policy	community	
• The	subsuming	of	climate	policy	into	BEIS	poses	a	significant	challenge.	It	has	
broken	 a	 previously	 strong	 institutional	 alliance	 between	 a	 government	
department	and	the	CCC,	and	sends	a	fairly	unequivocal	message	to	the	public	
about	 the	 government’s	 prioritisation	 of	 climate	 change	 i.e.	 it	 is	 now	 a	
background	 consideration	when	making	decisions	 about	energy	and	 industry.	
Although	 the	 individuals	 who	 have	 been	 appointed	 to	 climate	 change	 posts	
within	 the	department	have	 strong	 track	 records,	 they	 face	 a	difficult	 task	 in	
securing	 climate-specific	 policy	 development	 let	 alone	 integrating	 climate	
considerations	 into	 their	 colleagues’	 decision	 making	 (within	 BEIS	 as	 well	 as	
other	 departments).	 This	 raises	 serious	 questions	 about	 how	 to	 effectively	
‘mainstream’	climate	goals	into	government.	
• Non-executive	government	bodies,	such	as	the	CCC	and	Parliamentary	Select	
Committees,	 may	 become	 more	 important.	 Throughout	 this	 thesis	 the	 CCC	
was	 portrayed	 as	 a	 positive	 influence,	 whose	 reports	 and	 analyses	 were	
respected	 by	 government	 officials.	 However,	 despite	 their	 mandate	 not	 to	
make	specific	policy	recommendations,	they	will	need	to	increase	the	salience	
and	 impact	 of	 their	 progress	 reports	 to	 Parliament,	 as	well	 as	 build	 stronger	
links	with	non-climate	related	departments.	This	is	particularly	as	some	of	the	
parameters	 and	 potential	 contradictions	 within	 BEIS’	 remit	 begin	 to	 be	
formalised	in	policies	(e.g.	the	upcoming	Industrial	Strategy	and	Clean	Growth	
Strategy).	 The	 Parliamentary	 Select	 Committee	 responsible	 for	 scrutinising	
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climate	 and	 energy	 outputs	 provides	 an	 additional	 institutional	 space	 for	
deliberating	policy	pathways,	but	again,	they	are	non-executive	bodies	and	so	
their	influence	is	limited.	
6.3. Climate	 governance:	 the	 challenge	 of	 exercising	 agency	 with	
limited	authority	
Climate	 change,	 as	 a	 public	 policy	 and	 governance	 issue,	 embodies	 many	
contemporary	 debates	 about	 the	 changing	 role	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 need	 for	 new	
forms	 of	 governance	 for	 managing	 environmental	 change.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 these	
debates	 are	 two	 prominent,	 and	 deeply	 political,	 themes:	 authority	 and	 agency.	
Questions	 of	 authority	 extend	 beyond	who	 has	 the	 power	 and	 mandate	 to	 act,	 to	
include	how	this	power	is	 legitimised	and	exercised.	Questions	of	agency	refer	to	the	
strategic	actions	of	agents	and	their	dualism	with	pervasive	social	structures.		
Climate	change	has	been	described	as	many	things	e.g.	a	wicked	problem	(Urry,	2016),	
an	 amplifier	 of	 risk	 and	 existing	 social	 issues	 (Beck,	 2010),	 an	 economic	 opportunity	
(Stern,	 2007)	 and	 a	 threat	 to	 democracy	 (Lovelock,	 2009).	 Common	 to	 each	 is	 the	
necessary	 involvement	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 actors	 because,	 ultimately,	 its	 potential	
impacts	 will	 affect	 everyone	 and	 their	 successful	 mitigation	 depends	 on	 everyone.	
Thus,	 the	 simple	 but	 significant	 fact	 that	 climate	 change	 means	 different	 things	 to	
different	people	(Hulme,	2010)	adds	a	layer	of	interpretivist	complexity	to	the	already	
contested	 process	 of	 politically	 reconfiguring	 the	 state	 in	 an	 era	 of	 multi-actor	
governance.		
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In	 chapter	 2,	 it	was	 argued	 that	 already	powerful	 actors	 have	 sought	 to	 retain	 their	
authority	and	influence	and	that	this	has	been	made	possible	by	the	predominance	of	
a	 complex	 systems	 epistemology	 that	 allows	 for	 elitism.	 At	 its	most	 anti-democratic	
this	 discourse	 invokes	 wartime	 analogies	 and	 apocalyptic	 forecasts	 to	 legitimise	
authoritarian	 leadership	 (typically	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 nation	 state	 and	 planned	
economies)	 (Gilley,	2012;	Lovelock,	2009;	Žižek,	2011).	 In	 its	more	moderate	 form,	 it	
has	 placed	 experts	 of	 climate	 science,	 economics	 and	 technology	 at	 the	 centre	 of	
knowledge	creation	and	decision-making	processes.	Insights	from	chapters	3	and	4	in	
this	thesis,	and	elsewhere	in	the	literature	(Boykoff	et	al.,	2015)	have	shown	that	this	
has	not	always	had	a	positive	effect	on	public	support	and	can	actually	undermine	a	
political	mandate	for	action.	This	is	linked	to	a	distrust	of	experts	and	scepticism	about	
the	feasibility	and	desirability	of	evidence-based	policy	(for	a	discussion	see:	Pawson,	
2006),	which	 has	 been	 exacerbated	 by	 a	 rise	 of	 populist	 discourses	 and	 ‘post-truth’	
politics	(Calcutt,	2016;	Sismondo,	2017).	
The	 impact	 of	 information	 technology	 developments	 on	 political	 (especially	 state-
based)	authority	has	been	well	summarised	by	Hajer	(2009).	In	the	context	of	climate	
change,	 it	has	come	to	be	accepted	by	social	 theorists	 (Urry,	2016),	communications	
experts	 (Hine	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 and	 policymakers	 (interviewed	 in	 chapter	 5),	 that	
government	does	not	have	a	monopoly	over	shaping	the	climate	change	message	or	
defining	a	transition	to	a	low-carbon	future.	But,	as	illustrated	throughout	this	thesis,	it	
is	one	thing	to	acknowledge	multiple	interpretations,	but	it	is	another	thing	entirely	to	
create	sufficient	social	and	political	space	for	this	pluralism	to	play	out	(Stirling,	2011).	
In	fact,	 it	 is	clear	that	mainstream	politics	and	the	policymaking	process	–	even	 in	 its	
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short	 lived	 outward	 facing	 initatives	 such	 as	 ‘big	 society’	 and	 ‘open	 policymaking’	 –	
appears	 to	 adopt	 a	 discourse	 of	 shared	 authority	 (and	 responsibility)	 without	
facilitating	a	significant	increase	in	agency	(and	influence)	for	other	actors	in	practice.	
Theorists	 of	 deliberative	 democracy	 and	 communicative	 discourse	 argue	 that	 the	
involvement	of	multiple	and	diverse	actors	can	increase	the	efficacy,	efficiency,	equity	
and	 acceptability	 of	 public	 policies	 (Dryzek,	 2010;	 Habermas	 et	 al.,	 1990;	 Schmidt,	
2010).	 These	 claims	have	been	discussed	extensively	with	 regards	 to	 climate	 change	
and	 energy	 transitions,	 noting	 the	 importance	 of	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 relative	
power	imbalances	between	different	actors	and	ideas	(Bäckstrand,	2010;	Sovacool	and	
Watts,	2009;	Dryzek	and	Lo,	2014;	Stirling,	2015;	Wittmayer	et	al.,	2016).	
To	 test	 these	 theories	 empirically,	 this	 thesis	 applied	 (for	 the	 first	 time)	 recent	
conceptual	advances	in	discursive	institutionalism	(see	Carstensen	and	Schmidt,	2016).	
It	 elucidated	 the	 functioning	 of	 different	 types	 of	 ideational	 power,	 showing	 exactly	
which	ideas	mattered	and	how	policymakers	discussed	and	rationalised	their	decisions.	
This	 contribution	 has	 particular	 resonance	 for	 environmental	 issues	 such	 as	 climate	
change,	which	require	a	form	of	‘scalar	politics’	capable	of	acknowledging	the	material	
reality	of	greenhouse	gas	emissions	–	be	they	at	individual	or	global	levels	–	as	well	as	
the	 fluid	 interplay	 of	 ideas	 and	 discourses	 within	 broad	 networks	 of	 actors	 across	
space	and	time	(MacKinnon,	2010).	
Contrary	to	this,	the	UK	case	exhibited	silo	thinking	within	government	that	hindered	
cross-departmental/sectorial	 collaboration,	 leading	 to	 unconvincing	 messages	 and	
contradictory	 policy	 decisions	 that	 were	 drowned	 out	 by	 negative	 media	 framings.	
Furthermore,	 in	the	style	of	what	Flyvbjerg	(1998)	has	called	‘democracy	in	practice’,	
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chapter	 4	 showed	 how	 these	 entrenched	 ways	 of	 thinking	 (e.g.	 about	 energy	
infrastructure)	constitute	a	powerful	form	of	‘rationality’,	which	produced	ideologically	
motivated	 decisions	 and	 was	 the	 driving	 force	 behind	 policy	 rollback	 and	 slow	
implementation	in	the	energy	sector.	Without	this	sort	of	keen	attention	to	the	power	
of	 ideas,	and	the	discursive	practices	of	decision	makers	that	bring	their	assumptions	
to	 life,	 it	 will	 be	 difficult	 for	 climate	 policy	 researchers	 and	 stakeholders	 to	 identify	
underlying	 lines	 of	 contention	 and	 to	 develop	 effective	 strategies	 for	 influencing	
policy.	
Having	criticised	some	of	 the	 literature	on	multi-actor	environmental	governance	 for	
its	 lack	 of	 attention	 to	 politics	 and	 power	 in	 chapter	 2,	 the	 potential	 for	 non-state	
innovation	and	bottom-up	or	hybrid	forms	of	governance	was	re-examined	in	chapter	
5.	This	was	prompted	by	 the	UK	Government’s	 self-acknowledged	 limitations	and	 its	
various	strategies	to	devolve	responsibilities	and	encourage	a	multi-sector	response	to	
climate	change.	The	broad	conclusion	here	was	that	 largely	non-state	 initiatives	such	
as	transnational	networks	and	community	projects	were	plentiful	and	ambitious,	but	–	
as	is	often	noted	in	the	sustainability	transitions	literature	–	faced	significant	barriers	
to	 up-scaling	 and	 realising	 their	 transformational	 aspirations	 (Geels,	 2014).	 A	 similar	
story	 emerged	 from	 hybrid	 examples	 involving	 the	 state	 as	 a	 facilitator	 e.g.	 where	
powers	 were	 devolved	 without	 additional	 resources	 and	 when	 public-private	
partnerships	 and	 state-civic	 collaborations	 were	 limited	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 government	
funding	 or	 by	 the	 imposition	 of	 certain	 rationalities	 e.g.	 liberalism	 and	 economic	
growth.	
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So,	 the	 findings	 in	 this	 thesis	 sound	 a	 word	 of	 caution.	 Having	 found	 numerous	
examples	 of	 multi-actor	 climate	 policy	 and	 governance,	 as	 well	 as	 an	 ideological	
commitment	 within	 government	 to	 this	 style	 of	 governing,	 the	 critical	 question	 of	
whether	 this	 will	 lead	 to	 a	 more	 reliable	 and	 rapid	 climate	 transition	 has	 only	 just	
begun	to	be	answered.	Chapters	3,	4	and	5	showed	how	austerity	politics	and	funding	
cuts	 have	 hindered	 progress	 in	 all	 sectors	 of	 society,	 especially	 where	 governance	
arrangements	were	reliant	on	state	funding	or	institutions.	More	fundamentally,	these	
findings	also	raise	concerns	about	the	rationale	for	state	endorsement	of	multi-actor	
climate	 governance	 and	 its	 influence	 on	 other	 actors’	 agency,	 thereby	 directly	
challenging	the	presumed	benevolence	of	an	‘enabling/ensuring	state’.		
Governmentality	scholars	would	see	this	as	confirmation	of	the	state’s	expansion	into	
more	prosaic	forms	of	‘conducting	conduct’	i.e.	an	increase,	rather	than	reduction,	in	
state	authority	but	through	more	coercive	and	‘hands-off’	means	(Aiken,	2016;	Dean,	
2010).	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 precisely	when	 governments	 officially	 endorse	 them	 as	 solutions	
that	 these	 networked	 forms	 of	 governance	 should	 be	 most	 wary	 of	 inadvertently	
reinforcing	the	status	quo;	ultimately	their	capacity	to	transform	remains	constrained	
by	 ever-present	 power	 imbalances	 and	 the	 continued	 managerialism	 of	 the	 state’s	
involvement	 (Davies,	 2011;	 Swyngedouw,	 2013).	 Thus,	 a	 genuinely	 radical	 politics	 of	
climate	change	and	low-carbon	transformation	will	have	to	occur	in	governance	spaces	
that	 lie	 outside	 of	 the	 purview	 of	 these	 discursive	 and	 material	 constraints	 (see:	
MacKinnon,	2010;	Wilson	and	Swyngedouw,	2014).	
Taken	 together,	 these	 findings	 return	 us	 to	 a	 number	 of	 previously	 voiced	 concerns	
about	the	governance	turn,	but	in	a	new	context	and	with	added	depth.	To	begin,	the	
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authority	and	legitimacy	of	climate	policies	based	solely	on	opaque	expert	evidence	is	
not	 only	 objectionable	 on	 democratic	 grounds	 but	 it	 is	 being	 eroded	 by	 a	 wave	 of	
populism	 and	 selective	 use	 of	 evidence	 in	 an	 era	 of	 ‘post-truth	 policymaking’	
(Sismondo,	2017).	The	UK	Government	has	taken	steps	to	open	policymaking	to	more	
voices	and	transparency	but	familiar	criticisms	of	token	participation	and	the	hypocrisy	
of	redistributing	responsibility	but	not	capacity	are	still	applicable.	These	examples	of	
governance	 innovation	 facing	 practical	 barriers	 will	 be	 of	 interest	 to	 deliberative	
democracy	 theorists	 and	 transitions	 scholars	 (e.g.	 Bäckstrand,	 2010;	 Bulkeley	 and	
Castán	Broto,	2013;	Dryzek,	2010).	Similarly,	 responding	to	calls	 for	empirical	studies	
from	 the	polycentric	governance	 literature	 (Jordan,	et	al.,	 2016),	 this	 thesis	provides	
some	limited	evidence	of	added	value	but	also	some	evidence	of	these	initiatives	being	
instrumentalised	and	co-opted	by	the	state.	
6.3.1. Implications	for	theory	and	practice	
6.3.1.1. Climate	governance	
• Overlaps	 between	 climate	 change	 and	 other	 social	 issues	 bring	 actors	
together	 in	a	disruptive	way.	This	 is	particularly	apparent	 in	communications	
and	 media	 discourses	 about	 climate	 change,	 wherein	 no	 single	 voice	 or	
message	 prevails	 and	 climate	 science	 and	 policy	 are	 continually	 being	
interpreted	 from	 different	 perspectives.	 Whilst	 this	 encourages	 healthy	
critique,	it	may	also	stall	progress	by	undermining	public	support	and	provoking	
resistance	from	vested	interests	and	populists.	Perhaps	more	significantly,	the	
space	 for	 deliberation	 between	 competing	 interests	 and	 governance	 actors	
appears	to	be	limited	e.g.	because	of	silo	thinking	within	different	 institutions	
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and	 governance	 networks.	 Thus,	 more	 needs	 to	 be	 done	 to	 theorise	 and	
address	 the	 power	 relations	 that	 are	 embedded	 in	 climate	 policy	 and	
governance	discourses.	
• The	framing	of	climate	change	affects	the	level	of	authority	and	influence	of	
different	 governance	 actors.	As	was	 the	 case	within	 government,	 prominent	
hybrid	 and	 non-state	 forms	 of	 governance	 still	 focus	 on	 economics	 and	
technology.	Market-based	forms	of	governance	and	those	that	pilot	innovative	
techno-fixes	 enjoy	 the	 most	 authority;	 socially	 and	 materially	 construed.	
Similarly,	despite	efforts	 to	diffuse	 responsibility	away	 from	the	centre	of	 the	
state,	 there	 is	 a	 persistent	 view	 that	 national	 governments	 hold	 unique	
authority	over	certain	levers	for	change,	yet	they	remain	reluctant	(or	unable)	
to	 act.	 Overall,	 the	 general	 trend	 of	 authority	 and	 agency	 within	 climate	
governance	 favours	 technical	 experts	 and	 elite	 levels	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
empowering	social	movements	and	localised	perspectives.	
• Governance	networks	can	put	pressure	on	the	state,	or	circumvent	it	entirely.	
By	drawing	on	a	wide	range	of	sources,	for	knowledge	and	funding,	governance	
networks	 can	 shield	 themselves	 from	 the	 turbulence	 of	 state-based	 politics.	
They	 can	 also	 put	 pressure	 on	 governments	 and	 other	 sectors	 of	 society	 by	
strengthening	 international	agreements,	piloting	 innovations	and	encouraging	
policy	 diffusion.	 However,	 their	 level	 of	 influence	 appears	 to	 be	 confined	 to	
low-carbon	 sectors,	 with	 breakthroughs	 to	 other	 areas	 requiring	 significant	
political	 and	 policy	 support	 that	 is	 hard	 to	 come	 by.	 Thus,	 whether	 climate	
governance	networks	represent	a	true	redistribution	of	authority	and	agency	or	
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simply	a	contemporary	manifestation	of	 interest	group-based	politics	remains	
unclear.	
6.3.1.2. UK	climate	policy	community	
• Thought	 leaders	 have	 an	 opportunity	 to	 work	 with	 government.	 In	
recognition	of	 their	 inability	 to	control	messages	and	discourse	about	climate	
change,	with	 regards	 to	 policy	 and	beyond,	 government	 actors	 are	 seeking	 a	
more	 collaborative	 engagement	 with	 different	 ‘thought	 leaders’.	 Individuals	
and	organisations	 from	different	 sectors	of	 society	 thus	have	 the	opportunity	
to	make	 government	 discourse	 about	 climate	 change	more	 socially	 relevant.	
Yet,	 as	 is	 so	often	 the	case,	 the	 scope	 for	 influence	will	 likely	be	curtailed	by	
overriding	governmental	imperatives	such	as	securing	support	for	certain	policy	
decisions	 i.e.	 treating	 publics	 as	 recipients	 rather	 than	 architects	 of	 policy	
justifications.	 Similarly,	 the	 inclusiveness	 of	 such	 ‘elite	 visioning’	 (to	 use	 a	
transitions	 governance	 term)	 can	 always	 be	 questioned.	 Other	 deliberative	
spaces	and	practices	need	to	be	developed	if	the	climate	policy	and	governance	
community	 are	 to	 connect	 meaningfully	 with	 disengaged	 parts	 of	 society	
whose	 voices	 are	 deafeningly	 silent	 in	 conversations	 about	 low-carbon	
transitions.	 Ultimately,	 local	 initiatives	 and	 community-based	 governance	
actors	can	certainly	use	the	multi-actor	governance	agenda	to	gain	visibility	and	
authority,	but	they	will	need	to	be	wary	of	being	co-opted	or	instrumentalised.	
• The	 UK’s	 leadership	 position	 within	 climate	 governance	 networks	 is	
uncertain.	 Many	 transnational	 governance	 networks,	 such	 as	 C40	 and	 the	
Climate	 Group,	 have	 their	 headquarters	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 actively	 leverage	 the	
UK’s	 global	 position	 as	 a	 climate	 leader.	 Public	 private	 partnerships	 may	
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continue	to	be	effective	and	the	style	of	governing	in	the	UK	remains	open	to	
hybrid,	private	and	civic	forms.	However,	as	the	UK	negotiates	its	exit	from	the	
EU,	and	its	position	as	a	leader	within	the	UNFCCC	becomes	less	important	(as	
a	 result	 of	 the	 process	 becoming	more	 voluntary),	 this	 situation	 looks	 set	 to	
change.	Non-state	actors	may	be	able	to	draw	on	their	experience	of	engaging	
with	other,	more	 reluctant,	governments	 to	 fight	any	 rollback.	But,	 the	many	
uncertainties	 this	 brings,	 and	 the	 increasingly	 hostile	 political	 and	 economic	
context	 in	the	UK,	may	encourage	global	climate	governance	pioneers	to	 look	
elsewhere.	
6.4. Reflections,	limitations	and	further	research	
6.4.1. Research	design	
Recurring	 critiques	 of	 normativity	 and	 political	 naivety	 aimed	 at	 the	 sustainability	
transitions	literature	led	to	calls	for	more	work	on	the	social	and	political	dimensions	
of	 these	 theories	 and	 frameworks	 (Avelino	 and	 Rotmans,	 2009;	 Jørgensen,	 2012;	
Lawhon	 and	 Murphy,	 2012;	 Markard	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Meadowcroft,	 2011;	 Scrase	 and	
Smith,	2009;	Smith	and	Stirling,	2010).	A	 single	 case	design	was	adopted	 in	order	 to	
theoretically	and	empirically	engage	with	some	of	these	challenges	in	detail;	taking	the	
recent	 politics	 of	 climate	 change	 in	 the	UK	 as	 an	 example	of	 a	 ‘turbulent	 transition’	
towards	 a	 low-carbon	 future.	 The	 four	 main	 research	 questions	 underpinning	 the	
thesis	 were	 based	 on	 optimism	 about	 the	 analytical	 edge	 offered	 by	 social	 theory	
concepts,	 and	 scepticism	 about	 the	 durability	 of	 the	 UK’s	 climate	 leadership	
positioning.	
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Chapter	 2	 set	 out	 some	 for	 the	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 assumptions	 that	
underpinned	the	research	design	and	analytical	work	of	the	thesis.	Chief	among	them	
was	the	adoption	of	a	relational	ontology,	rejecting	the	functionalism	of	systems-based	
approaches	in	favour	of	a	view	of	social	phenomena	as	co-constituting	and	historically	
contingent	 (DeLanda,	2006;	Latour,	2005).	Ultimately	 the	emphasis	of	 the	thesis	was	
on	the	social	and	political	processes	of	climate	policy	and	governance,	rather	than	their	
technical	or	environmental	outcomes,	albeit	with	an	acknowledgement	that	 in	reality	
they	are	co-evolving.	
Chapters	3	 to	5	mobilised	a	number	of	different	 social	 science	 theories	about	 ideas,	
institutions	and	policymaking,	using	multiple	analytical	 frameworks	 to	explain	 recent	
events	in	the	UK.	Common	to	each	was	a	dialectical	understanding	of	social	structures	
and	agency,	in	which	the	actions	of	individuals	or	groups	are	said	to	be	influenced	by,	
and	 in	 turn	 exert	 their	 own	 influence	 upon,	 the	 durable	 structures	 of	 social	 life	
(Giddens,	 1984).	 However,	 each	 framework	 emphasised	 different	 aspects	 of	 this	
dialectic	 and	 therefore	 produced	different,	 but	 complementary,	 insights.	 The	 shared	
assumptions,	 and	 recurring	 themes	 of	 power,	 agency	 and	 authority,	meant	 that	 the	
thesis	as	a	whole	was	able	to	draw	together	a	final	set	of	contributions	that	were	more	
than	 just	 a	 restating	 of	 its	 constituent	 parts	 i.e.	 two	 cross-cutting	 research	
contributions	and	agendas	were	elaborated.	
Chapters	3	and	4	deployed	frameworks	that	addressed	ideational	forms	of	power	and	
discursive	 practices.	 Developing	 the	 link	 between	 Carstensen’s	 three	 types	 of	
ideational	 power	 and	 Schmidt’s	 Discursive	 Institutionalism	 was	 chapter	 3’s	 main	
theoretical	 contribution	 (Carstensen	 and	 Schmidt,	 2016).	 Chapter	 4	 built	 on	 these	
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insights,	 connecting	 to	 specific	 climate	 and	 energy	 policy	 outputs,	 using	 critical	
discourse	 analysis	 to	 illustrate	 the	 influence	 of	 economic	 framings	 and	 arguments.	
Contrary	 to	 the	 communicative	 emphasis	 of	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 this	 type	 of	
discourse	analysis	 focused	on	the	boundaries	of	what	was	thinkable	and	how	certain	
frames	 defined	 this.	 Moving	 away	 from	 the	 interpretivist	 emphasis	 on	 discourse,	
chapter	 5	 adopted	 a	 more	 structuralist	 approach	 to	 identify	 the	 specific	 factors	
constraining	 and	 enabling	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 UK	 climate	 policy	 community.	 Lastly,	
although	not	exactly	a	theoretical	or	analytical	framework,	the	concepts	and	norms	of	
polycentric	 governance	 offered	 a	 coherent	 set	 of	 evaluation	 criteria,	 yielding	 very	
specific	findings	about	the	distribution	of	agency	within	a	given	policy	area.	
The	 use	 of	 a	 single	 case	 research	 design	 has	 advantages	 and	 limitations	 (Flyvbjerg,	
2006;	Yin,	2009).	In	this	instance,	the	decision	to	focus	on	one	country	was	justified	by	
virtue	 of	 the	 research	 questions.	 Tracking	 the	 interplay	 between	 specific	 ideas,	
institutions	 and	 individuals	 required	 a	 significant	 depth	 of	 qualitative	 data	 and	
timespan.	 It	would	have	been	difficult	 to	 achieve	 the	 same	 level	 of	 detail	 had	 there	
been	more	than	one	country	to	analyse.	Despite	the	lack	of	a	directly	comparative	case	
to	 test	 the	 external	 validity	 of	 the	 findings,	 the	 conclusions	 outlined	 above	may	 be	
present	in	other	countries	and	policy	areas	(see	further	research	questions	below).		
Due	to	a	greater	emphasis	on	interpreted	social	processes,	rather	than	verifiable	policy	
outputs	and	outcomes,	 the	 findings	offer	more	 in	 the	way	of	 inductive	 insights	 than	
deductive-nomological	 truths	 (Mahoney,	 2012).	 Thus,	 the	 methodological	
underpinning	 for	 the	 contributions	 came	 from	 the	 richness	 of	 the	 data,	 and	 the	
contextualised	analysis	of	the	UK	case	over	time.	This	allowed	for	many	causal	process	
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observations	 to	 be	made,	multiple	 analytical	 frameworks	 to	 be	 used,	 and	 produced	
contributions	 to	 knowledge	 through	 ‘the	 force	of	 example’	 (Brady	and	Collier,	 2010;	
Flyvbjerg,	2006).	
A	significant	contribution	was	to	illuminate	and	analyse	the	otherwise	undocumented	
aspects	 of	 political	 process	 and	 decision	 making	 e.g.	 individuals	 beliefs,	 values	 and	
perceptions	(Beamer,	2002;	Yanow,	2000).	The	potential	bias	of	these	views	was	partly	
controlled	 for	 by	 ensuring	 anonymity	 for	 participants,	 and	 also	 by	 ensuring	 any	
arguments	 that	 depended	 strongly	 on	 these	 accounts	 (and	 not	 the	 researcher’s	
analysis)	 were	 contextualised	 with	 as	 much	 information	 as	 was	 practicable	 without	
revealing	 the	 sources’	 identity.	 The	 stakeholder	 workshops	 were	 a	 vital	 source	 of	
knowledge	co-production,	yielding	novel	insights	for	participants	and	researchers	alike	
(Martin,	 2010).	 To	 retain	 a	 critical	 distance	 they	 were	 analysed	 for	 the	 discursive	
practices	they	revealed,	more	so	than	for	their	descriptive	content.		
Throughout	 the	 thesis,	 documentary	 and	 transcript	 data	 analysis	 relied	 on	 a	 hybrid	
form	of	 thematic	analysis,	 incorporating	 inductive	data-driven	codes	as	well	as	more	
theory-driven	ones	derived	from	the	various	analytical	frameworks	used	(Fereday	and	
Muir-Cochrane,	2006).	In	some	instances,	such	as	the	analysis	of	discursive	practices	in	
chapter	3	or	the	evaluation	of	polycentric	governance	in	chapter	5,	a	stricter	inductive	
methodology	 (e.g.	 grounded	 theory)	 could	have	produced	more	extensive	and	novel	
theory-building	 insights	 (Charmaz,	 2014).	 However,	 in	 both	 instances,	 and	 to	 some	
extent	in	this	concluding	discussion	of	the	findings,	the	intention	was	to	test	the	value	
of	 current	 theoretical	 propositions	 about	 power	 and	 agency	 –	 and	 the	 analytical	
frameworks	available	for	studying	them	–	rather	than	to	generate	new	ones.	
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6.4.2. Unanswered	questions	
Three	prominent	and	widely	relevant	themes	emerged	that	warrant	further	research.	
First,	the	ambivalent	role	of	the	state	in	facilitating	polycentric	policy	and	governance	
needs	 attention.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 structural	 barriers	 identified	 in	 the	UK	 case	 (e.g.	
departmental	 power	 relations	 and	 resource	 constraints),	 a	 more	 fundamental	 issue	
emerged	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 state’s	 rationale	 for	 engaging	 with	 non-central	
governance	 actors.	 Whether	 government	 actors	 see	 non-state	 and	 hybrid	 forms	 of	
governance	as	an	opportunity	for	empowering	bottom-up	initiatives	or	as	a	means	of	
achieving	their	own	goals	through	more	prosaic	forms	of	power	is	pivotal.	As	the	fields	
of	polycentric	governance	and	governmentality	continue	to	grow,	more	research	that	
brings	 their	 assumptions	 into	 dialogue	 would	 be	 of	 interest.	 Instead	 of	 de	 facto	
assuming	 localism	 to	 be	 good	 and	 neoliberalism	 to	 be	 bad,	 future	 research	 should	
track	 the	way	 these	agendas	alter	 relations	between	governance	actors	de	 jeur	 and,	
more	 normatively,	 look	 for	 ways	 to	 expose	 and	 challenge	 the	 rationale	 behind	
inadequate	climate	policies	and	governance	arrangements.	
Second,	 and	 following	 on	 from	 the	 above,	 the	 role	 of	 flagship	 policies	 such	 as	
strategies	and	targets	needs	to	be	understood	 in	more	political	 terms.	Policy	science	
and	 public	 administration	 is	 often	 concerned	 with	 measuring	 the	 efficacy	 of	 policy	
implementation.	However,	governments	remain	reluctant	to	carry	out	comprehensive	
ex	post	analyses	and	 the	 increasingly	 technocratic	approach	 to	policymaking	enables	
adjustments	 to	 targets	 and	 metrics	 to	 be	 depoliticised.	 Thus,	 the	 symbolic	 and	
strategic	nature	of	policy	targets	needs	greater	attention.	For	instance:	
• Who	has	the	authority	to	set	and	revise	targets?		
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• What	power	do	monitoring	agencies	have	in	theory	and	in	practice?	
• Can	the	drivers	of	an	implementation	gap	be	identified	and	addressed?		
• Who	is	accountable	when	targets	are	missed?	
Third,	 processes	 for	 involving	multiple	 perspectives	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	 shared	
narrative	of	social	change	need	to	be	explored.	Distinct	 from	the	grand	narratives	of	
political	ideology,	the	visioning	of	a	climate	compatible	future	should	begin	from	non-
partisan	 foundations.	 If	 the	 general	 public	 and	 politicians	 are	 to	 support	 policies	 in	
pursuit	of	such	a	vision	–	especially	when	their	lives	are	altered	and	their	interests	are	
challenged	 –	 they	 will	 need	 to	 have	 had	 sufficient	 input	 to	 develop	 a	 sense	 of	
ownership	 and	 continued	 commitment	 during	 turbulent	 times.	 Thus,	 questions	 of	
deliberative	democracy,	devolved	governance,	and	 inclusive	forms	of	communication	
are	paramount.	For	instance:	
• How	are	competing	interests	and	contradictory	policy	goals	managed?	
• How	are	different	‘official’	messages	from	different	sectors	of	society	brought	
together?	
• Who	gets	to	shape	government	messages	and	how	are	these	interpreted?		
• Which	forms	of	communication	are	most	effective	for	generating	dialogue	and	
avoiding	zero-sum	interest	based	politics?	
Finally,	with	regards	to	the	UK	case,	a	number	of	specific	questions	about	the	future	of	
climate	policy	need	 to	be	addressed	 through	 further	 research	and	dialogue	with	 the	
climate	policy	community.	These	include:	
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• How	can	the	CCC	and	the	climate	policy	community	raise	awareness	about	the	
growing	 implementation	 gap	 without	 undermining	 the	 UK’s	 leadership	
position,	and	how	can	they	secure	political	support	for	the	policies	needed	to	
fill	this	gap?	
• What	are	the	consequences	of	 leaving	the	EU	and	disbanding	DECC,	and	how	
can	policymakers	now	ensure	that	climate	goals	are	prioritised	within	energy,	
industry	and	other	sectors?	
• Will	it	be	possible	to	recreate	a	competitive	consensus	among	political	parties	
and	 senior	 decision-makers,	 or	 is	 another	 type	of	 strategy	needed,	 and	what	
external	 drivers	 can	 these	 efforts	 harness	 e.g.	 the	 devolution	 agenda	 and	
negotiating	leaving	the	EU?	
6.5. Conclusions	
This	thesis	set	out	to	make	a	number	of	contributions	to	the	pressing	debate	of	how	to	
govern	social	change	towards	a	low-carbon	future.	Far	from	being	a	normative	set	of	
prescriptions	about	how	to	manage	a	particular	transition,	the	main	aim	was	to	draw	
lessons	from	a	case	study	in	order	to	troubleshoot	and	provide	useful	insights	into	the	
numerous	barriers	and	opportunities	that	can	be	anticipated	along	the	way.		
Nation	 states	 and	 their	 national	 governments	 continue	 to	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 this	
process.	 In	 fact,	 one	 of	 the	 central	 stories	 of	 this	 thesis	 was	 the	 way	 the	 state	 –	
represented	 by	 three	 different	 UK	 Governments	 between	 2006	 and	 2016	 –	 has	
exercised	 its	 authority	 and	 sought	 to	 adapt	 to	 the	 challenges	 of	 governing	 during	 a	
turbulent	economic	and	political	period.	The	other	central	story	was	the	way	society	
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more	 broadly	 is	 responding	 to	 the	 challenges	 of	 mitigating	 anthropogenic	 climate	
change.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 thesis	 brought	 much	 needed	 consideration	 to	 the	 way	
climate	 politics	 (in	 the	 abstract)	 has	 become	 disconnected	 from	 the	 political	
implications	of	transforming	multiple	sectors	of	society.	
Broadly	speaking,	the	theoretical	contributions	and	innovations	of	this	thesis	brought	
the	fields	of	sustainability	transitions	and	political	science	into	a	closer	dialogue.	Some	
of	 the	 key	 limitations	 and	 blind	 spots	 of	 systems-based	 theories	 of	 transitions	were	
identified	and	remedied	using	social	theories	of	power	and	agency.	The	ideational	and	
structural	 processes	 that	 enable	 vested	 interests	 to	 resist	 –	 or	 at	 least	 delay	 –	
fundamental	 social	 change	 were	 enumerated.	 The	 malleability	 of	 institutionalised	
ideas	 about	 governing	 climate	 change	 throughout	 this	 process	 was	 also	 illustrated,	
using	a	novel	combination	of	theories	about	power	and	discourse.		
A	number	of	analytical	frameworks	were	discussed,	tested	and	critically	reconsidered.	
This	included	the	increasingly	relevant	policy	dismantling	framework	that	tracks	policy	
change	 during	 periods	 of	 austerity	 as	 well	 as	 the	 broad	 church	 of	 polycentric	
governance	that	offers	guiding	principles	for	advancing	climate	innovations	beyond	the	
nation	state.		
Empirically,	 a	 number	 of	 hypotheses	 about	 climate	 politics,	 policy	 and	 governance	
were	 explored.	 Assumptions	 about	 the	 longevity	 and	 influence	 of	 flagship	 policies	
were	challenged,	partly	as	a	result	of	an	apparent	lack	of	political	will,	contrary	to	the	
official	 discourses	 of	 government	 leadership	 and	 commitment	 to	 a	 low-carbon	
transition.	The	negative	effects	of	this	political	gap	were	compounded	by	a	concurrent	
–	 and	 not	 unrelated	 –	 decline	 of	 political/public	 salience	 and	 the	 pressures	 of	 a	
		
245	
prolonged	 economic	 depression.	 By	 closely	 tracking	 the	 institutional,	 and	 inter-
personal,	 processes	 through	 which	 these	 factors	 affected	 policymaking,	 the	 thesis	
raised	some	critical	questions	about	the	inherent	limitations	of	state-led	responses	to	
climate	change;	at	both	a	discursive	and	policy	level.		
Although	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	 these	 discursive	 and	 policy	 practices	 were	
enumerated	in	the	case	of	renewable	energy,	some	positive	trends	were	identified	in	
other	 areas.	 The	 double-edged	 sword	 of	 devolution	 and	 new	 forms	 of	 governance	
revealed	high	levels	of	ambition	in	non-central	government	sites	of	authority	such	as	
city	networks	and	 local	communities.	But	these	were	tempered	by	relations	with	the	
state	and	by	many	of	the	same	economic	pressures	faced	by	central	government.	As	
the	UK’s	claim	to	being	a	climate	leader	has	weakened	and	its	relationship	with	other	
low-carbon	pioneers,	 such	as	 the	European	Union	and	 the	 renewable	energy	 sector,	
has	 grown	uncertain,	 this	 case	 study	has	 raised	 some	 crucial	 questions	 (and	offered	
some	 useful	 insights)	 about	 the	 efficacy	 of	 different	 political	 strategies	 for	 tackling	
climate	change.		
The	 conclusions	 and	 recommendations	 of	 this	 thesis	 rest	 on	 a	 novel,	 extensive	 and	
highly	relevant	evidence-base.	 In-depth	interviews	with	high	level	political	actors	and	
those	involved	in	the	wider	climate	policy	community	yielded	some	very	informed	and	
contextualised	interpretations	of	how	the	thoughts	and	actions	of	decision	makers	had	
shaped	UK	climate	policy	in	recent	times.	A	mixture	of	partisan,	professional,	strategic	
and	operational	perspectives	 from	government	provided	a	comprehensive	picture	of	
the	policymaking	process.	Whilst	non-government	actors	and	those	on	the	 fringes	of	
policymaking	 –	 who	 are	 no	 less	 important	 due	 to	 their	 advisory,	 lobbying	 and	
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communicating	 activities	 –	 also	 meant	 that	 the	 case	 study	 was	 not	 entirely	 state-
centric.	 The	 three	 co-production	workshops	 brought	 these	 interactions	 between	 the	
climate	 policy	 community	 to	 life,	 and	 offered	 insights	 into	 their	 strategies	 for	
addressing	future	challenges	such	as	negotiating	leaving	the	EU	and	fostering	a	more	
inclusive	 narrative	 for	 the	 low-carbon	 transition.	 Finally,	 documentary	 evidence	was	
used	throughout	the	research	as	a	constant	counterpoint	for	triangulating	the	claims	
and	 interpretations	 of	 interviewees.	 It	 also	 underpinned	 much	 of	 the	 discourse	
analysis	and	policy	output	analysis.	
Lastly,	as	 this	discussion	chapter	has	made	clear,	 there	 is	much	more	 to	be	said	and	
done	 with	 regards	 to	 governments	 and	 their	 mediating	 role	 between	 society	 and	
climate	change.	Structural	limitations	and	the	negative	effects	of	partisan	politics	and	
certain	policymaking	processes	have	been	highlighted.	Remedies	for	these	have	been	
discussed	 in	 the	 literature	 but	 as	 the	 low-hanging	 fruit	 begins	 to	 dwindle	 and	 these	
strategies	 continue	 to	 fall	 short	 of	 their	 goals	 then	 the	need	 for	more	 innovative	 or	
radical	 solutions	will	grow.	Partly	 in	anticipation	of	 these	more	drastic	decisions,	but	
also	partly	in	response	to	a	recurring	theme	of	a	‘democratic-deficit’	in	climate	politics,	
the	most	important	task	that	this	thesis	sets	out	for	future	researchers	and	governance	
actors	 is	to	diversify	the	range	of	 low-carbon	futures	we	are	working	towards	and	to	
ensure	 that	 more	 people	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 discuss	 and	 direct	 our	 pathways	
towards	them.			
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7. Appendix	
A. Interview	invitation	
Invitation	to	participate	in	research	on	UK	climate	policy	
You	are	being	 invited	 to	participate	 in	a	doctoral	 research	project.	Please	 read	 the	 following	
information	carefully	and	consider	whether	you	wish	to	take	part.	
The	Project	
This	 research	 aims	 to	 explore	 how	 and	why	 climate	 policy	 in	 the	UK	 has	 changed	 since	 the	
passing	of	the	Climate	Change	Act	in	2008.	By	collecting	the	views	of	policy	actors,	civil	society	
and	 private	 enterprises	 and	 combining	 these	 with	 a	 detailed	 look	 at	 policy	 documents	 it	 is	
hoped	 that	 we	 can	 better	 understand	 how	 to	 achieve	 ambitious	mitigation	 and	 adaptation	
goals.	The	research	is	funded	by	the	Economic	and	Social	Research	Council.		
Your	Role	
As	someone	identified	as	being	a	stakeholder	in	UK	climate	policy	we	would	like	to	hear	your	
thoughts	on	a	number	of	 issues.	We	would	 like	 to	conduct	a	one-to-one	 interview	with	you,	
lasting	up	 to	an	hour,	and	taking	place	at	a	 time	and	place	 to	suit	you.	This	can	be	done	via	
phone,	 over	 Skype	 or	 in	 person	 and	 will	 involve	 a	 simple	 mind	 map	 and	 timeline	 drawing	
exercise.	The	interview	will	be	an	informal	discussion	designed	to	gather	your	professional	and	
personal	 opinions	 and	 you	 have	 the	 right	 not	 to	 comment	 or	 to	 end	 the	 discussion	 at	 any	
point.	
Data	Protection	
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The	interview	will	be	recorded	and	transcribed	but	only	the	immediate	research	team	will	have	
access.	 Recordings	 and	 transcripts	 will	 be	 completely	 anonymised	 so	 that	 your	 name	 or	
anything	that	could	affiliate	you	with	the	information	you	share	with	us	is	kept	separately.	We	
may	need	to	contact	you	 in	 the	 future	 to	seek	permission	 to	use	particular	quotes	you	have	
given	 or	 to	 discuss	 future	 research.	 Your	 contact	 details	 and	 interview	 data	 will	 be	 stored	
securely	at	the	University	of	Leeds	for	up	to	5	years	but	you	have	the	right	to	request	for	it	to	
be	erased	at	any	point.	However,	if	you	decide	you	do	not	want	your	interview	to	be	included	
in	the	research	you	will	need	to	let	us	know	before	analysis	has	begun	(1st	August	2015).	
To	arrange	an	interview	or	for	further	information	please	contact	the	
primary	researcher	via	the	contact	details	above.	 	
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B. Example	interview	protocol	
Interview	Skeleton	
Your	Position	
• Individually	and	as	an	organization:	
• What	are	you	trying	to	achieve	and	how?	
o Problematisation	
• Who	else	do	you	work	with	to	achieve	this	and	how?	
o Professional	and	political	coalitions	
• What	external	factors	affect	your	capacity/strategy?	
o Economics	
o Politics	
o Media	
	
The	Government’s	Position	
• What	have	been	the	major	changes	in	climate	policy	/	governance	since	2008?	
o Discourse	
o Practice	
• What	have	been	the	most	influential	factors	in	this?	
o People	
o Events	
o Publications	
o Media	
• How	is	the	government	implementing	their	policies?	
o Style	of	governing	
o Assumptions	
Practice	
• How	does	policy	affect	what	you	do?	
o Oversight	
o Targets	
o Metrics	
o Capacity	
• Have	you	been	able	to	influence	the	policy	process	at	any	stage?	
o Direct	involvement	
o Giving	evidence	
o Lobbying	
• What	has	this	meant	for	your	outputs/achievements?	
o Strategy
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C. Example	workshop	briefing	note	
Innovations	in	Climate	Policy	
2nd	Workshop	Brief	
Overview	
The	first	workshop	in	this	series	considered	the	scope	for	policy	innovations	relating	to	
the	social	dimensions	of	climate	change	in	areas	including	energy,	heating,	food	and	
water.	This	second	workshop	develops	some	of	the	key	ideas	that	emerged	from	the	
previous	discussion	by	focusing	in	more	detail	on	the	scope	for	policy	innovations	in	
three	related	areas;	communications	strategies,	innovative	information	technologies	
and	policy	integration	and	learning.	In	each	case,	we	have	identified	an	overarching	
question	that	will	be	addressed	by	expert	speakers	and	through	open	discussion	and	
working	groups.	The	outcomes	will	inform	the	specific	policy	recommendations	to	be	
developed	in	the	final	workshop	in	the	series.	
Climate	communications	
Question:	How	could	a	long-term	communications	and	engagement	strategy	on	
climate	change	build	public	support	for	transitions	to	a	low	carbon/climate	resilient	
society	and	help	to	enable	informed	and	targeted	policy	interventions?		
	
Discussion	primer	
Transitions	towards	a	low	carbon,	climate	resilient	future	could	have	profound	
implications	for	many	areas	of	social	and	economic	life.	But	it	is	not	clear	that	‘the	
public’	are	sufficiently	aware	of	what	the	implications	might	be	or	have	actively	signed	
up	to	support	all	elements	of	the	transition,	particularly	in	the	longer	term.	How	could	
DECC	(with	regards	to	mitigation)	and	DEFRA	(with	regards	to	adaptation)	best	engage	
with	the	public	and	policymakers	across	government	to	build	support	for	ambitious	or	
demanding	climate	targets	over	the	long	term?	Does	government	need	to	lead	on	this	
or	could	a	broader	coalition	of	influencers	be	developed?	Would	this	turn	into	an	
advocacy	exercise,	or	could	more	independent	bodies	or	groups	lead	the	
communication	and	engagement	process?	Are	there	other	related	strategies	or	
initiatives	that	could	inform	a	longer-term	strategic	climate	communications	initiative?		
How	could	such	an	initiative	tailor	its	activities	to	fit	with	the	particular	needs	of	
different	groups	at	different	times?	What	is	the	right	balance	between	appeals	to	
collective	action	and	more	individualised	interests?		
	
Speaker:	REDACTED	
Working	group:	Climate	policy	relating	to	both	mitigation	and	adaptation		
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Information	and	sustainable	production	and	consumption	
Question:	How	could	new	technology	and	new	forms	and	flows	of	information	
transform	the	sustainability	of	production	and	consumption,	and	what	are	the	
implications	for	policy	and	governance?	
	
Discussion	Primer	
We	live	in	an	information	age	where	new	technologies	are	creating	a	proliferation	of	
new	forms	and	flows	of	information.	Some	new	information	based	technologies	–	such	
as	Uber	in	the	transport	realm	-	have	the	potential	to	disrupt	established	patterns	of	
production	and	consumption	and	to	replace	them	with	radically	different	alternatives.	
Others	–	such	as	wearable	health	devices	-	clearly	create	new	opportunities	for	
different	actors	and	for	individuals	themselves	to	‘govern’	aspects	of	life	that	were	
previously	invisible	or	out	of	reach.	Should,	or	could,	policy	harness	some	of	the	
transformative	powers	of	such	innovations	to	deliver	public	interest	objectives	in	new	
ways?	Could	new	forms	of	(big	or	real-time)	data	create	possibilities	for	new	forms	of	
monitoring	(e.g.	of	food	standards)	or	for	more	targeted	forms	of	intervention	(e.g.	of	
food	production	or	consumption)?	Can	we	predict	the	areas	where	new	technologies	
and	new	forms	of	information	could	have	a	deeper	and	more	transformative	effect	
and	those	where	they	may	have	a	more	superficial	or	temporary	effect?	Do	we	need	to	
govern	the	technologies	themselves	and	the	information	that	they	generate	rather	
than	the	activities	that	have	been	the	traditional	focus	of	policy?	Are	there	some	areas	
that	will	or	that	should	continue	to	be	outside	the	reach	of	‘governance	through	
information’?	
	
Speaker:	REDACTED	
Working	group:	Food	policy	with	particular	reference	to	food	labelling	
	
Complexity,	policy	integration	and	learning	
Question:	How	could	a	better	understanding	of	the	complex	drivers	of	-	and	multiple	
policy	influences	on	–	different	forms	of	behaviour	enable	more	joined	up,	effective	
and	efficient	policy	interventions?	
	
Discussion	primer	
Social	behaviour	emerges	as	the	result	of	the	collective	influence	of	a	vast	‘cocktail’	of	
different	factors,	some	of	which	are	policy	related	and	many	of	which	are	not.	Would	a	
fuller	understanding	of	the	complexity	of	these	factors	and	the	way	that	they	interact	
enable	us	to	target	the	key	drivers	of	some	behaviours	more	effectively?	What	role	
could	be	played	by	new	types	of	bottom-up	policy	evaluation	–	perhaps	informed	by	
big	data	or	new	framings	and	methodologies	–	in	this	process?	Might	policy	learning	be	
encouraged	if	the	gap	between	somewhat	speculative	ex	ante	assessments	(such	as	
those	in	Regulatory	Impact	Assessments)	and	more	empirically	grounded	ex	post	policy	
appraisals	was	closed?	Could	this	enable	environmental	problems	to	be	addressed	at	
source	through	joined-up,	integrated	approaches	to	policy	and	would	this	be	more	
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effective	and	efficient	than	more	fragmented	and	reactive	approaches?	Are	there	
instances	where	policy	integration	has	successfully	reduced	the	need	for	reactive	
policies	or	is	the	goal	of	coordinating	across	policy	domains	often	impossible	to	
realise?		
	
Speaker:	REDACTED	
Working	group:	Energy	policy	with	illustration	from	REDACTED	
	
	
